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BACK FROM THE MARGINS: AN ENVIRONMENTAL





The law governing private cleanup cost disputes is in disarray. For
over twenty years, owners of contaminated property voluntarily cleaned
up pollution caused by others in reliance on a federal law right under
CERCLA to recover from those who contributed to the contamination
their fair share of cleanup costs. That changed with the US. Supreme
Court's decision in Cooper Industries v. Aviall Services, Inc. Aviall held
that liable persons under CERCLA (such as the current owners of con-
taminated property) who voluntarily incur cleanup costs cannot sue for
contribution under CERCLA, calling into question any future role for
federal law in most private cleanup cost disputes. Current state law fails
to offer a meaningful alternative to federal law for allocating cleanup
costs at many of the nation's hundreds of thousands of contaminated
sites. This need not be so.
Private nuisance is a flexible doctrine that is potentially well-suited
for resolving cleanup cost allocation disputes. Doctrinal limitations and
inter-state inconsistencies, however, currently shackle private nuisance
law and prevent its application to many common problems involving
contaminated property. CERCLA has pushed nuisance and other state
law theories to the margins of private cleanup cost litigation. After Avi-
all, private nuisance could emerge to play a major role in resolving pri-
vate cleanup cost disputes, but only if states seize the opportunity to re-
examine and modernize the law of private nuisance in soil and ground-
water contamination cases. This article analyzes the deficiencies that
currently riddle private nuisance law and proposes an environmental
nuisance paradigm. The paradigm would expand private nuisance law
to address contamination created by prior property owners and encour-
age site cleanup through a rebuttable presumption that chemical con-
tamination constitutes a continuing nuisance that remains actionable
until the contamination is abated.
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sity of California, Berkeley. A.B., 1977, University of California, Berkeley. The author thanks
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INTRODUCTION
The law governing private cleanup cost disputes is in disarray. The
U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Cooper Industries, Inc. v. Aviall Ser-
vices, Inc. (Aviall),1 called into question the availability of federal
cleanup cost contribution rights under the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA).2 In Aviall, the
Court held that a potentially responsible party (PRP) 3 who voluntarily
spent millions of dollars in cleanup costs could not use CERCLA's con-
tribution provision 4 to recover from another PRP who caused much of
the contamination its fair share of cleanup costs. 5 In so doing, Aviall cast
6doubt on the future role of federal law in private cleanup cost disputes.
1. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
2. Pub. Law No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (1980) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601-
9675 (West 2006)). CERCLA is sometimes referred to as the "Superfund" statute. See infra notes
42-63 and accompanying text.
3. Individuals or entities falling within one of the four categories of "covered persons" set
forth in (CERCLA sections 107(a)(1)-(4)), are often referred to as PRPs. See infra notes 46-51 and
accompanying text.
4. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(f(1).
5. Aviall, 543 U.S. at 167. See infra notes 77-83 and accompanying text; see also Ronald G.
Aronovsky, Federalism and CERCLA: Re-Thinking the Role of Federal Law in Private Cleanup
Cost Disputes, 33 ECOLOGY L. Q. 1, 45-50 (2006) (discussing the Aviall decision).
6. As used in this article, the phrase "private cleanup cost disputes" refers to disputes be-
tween private parties regarding the allocation of contaminated property cleanup cost responsibilities.
These disputes may concern reimbursement (by a direct action for damages or a derivative action for
contribution) by a PRP of its fair share of cleanup costs already expended by a current landowner or
2006]
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The absence of a federal cleanup cost contribution right, of course,
would not implicate major national environmental policy concerns if
PRPs could recover cleanup costs from other PRPs under state law. Of-
ten, however, no such state law remedy is available. 7 It should be. Pri-
vate nuisance is potentially well suited for resolving contaminated prop-
erty cleanup cost allocation disputes. Doctrinal limitations and inter-
state inconsistencies, however, currently shackle private nuisance law by
restricting its application to neighboring land use disputes and shielding
from liability a defendant's continued failure to abate long-standing con-
tamination.
Indeed, the inadequacies of nuisance law (and other state law theo-
ries) helped inspire CERCLA's passage in 1980 to provide for the reme-
diation of contaminated sites.8  For over two decades, CERCLA pushed
nuisance and other state law theories to the margins of private cleanup
cost litigation as the owners of contaminated property and other PRPs
voluntarily incurred cleanup costs in reliance on CERCLA cleanup cost
contribution rights. Aviall proved this reliance was misplaced. The
states should seize the opportunity created by Aviall to modernize the
law of private nuisance by eliminating anachronistic limitations that cur-
rently prevent it from playing a vital role in common cleanup cost alloca-
tion disputes.
States should not ignore this opportunity. The underlying problem
is significant: there are hundreds of thousands of contaminated sites
across the United States 9 that will cost hundreds of billions of dollars to
remediate.10 Voluntary cleanup of these sites is essential because state
and federal government agencies lack the resources either to directly
remediate the pollution at these sites or force private parties to clean
them up by prosecuting thousands of regulatory cleanup obligation en-
forcement lawsuits." Cleanup cost recovery rights are crucial to pro-
moting voluntarily remediation 12 because at most sites more than one
PRP contributed to site contamination. 13
other PRP. They may also concern the allocation of future cleanup cost responsibilities, including
claims for (a) damages covering future cleanup costs, (b) declaratory relief allocating future cleanup
cost responsibilities, or (c) injunctive relief directing one or more PRPs to remediate contamination.
7. See infra notes 150-360 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 35-41 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 20-23 and accompanying text.
10. See infra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
11. See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 42-43, 56-57. As used in this article, the phrase "volun-
tary cleanups" refers to remediation undertaken by a private party short of a court order, i.e., at the
party's own initiative or at the direction of a regulatory agency.
12. See James B. Brown & Michael V. Sucaet, Environmental Cleanup Efficiency: Private
Recovery Actions for Environmental Response Costs, 7 T.M. COOLEY L. REV. 363, 387 (1990) ("A
liable party is more likely to expend cleanup funds if it is reasonably certain that response costs
expended on contamination may be recovered. Moreover, a PRP armed with knowledge of legal
rights against others is more likely to initiate a prompt cleanup."); cf Andrew R. Klein, Hazardous
Waste Cleanup and Intermediate Landowners: Reexamining the Liability-Based Approach, 21
[Vol. 84:2
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Cleanup cost contribution is particularly important for owners of
contaminated property. Current landowners typically bear regulatory
responsibility to clean up their property, including pollution caused by
others. 14 Cleanup cost contribution rights thus can affect both the incen-
tive of current property owners to voluntarily take the lead in site cleanup
short of government enforcement action and the fairness of cleanup cost
responsibility allocation.
This article proposes an environmental nuisance paradigm 5 that
would allow private nuisance to play a significant role in allocating the
costs of cleaning up the nation's polluted soil and groundwater. This
paradigm, if adopted by state courts or legislatures, would transform the
ancient law of nuisance to meet the realities of modem contamination
disputes in the following respects. First, it would permit private nuisance
claims against the former owners of contaminated property, not just
neighboring owners. Second, it would eliminate the antiquated doctrine
of caveat emptor as a defense to former owner nuisance liability while
continuing to allow market-related factors to affect nuisance remedies.
Third, it would revitalize the continuing nuisance doctrine by basing it on
a defendant's continued failure to abate the soil or groundwater contami-
nation caused by the defendant. Finally, it would create a rebuttable pre-
sumption that soil and groundwater contamination constitutes a continu-
ing nuisance by placing on any party contending that the contamination
was a permanent nuisance the burden of proving that the contamination
could not reasonably be abated.
Under this paradigm, private nuisance claims would compliment
any private cleanup cost remedies remaining under CERCLA after Avi-
all. The inadequacy of current state law requires a uniform federal rem-
edy to ensure nationwide availability of contribution rights for PRPs who
voluntarily incur cleanup costs. 16 Such a CERCLA "safety net" remedy,
HARV. ENVTL. L. REv. 337, 346 (1997) (noting that "[j]oint and several liability, in particular, can
lead to PRPs facing exposure far out of proportion to any damage they actually caused").
13. See, e.g., ENVTL. LAW INST., AN ANALYSIS OF STATE SUPERFUND PROGRAMS: 50 STATE
STUDY, 1998 UPDATE 33 ("Most hazardous substance sites have more than one potentially responsi-
ble party."); see also Key Tronic Corp. v. United States, 511 U.S. 809, 819 n. 13 (1994) ("CERCLA
is designed to encourage private parties to assume financial responsibility of cleanup by allowing
them to seek recovery from others."); At. Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827, 836 (8th
Cir. 2006) ("Contribution is crucial to CERCLA's regulatory scheme.").
14. For example, CERCLA section 107(a)(1) imposes response cost liability on the current
owner of contaminated property even if the current owner did not cause any of the site contamina-
tion. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(1) (West 2006).
15. As used in this article, the phrase "environmental nuisance paradigm" refers to a model
framework for private nuisance claims regarding the allocation of remediation or cleanup cost re-
sponsibilities for soil or groundwater contamination of plaintiff's property.
16. In Aronovsky, supra note 5, from which some background information in this article is
drawn, I argue that while significant litigation and remedial efficiency and flexibility interests could
be served if state law provided the primary source for rules of decision in private cleanup cost dis-
putes (as described infra at notes 133-48 and accompanying text), a federal "safety net" cleanup cost
remedy for all PRPs is necessary because of the inconsistencies and doctrinal limitations of current
state law. Aronovsky, supra note 5 at 68-79. This article addresses how private nuisance law, as
20061
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however, would not necessarily provide a rule of decision superior to
private nuisance law in contaminated property disputes. To the contrary,
the proposed paradigm for private nuisance law could: (a) facilitate
prompt site remediation through the presumption that the contamination
can be abated; (b) create incentives for informal cleanup cost dispute
resolution by expanding current landowner cleanup cost rights; (c) pro-
mote efficiency by permitting all contaminated property related claims
be resolved under a common body of state law; and (d) encourage flexi-
bility by allowing PRPs to pursue technically sound, cost-effective
cleanups.17 The paradigm's benefits thus extend far beyond addressing
the aftermath of Aviall. At some point, the uncertainty created by Aviall
about the availability of PRP cost recovery rights under CERCLA will be
resolved by federal legislation or case law.' 8  Whether or not all PRPs
ultimately come to enjoy a federal right to cleanup cost contribution,
states should adopt the proposed environmental nuisance paradigm to
promote litigation and remedial efficiency and flexibility.
This article argues that states should adopt this proposed paradigm
by statute or case law. Part I describes the contaminated property prob-
lem facing the United States, the emergence of CERCLA in the 1980s as
the primary rule of decision in private cleanup cost disputes, and the un-
certain future role of federal law in contaminated property litigation after
Aviall.19 Part II evaluates current nuisance law as applied to private
cleanup cost disputes (including an analysis of its doctrinal and practical
limitations) and argues that states should seize the opportunity caused by
post-Aviall uncertainty to claim a significant role for private nuisance
law in cleanup cost disputes. Part III proposes the means to accomplish
this goal through adoption of the proposed environmental nuisance para-
digm, and analyzes how the paradigm would expand cleanup cost reme-
dies for the current owner of contaminated property, encourage prompt
and efficient site remediation, and promote the informal resolution of
cleanup cost disputes.
revitalized by adoption of the proposed environmental nuisance paradigm, could serve these effi-
ciency and flexibility goals and offer a meaningful (if not superior) alternative to a CERCLA "safety
net" remedy for current owners of contaminated property.
17. For example, the right to recover cleanup costs under a private nuisance theory would not
be dependent on a current landowner plaintiff proving that claimed costs were incurred in a manner
consistent with the National Contingency Plan (NCP), 40 C.F.R. pt. 300 el seq., (2005), a set of U.S.
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) regulations setting forth the often costly and time-
consuming procedures required for conducting a cleanup under CERCLA. See 42 U.S.C.A. §
9607(a)(4)(B) (private party may only recover response costs that are consistent with NCP). See
infra notes 54, 63, 140-45 and accompanying text.
18. See infra notes 88-121, 133-48 and accompanying text.
19. As used in this article, the phrase "primary rule of decision" refers to the body of law most
frequently relied on by private parties to resolve disagreements regarding the allocation of cleanup
costs. For a discussion of the emergence of federal law as the primary rule of decision in private
cleanup cost disputes, see Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 9-35.
[Vol. 84:2
2006] BACK FROM THE MARGINS
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Scope of the Problem
Soil and groundwater contamination is an enormous national prob-
lem. 20 Estimates of the number of contaminated sites throughout the
country reach into the hundreds of thousands, 21 from seriously contami-
nated National Priorities List (NPL)22 sites to properties presenting rela-
tively discrete remediation issues. All levels of government-federal,
state and local-are involved in regulating the investigation and cleanup
of contaminated sites. The United States Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) is actively involved at only a small percentage of the na-
tion's contaminated sites; 23 state and local government authorities serve
as the lead agency at the vast majority of sites. 24 It will take decades to
remediate these sites, costing hundreds of billions of dollars.2 5
20. See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 7-9.
21. The EPA has estimated that approximately 77,000 contaminated sites have been discov-
ered throughout the United States, and that approximately 217,000 additional sites across the country
will eventually be identified. EPA, CLEANING UP THE NATION'S WASTE SITES: MARKETS AND
TECHNOLOGY TRENDS viii (2004), available at http://www.clu-in.org/download/market/2004market.
pdf [hereinafter EPA, CLEANING UP THE NATION'S WASTE SITES]. The EPA estimates that there are
"more than 450,000 brownfields" in the United States. EPA, Brownfields Cleanup and Redevelop-
ment, http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/about.htm (last visited Aug. 31, 2006); accord U.S. GEN.
ACCOUNTING OFFICE, COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT: LOCAL GROWTH ISSUES-FEDERAL
OPPORTUNITIES AND CHALLENGES 118 (2000), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/
rc00178.pdf. CERCLA section 101(39)(A) defines "brownfield" as property, "the expansion, rede-
velopment, or reuse of which may be complicated by the presence or potential presence of a hazard-
ous substance, pollutant, or contaminant." 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(39)(A) (West 2006).
22. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9605(a)(8)(B) (requiring that EPA list "national priorities among the
known or threatened releases of hazardous substances throughout the United States" and "revise the
list no less than annually"). As of October 2006, 1,243 sites were listed on the NPL, with another 61
sites proposed for addition to the NPL. See EPA, NPL Site Totals by Status and Milestone,
http://www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/query/queryhtn/npltotal.htm (last visited Nov. 19, 2006).
23. According to the EPA, the "vast majority" of contaminated sites will be cleaned up under
state (rather than federal) regulatory authority oversight. See EPA, State and Tribal Response Pro-
grams, http://www.epa.gov/swerosps/bf/state tribal.htm (last visited Nov. 7, 2006) (quoting S. REP.
No. 107-2 (2001)) [hereinafter EPA, State and Tribal Response Programs]; see also EPA, CLEANING
UP THE NATION'S WASTE SITES, supra note 21, at viii (estimating that 90% of contaminated sites
will likely be managed under state or underground storage tank programs).
24. EPA, State and Tribal Response Programs, supra note 23; see also Richard L. Revesz,
Federalism and Environmental Regulation: A Public Choice Analysis, 115 HARV. L. REV. 553, 596-
98 (2001) (describing state regulatory agency role at most contaminated sites); Roger D. Schwenke,
Applying and Enforcing Institutional Controls in the Labyrinth of Environmental Requirements - Do
We Need More Than the Restatement of Servitudes to Turn Brownfields Green?, 38 REAL PROP.
PROB. & TR. J. 295, 297 (2003) ("[S]tates are responsible for the bulk of environmental enforcement
activities, including contamination detection, site remediation, and notification requirements.");
Philip Weinberg, Local Environmental Laws: Forging a New Weapon in Environmental Protection,
20 PACE ENVTL. L. REv. 89, 107 (2002) (discussing use of local environmental controls to fill state
and federal regulatory gaps).
25. See, e.g., EPA, CLEANING UP THE NATION'S WASTE SITES, supra note 21, at viii (estimat-
ing that 294,000 sites will need cleanup during the next three decades at a cost of $209 billion).
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At most of the nation's sites more than one PRP contributed to site
contamination.26 A site may have been contaminated by the activities of
successive owners or operators of that property. For example, several
companies may have operated businesses disposing of hazardous wastes
on a parcel of industrial property. Similarly, hundreds or thousands
waste generators may have sent hazardous substances to a landfill. At
other sites, contamination on one parcel may have been caused by the
migration (e.g., in groundwater or surface water, or through the air) of
contaminants from a neighboring parcel. An environmental regulatory
agency will often name the current owner as a respondent on a cleanup
order at multi-PRP sites, requiring the current owner to comply with
regulatory requirements, or risk administrative or judicial enforcement
proceedings as well as severe penalties for non-compliance.27 Private
cleanup cost disputes arise when the current owner or another PRP at a
multi-PRP site incurs cleanup costs in excess of what the PRP perceives
to be its fair share, but is unable to informally obtain reimbursement or
contemporaneous cost contribution from other PRPs.
B. Private Cleanup Cost Disputes Before CERCLA
Before CERCLA was enacted in 1980, federal law did not provide a
private cleanup cost dispute remedy.28 Instead, state law provided the
sole rule of decision governing private disputes regarding the allocation
of responsibility for soil or groundwater contamination. 29 Four common
law theories provided the primary potential bases for private cleanup cost
claims 30 : negligence, 31 nuisance,32 trespass, 33 and strict liability for ultra-
hazardous activity.34
26. ENvTL. LAW INST., AN ANALYSIS OF STATE SUPERFUND PROGRAMS: 50 STATE STUDy,
1998 UPDATE 33 ("Most hazardous substance sites have more than one potentially responsible
party.").
27. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 9606(b)(1) (West 2006) (imposing $25,000 per day fines for non-
compliance absent "sufficient cause"); 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(c)(3) (authorizing treble cost punitive
damages for failure "without sufficient cause" to "properly provide removal or remedial action upon
order of the President" under CERCLA sections 104 or 106).
28. See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 9-12 (discussing legal framework of pre-CERCLA pri-
vate cleanup cost disputes); see also Robert B. Mckinstry, Jr., The Role of State "Little Superfunds"
in Allocation and Indemnity Actions Under the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Act, 5 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 83, 86 (1994) ("Prior to 1980, no federal legislation
existed which addressed past disposals of hazardous wastes; all existing laws were directed only at
regulating current activity."); Steven T. Singer, An Analysis of Common Law and Statutory Remedies
for Hazardous Waste Injuries, 12 RUTGERs L.J. 117, 147 (1980) (before CERCLA, no federal stat-
ute "would support a claim for damages from toxic chemicals").
29. See, e.g., Theodore Baurer, Love Canal: Common Law Approaches to a Modern Tragedy,
11 ENVTL. L. 133 (1980) (discussing common law theories potentially applicable to the Love Canal
site); Singer, supra note 28, at 122-38 (reviewing available common law theories of recovery).
30. Cleanup cost claims (e.g., claims for breach of contract, waste, misrepresentation) also
can arise as a consequence of contractual privity. See Klein, supra note 12, at 374 ("The cause of
action that most directly protects 'vertical' landowners in hazardous waste litigation is fraud."); see
also Ronald G. Aronovsky, Liability Theories in Contaminated Groundwater Litigation, 1 J. ENVTL.
FORENSICS 97, 111-113 (2000) (discussing common law theories).
31. See, e.g., Ewell v. Petro Processors of La., Inc., 364 So.2d 604, 606 (La. Ct. App. 1978)
(defendants negligently permitted toxic waste to leak from disposal pits onto plaintiff's property); P.
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With growing awareness in the 1970s about the extent of the na-
tion's soil and groundwater contamination problems, the perception grew
that existing state law could not adequately address site remediation and
the allocation of cleanup responsibilities.35 Tort law varied dramatically
from state to state. Moreover, for reasons equally applicable today,
common law tort theory often fit poorly with the realities of private
cleanup cost disputes. First, nuisance, trespass, and negligence all re-
quired proof of culpability, 36 while strict liability for ultra hazardous
activity required an unpredictable multi-factored analysis of whether the
defendant's activity was abnormally dangerous.37 Second, common law
tort theories typically required proof that the defendant's conduct caused
plaintiffs damage (e.g. cleanup costs)--a potentially significant eviden-
tiary problem at older contaminated sites. 38  Third, a range of liability
defenses could prevent recovery under common law tort theories. 39 The
Ballantine & Sons v. Pub. Serv. Corp. of N.J., 91 A. 95, 96 (N.J. 1914) (tar products escaping from
defendant's plant leached through soil to groundwater that migrated to plaintiffs well).
32. See, e.g., Assoc. Metals & Minerals Corp. v. Dixon Chem. & Research, Inc., 197 A.2d
569, 580 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1963) (escape of sulfur dust to neighboring property); Helms v.
E. Kan. Oil Co., 169 P. 208, 208-09 (Kan. 1917) (migration of refinery oil and other hazardous
materials to neighboring property).
33. See, e.g., Curry Coal Co. v. M.C. Amoni Co., 266 A.2d 678, 683 (Pa. 1970) (sludge
dumped on ground surface seeped into mine); Burr v. Adam Eidemiller, Inc., 126 A.2d 403, 405-08
(Pa. 1956) (water from defendant's spraying slag pile contaminated plaintiffs underground water
supply); Elsey v. Adirondack & St. Lawrence R.R. Co., 161 N.Y.S. 391, 393 (Sup. Ct. 1916) (sub-
surface migration of pollutants from defendant's railroad embankment to plaintiff's property).
34. See, e.g., Cities Serv. Co. v. State, 312 So. 2d 799, 803 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975) (breach
of waste reservoir damaging public waters); Atlas Chem. Indus., Inc., v. Anderson, 514 S.W.2d 309,
314-15 (Tex. App. 1974), aff'd, 524 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1975) (contaminants released into stream that
crossed plaintiff's land), abrogated by Neely v. Cmty. Prop., Inc., 639 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. 1982). See
generally Alexandra B. Klass, From Reservoirs to Remediation: The Impact of CERCLA on Com-
mon Law Strict Liability Environmental Claims, 39 WAKE FOREST L. REv. 903, 917-18, 934 (2004)
(discussing pre-CERCLA strict liability environmental contamination cases).
35. A House of Representatives report on the CERCLA legislation concluded that: "Existing
state tort laws present a convoluted maze of requirements under which a victim is confronted with a
complex of often unreasonable requirements with regard to theories of causation, limited resources,
statutes of limitations and other roadblocks that make it extremely difficult for a victim to be com-
pensated for damages." H.R. REP. NO. 96-1016, at 63-64 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N.
6119, 6140-41.
36. See infra notes 151, 153, 174 and accompanying text.
37. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 519 (1977) (engaging in an activity which is
abnormally dangerous subjects the actor to strict liability for harm caused to his neighbors resulting
from the abnormally dangerous character of the activity, even though the actor has exercised the
utmost care and has acted without negligence). The Restatement identifies six factors as guidelines
to determine whether an activity is abnormally dangerous:
(a) existence of a high degree of risk of some harm to the person, land or chattels of oth-
ers; (b) likelihood that the harm that results from it will be great; (c) inability to eliminate
the risk by the exercise of reasonable care; (d) extent to which the activity is not a matter
of common usage; (e) inappropriateness of the activity to the place where it is carried on;
and (f) extent to which its value to the community is outweighed by its dangerous attrib-
utes.
Id. § 520.
38. See Gary Milhollin, Long-Term Liability for Environmental Harm, 41 U. PITT. L. REV. 1,
6 (1979) ("Whether the theory is negligence, nuisance or strict liability, the plaintiff must prove that
it was the defendant's act which caused the harm.").
39. These potential liability defenses included the doctrine of caveat emptor, discussed infra
at notes 222-46 and accompanying text.
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statute of limitations in particular often barred private cleanup cost
claims at many sites where contamination occurred decades ago.40 In
sum, by the end of the 1970s, the nation had begun to appreciate the
magnitude of its soil and groundwater contamination problem, and the
inadequacy of the existing state law framework for addressing the prob-
lem. In December 1980, Congress passed CERCLA, which for the next
twenty-five years provided a uniform, nationally applicable rule of deci-
sion for private cleanup cost disputes .4  That is, until the U.S. Supreme
Court decided the Aviall case in 2004.
C. CERCLA
1. CERCLA Liability
The liability scheme established by CERCLA in 1980 dramatically
departed from state law governing cleanup cost disputes.42 CERCLA
liability does not req-aire proof of causation. 43  It imposes status-based,
strict, 44 and retroactive 45 liability on four categories of "covered per-
40. See infra notes 247-59 and accompanying text. The "discovery rule" (tolling the statute
of limitations until plaintiff knows or has reason to know of her claim) may preserve otherwise time-
barred claims involving older contamination problems. See, e.g., McKelvey v. Boeing N. Am., Inc.,
86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 651 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999) (under California law, the period of limitations runs
"without regard to whether the plaintiff is aware of the specific facts... , provided that he has a
Isuspicion of wrongdoing,' which he is charged with once he has 'notice or information of circum-
stances to put a reasonable person on inquiry."' (citations omitted)).
41. See Aronovsky, supra note 5 at 12-35 (discussing evolution of pre-Aviall PRP cleanup
cost claim case law under CERCLA).
42. See Atl. Research Corp. v. United States, 459 F.3d 827, 830 (8th Cir. 2006) (CERCLA,
enacted to encourage timely cleanup of hazardous waste sites and place cleanup costs on those
responsible for contamination, "effectively transformed centuries of real property and tort liability
law by making those who contaminate a site strictly liable for the costs of subsequent cleanup by
others."); see also Ronald G. Aronovsky & Lynn D. Fuller, Liability of Parent Corporations for
Hazardous Substance Releases Under CERCLA, 24 U.S.F. L. REv. 421, 425-26 (1990) (describing
enactment of CERCLA).
43. See, e.g., Kalamazoo River Study Group v. Menosha Corp., 228 F.3d 648, 656-57 (6th
Cir. 2000). However, a defendant may show a lack of causation as part of a divisibility affirmative
defense. Id.; see also infra notes 60, 71 and accompanying text. CERCLA section 107(b) provides
a "covered person," including the current landowner who did not contribute to site contamination,
with only three affirmative defenses to liability: (1) act of God; (2) act of war; or (3) act of a third
party. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9607(b)(l)-(4) (West 2006). Equitable defenses (e.g., laches, estoppel) do
not bar CERCLA liability. See, e.g., W. Props. SerV. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 358 F.3d 678, 692-93
(9th Cir. 2004) ("[E]quitable defenses such as laches are not available as a bar to section 107(a)
liability"). CERCLA also exempts certain activities from liability. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 96070)
(federally permitted releases); 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(i) (federally registered pesticide discharges); 42
U.S.C.A. § 9607(d) (persons acting pursuant to the NCP or following orders given by an on-site
response coordinator appointed under the NCP). In 2002, Congress added two narrow affirmative
defenses to CERCLA liability, found in sections 107(o) (de micromis generators of waste at NPL
sites before April 1, 2001) and 107(q) (certain owners or operators of properties contiguous to up-
gradient contamination sources).
44. See, e.g., New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985) ("Con-
gress intended that responsible parties be held strictly liable ....").
45. See, e.g., United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 315 F.3d 179, 188-89 (2d Cir. 2003)
(holding that CERCLA liability is retroactive and that application of retroactive CERCLA liability is
constitutional), cert. denied, 540 U.S. 1103 (2004).
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sons:" 46 (1) the current owner and operator 47 of contaminated property;
48
(2) anyone who owned or operated contaminated property when it was
polluted; 49 (3) anyone who arranged to dispose of hazardous substances
on another's property; 50 and (4) anyone who transported a hazardous
substance to the contaminated property. 5' CERCLA applies to the re-
lease or threatened release of "hazardous substances," a broadly defined
term covering a wide variety of pollutants.52 Petroleum, however, is
expressly excluded from CERCLA's definition of "hazardous sub-
stances. 53 The national contingency plan (NCP),54 a set of EPA regula-




CERCLA provides regulatory agencies with several enforcement
remedies. EPA may issue a unilateral administrative order requiring a
PRP (i.e., a CERCLA covered person 56) to undertake specific remedia-
46. CERCLA section 107(a)(l)-(4) identifies the four categories of covered persons. 42
U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(l)-(4).
47. CERCLA defines the "owner or operator" of a facility as "any person owning or operating
such facility," excluding "a person who, without participating in the management of a vessel or
facility, holds indicia of ownership primarily to protect his security interest in the . . . facility."
42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(20)(A).
48. Section 107(a)(1) imposes liability on the current owner or operator of a "facility." 42
U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(1). Section 101(9)(B) broadly defines "facility" to include "any site or area
where a hazardous substance has been deposited, stored, disposed of or placed, or otherwise come to
be located [except] any consumer product in consumer use or any vessel." 42 U.S.C.A. §
9601(9)(B). Liability under section 107(a)(1) applies to a current owner of contaminated property
without regard to whether the current owner caused any site contamination. 42 U.S.C.A. §§
9601(9)(B), 9607(a)(1).
49. Section 107(a)(2) imposes liability on "any person who at the time of disposal of any
hazardous substance owned or operated any facility at which such hazardous substances were dis-
posed of." 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(2). Section 101(21) defines "person" to include "an individual,
firm, corporation, association, partnership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United
States Government, State, municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any inter-
state body." 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(21). Section 101(29) incorporates the definition of"disposal" used
in section 1004 of the Solid Waste Disposal Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6903(3) (West 2006), which pro-
vides that: "[t]he term 'disposal' means the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping, spilling, leaking,
or placing of any solid waste or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so that such solid waste
or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may enter the environment or be emitted into the air or
discharged into any waters, including ground waters." 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(29).
50. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(3). Courts have expansively interpreted the scope of "arranger"
liability to include such persons as those who arrange to dispose of hazardous substances at landfills,
toll formulators, and persons who send material containing hazardous substances to recyclers with
the knowledge that some of the material will not be returned. See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 13
n.48.
51. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4).
52. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(14)
53. Id.
54. National Oil and Hazardous Substances Pollution Contingency Plan (NCP), 40 C.F.R. pt.
300 (2005).
55. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9605. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.1 (the purpose of NCP is "to provide the organ-
izational structure and procedures for preparing for and responding to discharges of oil and releases
of hazardous substances, pollutants, and contaminants").
56. See supra notes 46-51 and accompanying text.
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tion tasks.57  The government may also conduct the cleanup itself, and
then sue under section 107(a), CERCLA's direct cost recovery provision,
to recover its costs of responding to the release or threatened release of
hazardous substances (response costs). 59  Under section 107(a)(4)(A), a
PRP is jointly and severally liable 60 for "all costs of removal or remedial
action incurred by the United States Government or a State or an Indian
tribe not inconsistent with the national contingency plan., 61  Section
107(a)(4)(B) permits a private party who incurs response costs to bring a
cost recovery action, providing that PRPs are liable for "any other nec-
essary costs of response incurred by any other person consistent with the
national contingency plan."63
57. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9606(a).
58. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9604(a)(1).
59. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(A). CERCLA refers to cleanup costs incurred in response to
the release or threatened release of hazardous substances as "response costs." See 42 U.S.C.A. §
9601(25) (defining "response"); 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4) (referring to "costs of response").
60. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(A). CERCLA is silent regarding the scope of response cost
liability. By the mid-1980s, courts generally concluded that liability to the government under
CERCLA section 107(a) was joint and several. See John M. Hyson, "Fairness" and Joint and
Several Liability in Government Cost Recovery Actions Under CERCLA, 21 HARV. ENvTL. L. REV.
137, 150-60 (1997) (discussing evolution of CERCLA joint and several liability case law). The
courts similarly came to hold that liability under section 107(a) for costs incurred by private parties
was joint and several. See, e.g., Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 423-24 (2d Cir. 1998)
(explaining section 107(a)(4)(B) claim imposes joint and several liability at sites with indivisible
harm); Rumpke of Ind., Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., 107 F.3d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir. 1997) (explain-
ing section 107(a)(4)(B) claim imposes joint and several liability and may be maintained by current
landowner who did not add contamination to site).
61. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(A). Defendants can argue as an affirmative defense that liabil-
ity should be apportioned severally if the harm at the contaminated site is divisible. See, e.g., United
States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252, 270-71 (3d Cir. 1992) (explaining several liability
appropriate if PRP proves divisibility and reasonable basis for apportionment).
62. Claims for personal injury or property damages caused by hazardous substance contami-
nation are not available under CERCLA. See, e.g., Artesian Water Co. v. Gov't of New Castle
County, 659 F. Supp. 1269, 1285 (D. Del. 1987) ("Congress in enacting CERCLA clearly mani-
fested an intent not to provide compensation for economic losses or for personal injury resulting
from the release of hazardous substances.").
63. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(B) (emphasis added). The phrase "any other person" refers to
persons other than the United States, States, or Indian tribes who have a right of cost recovery under
section 107(a)(4)(A). Post-Aviall decisions have disagreed about whether the term "other" in the
phrase "any other person" also excludes PRPs, i.e., "covered persons" falling within the categories
of liable parties set forth in § 9607(a)(l)-(4). Compare, e.g., Atd. Research, 459 F.3d 827 at 835-36.
("'any other person' means any person other than the statutorily enumerated 'United States Govern-
ment or a State or an Indian tribe."' (citation omitted)), and Consol. Edison Co. v. UGI Utils., 423
F.3d 90, 99-100 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding that a PRP who voluntarily incurred cleanup costs could
state a section 107(a)(4)(B) direct cost recovery claim, reasoning that it would be inappropriate to
impose an "innocence" condition on the "any other person" language of section 107(a)(4)(B)), with
Aviall Servs., Inc., v. Cooper Indus., Inc., No. 3:97-CV-1926-D, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55040, at
*21-25 (N.D. Tex. Aug. 8, 2006) (granting Cooper's motion for summary judgment following re-
mand from U.S. Supreme Court, holding that Aviall as PRP could not maintain a section
107(a)(4)(B) claim and reasoning after "examining CERCLA holistically" that the phrase "any other
person" in section 107(a)(4)(B) refers to any person other than section 107(a)(l)-(4) covered persons
as well as section 107(a)(4)(A) entities). See also Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 82, n.350.
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3. The Section 107 / Section 113 Conundrum
In 1986, Congress passed the Superfund Amendments and Reau-
thorization Act (SARA). 64 The SARA amendments included two ex-
press CERCLA contribution provisions: (1) section 113(f)(1), which
provides that any person may seek contribution during or after an EPA
administrative order judicial enforcement action65 or cost recovery ac-
tion,66 and (2) section 1 13(f)(3)(B), which provides that any person may
seek contribution after settling its CERCLA liability with the govern-
ment.67  Section 113(0 was intended to "clarify" and "confirm"
CERCLA contribution rights. 68  Section 113(0 did not, however, ex-
pressly address the most common CERCLA "contribution" plaintiff: a
current landowner (or other PRP) who voluntarily incurs cleanup costs
but has neither been sued in an EPA judicial enforcement action or cost
recovery action, 69 nor settled its CERCLA liabilities with the govern-ment.70
64. Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat.
1613 (1986).
65. CERCLA section 106 authorizes the federal government to (a) issue unilateral administra-
tive orders directing parties to investigate and remediate site contamination and (b) initiate a judicial
enforcement action in the event of non-compliance. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9606. Few private plaintiffs
would have contribution rights triggered by a section 106 action. Section 106 actions may only be
brought by the federal government, which is actively involved at only a handful of the nation's
contaminated sites. See supra note 23 and accompanying text; see also Larry Schnapf, Impact of
Aviall on Real Estate and Corporate Transactions, 20 Toxics L. REP. (BNA) 607, 610 (2005)
("[S]tates bring over 70 percent of enforcement actions and the vast majority of contaminated sites
are remediated under [state Superfund] programs .. "). Even at sites where the EPA plays an
active role, there would be no reason to initiate a section 106 action unless a PRP was not in compli-
ance with a section 106 administrative order or otherwise was not adequately responding to site
contamination.
66. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(0(1). Section 113(0(1) provides that:
[a]ny person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or potentially li-
able under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following any civil action under section
9606 of this title [EPA administrative order enforcement action] or under section 9607(a)
[cost recovery action] of this title. Such claims shall be brought in accordance with this
section and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and shall be governed by Federal law.
In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response costs among liable par-
ties using such equitable factors as the court determines are appropriate. Nothing in this
subsection shall diminish the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the
absence of a civil action under section 9606 of this title or section 9607 of this title.
42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(0(1).
67. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(0(2)-(3). Section 113(0(2) contemplates a settlement by a "person
who has resolved its liability to the United States or a State " while section 113(f)(3)(B) allows the
settling PRP to pursue CERCLA contribution against non-settling PRPs. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(0(2)-
(3).
68. S. REP. No. 99-11, at 4 (1985) (objective of proposed new contribution provision was to
"clariq[y] and confirm[] the right of a person held jointly and severally liable under CERCLA to seek
contribution from other potentially liable parties, when the person believes that it has assumed a
share of the cleanup or cost that may be greater than its equitable share under the circumstances");
H.R. REP. No. 99-253, at 79 (1985), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2861.
69. A PRP, rather than a government agency or non-PRP private party, usually takes the lead
in site cleanup; accordingly, a PRP seeking contribution likely would not first have been sued for
cost recovery under section 107(a). A PRP may be sued under section 107(a) by a non-PRP (1) in
the rare circumstance where an "innocent" private party incurs cleanup costs, 42 U.S.C.A. §
9607(a)(4)(B); cf City of Bangor v. Citizens Comm'ns Co., 437 F. Supp. 2d 180, 222-23 (D. Me.
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This statutory interpretation issue, however, did not appear to trou-
ble the courts or PRPs. After the SARA amendments, the issue before
the courts was not whether a PRP could recover cleanup costs from other
PRPs. Rather, litigation arose across the country about which provision
of CERCLA provided the basis for such an action-the direct cost re-
covery provision of section 107(a)(4)(B) or the contribution provisions
of section 113(f)(1). 71 By the time the Supreme Court decided Aviall in
December 2004, each court of appeals to have addressed this section 107
/ section 113 conundrum had held that a plaintiff who was a liable party
under CERCLA could not bring a direct action for cost recovery under
CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B).72 These courts assumed, expressly or
2006) (holding that a PRP may bring a section 107(a) action and noting that "it is hard to imagine
many cases in which purely 'innocent parties' would ever be motivated to initiate an action under
section 107"); or (2) where a government agency seeks to recover its direct cleanup costs or its costs
of overseeing a private cleanup. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(A); United States v. E.I. Dupont De
Nemours & Co., 432 F.3d 161, 179 (3d Cir. 2005) (en banc) (federal government oversight costs
recoverable under section 107(a)(4)(A)).
70. The last sentence of section 113(0(1) provides that "[n]othing in this subsection shall
diminish the right of any person to bring an action for contribution in the absence of a civil action
under [sections 106 or 107(a)]." 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(0(1). CERCLA and its legislative history,
however, say nothing about what "contribution" rights (e.g., direct or implied contribution rights
under CERCLA section 107(a), state contribution law contribution rights) were left "undiminished"
by section 113(0(1).
71. See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 24-33 (discussing the section 107/section 113 conun-
drum). This issue mattered to CERCLA defendants, who argued that claims by one CERCLA-liable
party against another sounded in contribution and thus should be brought under section 113(0(1).
They reasoned it would be unfair for a liable plaintiff to impose a joint and several liability direct
cost recovery section 107(a) claim, see supra note 60, which would place on defendants (a) the
burden of showing the divisibility of environmental harm caused by the defendant's conduct, see,
e.g., Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R. Co., 142 F.3d 769, 776 & n.4
(4th Cir. 1998) (instructing district court under section 113(f) to allocate costs according to appropri-
ate equitable factors but, unlike a joint and several liability action under section 107(a), not to im-
pose a divisibility of harm allocation burden on defendants); and (b) the risk of any "orphan shares"
of liability. See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 24-26. An "orphan share" is the equitable share of
cleanup cost liability attributable to a PRP that is unable to pay, such as a PRP who cannot be lo-
cated or who is insolvent, deceased or bankrupt. See, e.g., Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining
Corp., 118 F.3d 1298, 1303 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that a PRP cannot assert a joint and several
section 107(a) claim against other PRPs, because "those defendant-PRPs would end up absorbing all
of the cost attributable to 'orphan shares'-those shares attributable to PRPs who either are insolvent
or cannot be located or identified").
72. As of December 2004, the First, Second, Third, Fourth, Sixth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth,
Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits each had held that a PRP could not bring a section 107(a) cost recovery
action against another PRP, and that a PRP seeking to recover cleanup costs from another PRP under
CERCLA was limited to a contribution action for several liability under section 113(f). See, e.g.,
United Techs. Corp. v. Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc., 33 F.3d 96, 100-01 (1st Cir. 1994); Bedford
Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 425 (2d Cir. 1998); New Castle County v. Halliburton NUS Corp.,
111 F.3d 1116, 1120 (3d Cir. 1997); Pneumo Abex Corp. v. High Point, Thomasville & Denton R.R.
Co., 142 F.3d 769, 776 (4th Cir. 1998); Centerior Serv. Co. v. Acme Scrap Iron & Metal Corp., 153
F.3d 344, 356 (6th Cir. 1998); Rumpke of Ind., Inc. v. Cummins Engine Co., 107 F.3d 1235, 1239-
40 (7th Cir. 1997) (section 107(a) action also available to current landowner PRP who did not con-
tribute to site contamination; all other PRPs limited to section 113(f) contribution action); Dico, Inc.
v. Amoco Oil Co., 340 F.3d 525 (8th Cir. 2003); Pinal Creek Group v. Newmont Mining Corp., 118
F.3d 1298, 1306 (9th Cir. 1997); United States v. Colo. & E. R.R. Co., 50 F.3d 1530, 1536 (10th Cir.
1995); Redwing Carriers v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489, 1513 (11th Cir. 1996). The Fifth
Circuit's three-judge panel in Aviall concluded that "a PRP cannot file a section 107(a) suit against
another PRP; it must pursue a contribution action instead." Aviall Servs., Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc.,
263 F.3d 134, 137 (5thCir. 2001), reh'g en banc, 312 F.3d 677 (2002), rev'd, 543 U.S. 157 (2004).
2006] BACK FROM THE MARGINS
implicitly, that the PRP plaintiff instead could and should sue for contri-
bution under section 113(f). 73 As a result, a current owner of contami-
nated property or other PRP who had taken the lead cleaning up a multi-
PRP site typically filed a section 113(0(1) cleanup cost contribution ac-
tion, and CERCLA contribution law became the primary rule of decision
in private cleanup cost disputes.74 Owners of contaminated property,
other PRPs, and government agencies alike came to rely on the nation-
wide availability of a CERCLA cleanup cost remedy. 75  CERCLA con-
tribution rights provided an incentive for PRPs to voluntarily comply
with regulatory agency cleanup orders. Similarly, businesses factored
the potential for obtaining cleanup costs from PRPs in deciding whether
to acquire or develop brownfield or other real property that was or might
be contaminated.76 All this was changed when the U.S. Supreme Court
decided Aviall.
This decision was supplanted by the Fifth Circuit's en banc decision in Aviall that ultimately was
reversed by the Supreme Court. Id.; see also Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 672 (5th
Cir. 1989) ("When one liable party sues another to recover its equitable share of response costs, the
action is one for contribution, which is specifically recognized under CERCLA" (citing section
113(0). But see OHM Remediation Servs. v. Evans Cooperage Co., 116 F.3d 1574, 1582 n.l (5th
Cir. 1997) ("We express no opinion ... whether a PRP may seek to hold other parties jointly and
severally liable under section 107(a) for response costs."); Aviall, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55040, at
*11-14 (granting Cooper's motion for summary judgment following remand from the U.S. Supreme
Court, holding that Aviall as PRP could not maintain a section 107(a)(4)(B) claim, reasoning that the
Fifth Circuit's en banc decision in Aviall was not binding on the district courts after the U.S. Su-
preme Court's Aviall decision so that in light of OHM no binding Fifth Circuit decision had yet
addressed whether a PRP could bring a section 107(a) action against another PRP).
73. See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 26-35. These courts implicitly or explicitly assumed that
a section 113(0(1) contribution would be available to a PRP, regardless of whether the PRP first had
been sued under CERCLA section 106 or 107(a) or had settled its CERCLA liabilities with the
government. See, e.g., Atl. Research, 459 F.3d at 832-33 (describing as judicial "[t]raffic-directing"
the pre-Aviall cases that limited PRPs to a section 113(f) contribution action, noting that "[i]n the
pre-Aviall analysis, section 113 was presumed to be available to all liable parties including those
which had not faced a CERCLA action"); City of Waukesha v. Viacom, Inc., 221 F. Supp. 2d 975,
979 (E.D. Wis. 2002) (explaining absence of reported decisions on the section 113(0(1) standing
issue may reflect the common understanding among the bench and bar that such an action was
available to any PRP); Adobe Lumber, Inc. v. Hellman, 415 F. Supp. 2d 1070, 1076 (E.D. Cal.
2006) (permitting PRP plaintiff to proceed with section 107(a) action and noting that "the Ninth
Circuit's pre-Aviall precedents assumed a cost recovery suit was not a prerequisite for a § 113(0
contribution action").
74. See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 33-35. Sometimes plaintiffs would join state law claims
to fill gaps in the CERCLA statutory framework. For example, state law cleanup cost claims might
be asserted under an alternative state law liability scheme or to provide a vehicle for recovering
petroleum remediation or other cleanup costs that could not be recovered under CERCLA. See, e.g.,
William W. Watts, Common Law Remedies in Alabama for Contamination of Land, 29 CUMB. L.
REv. 37, 39 (1999) (describing use of common law theories for cost claims regarding Alabama sites
as alternative to CERCLA); Michael B. Hingerty, Property Owner Liability for Environmental
Contamination in California, 22 U.S.F. L. REv. 31, 37-42, 63-82 (1987) (describing California
common law and statutory theories potentially applicable to landowners). Similarly, claims for
property damage (e.g., diminution in value, stigma, lost use of property) or personal injury could not
be asserted under CERCLA and thus could only be brought under state tort law.
75. See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 33-36.
76. See id. at 54 n.248.
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4. The Aviall Decision
Aviall Services, Inc., the buyer of contaminated properties from
Cooper Industries, Inc., brought a section 113(f) contribution claim
against Cooper to recover costs Aviall incurred after it was directed by a
state regulatory agency to clean up contamination to which both compa-
nies contributed.77 In December 2004, the U.S. Supreme Court held that
section 113(f) permitted a PRP to bring a contribution action only if (1)
the PRP plaintiff had first been sued by the federal government under
CERCLA section 106 to enforce a CERCLA administrative order, or by
a government or private party under CERCLA section 107(a) for cost
recovery; or (2) the PRP plaintiff had first settled her CERCLA liability
with the government.78 Because Aviall had neither been sued under
CERCLA nor settled with the government, the Court held that Aviall
could not maintain a section 113(f) contribution action.79
The Court, however, did not go so far as to hold that Aviall was
barred from stating any response cost claim under CERCLA. Aviall had
urged the Court in the alternative to find that Aviall could state a direct
cost recovery claim under section 107(a)(4)(B) as "any other person"
incurring response costs. 80  The Court chose not to decide the issue,
81
and instead remanded the case to the Fifth Circuit to address whether
Aviall had waived any section 107(a)(4)(B) claim 82 and, if not, whether a
PRP could assert a direct cost recovery claim under section
107(a)(4)(B).8 3
77. Aviall, 543 U.S. at 163-64. For a detailed discussion of the Aviall litigation, see
Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 35-49.
78. Aviall, 543 U.S. at 167-68. In 2000, the District Court had granted Cooper's motion for
summary judgment, holding that the first sentence of section 113(0(1) limited contribution claims to
plaintiffs (unlike Aviall) who had been first been sued under sections 106 or 107(a). Aviall Servs.
Inc. v. Cooper Indus., Inc., No. Civ.A.397CV1926D, 2000 WL 31730, at *24 (N.D. Tex. Jan. 13,
2000). The court declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Aviall's state law claims. Id. at
*5. In 2001, a divided three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling.
Aviall, 263 F.3d at 134. Rehearing the case en banc in 2002, the Fifth Circuit by a 10-3 vote re-
versed the district court's decision. Aviall, 312 F.3d at 677 (en banc).
79. A viall, 543 U.S. at 171.
80. Id. at 168.
81. Id. at 168-70. In a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Stevens, Justice Ginsburg argued
that the Court should have proceeded to decide whether Aviall as a PRP could state a claim under
section 107(a)(4)(B). Id. at 170, 173-74 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
82. The Fifth Circuit ultimately concluded that no such waiver had occurred and remanded
the case to the District Court for further proceedings. See infra note 88.
83. Aviall, 543 U.S. at 168-70. The Court noted that among the issues that might be consid-
ered on remand was whether Aviall "may pursue a section 107 cost recovery action for some form of
liability other than joint and several." Id. at 169-70. The Court also declined to decide whether
Aviall had an implied right to contribution under section 107(a) or federal common law. Id. at 170-
71. On February 15, 2005, the Fifth Circuit ordered the case remanded to the district court with
instructions to permit Aviall to amend its complaint to assert a section 107(a) claim without preju-
dice to Cooper's defense that such an amendment would fail to state a claim for which relief may be
granted. Aviall, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55040, at *7-8. On August 8, 2006, the district court
granted Cooper's motion for summary judgment, holding that Aviall as PRP could not maintain a
direct section 107(a)(4)(B) claim because the phrase "any other person" in section 107(a)(4)(B)
referred to persons other than section 107(a)(l)-(4) covered persons as well as section 107(a)(4)(B)
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Aviall caused a sea change in contaminated property law. It upset
years of reliance by the regulated community that a PRP could always
obtain cleanup cost contribution under CERCLA. 84  It created wide-
spread uncertainty about the availability of federal cleanup cost recovery
rights by leaving unresolved whether the lower federal courts in their
pre-Aviall decisions had correctly barred PRPs from bringing direct cost
recovery actions.85 Aviall also effectively extended an invitation, which
this article accepts, to evaluate how state law may enter center stage in
private cleanup cost disputes by overcoming the current inconsistencies
and doctrinal limitations of common law tort theory.
D. The Aftermath of Aviall
Was the Aviall decision a reasonable interpretation of a muddled
statute? Perhaps. Should the bench, bar, and regulatory agencies have
assumed for nearly twenty years that it was beyond peradventure that a
PRP who had not first been sued under CERCLA could bring a section
113(0(1) contribution action? Perhaps not. Nevertheless, the Aviall
decision stunned environmental cleanup cost dispute stakeholders-they
simply did not see it coming.86
1. Uncertain Future of PRP Contribution Claims
By declining to decide whether a PRP could maintain a section
107(a)(4)(B) action, the Supreme Court created profound uncertainty
about whether most PRPs could recover from other PRPs their fair share
of cleanup costs under CERCLA. Every court of appeals to have ad-
dressed the issue before Aviall had held that a PRP could not maintain a
section 107(a)(4)(B) action-but did so under the express or implied
assumption that the PRP instead could bring a section 113(f) contribution
87action.
Following Aviall, federal courts across the country began to grapple
with whether appellate decisions barring section 107(a)(4)(B) claims by
PRPs retained their precedential value after Aviall. Some district courts
(including the district court upon remand in Aviall) relied on pre-Aviall
case law to hold that a PRP could not recover costs under section
governmental and Indian tribe plaintiffs, id. at *24, 29, and that there was no implied contribution
right under section 107(a)(4)(B), id. at *36.
84. See E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, 460 F.3d 515, 523 (3d Cir. 2006)
(noting the "understanding at the time [before the Aviall decision was that] ... a PRP that voluntar-
ily cleaned up a contaminated site sua sponte could seek contribution from other PRPs without
waiting for an enforcement action, a Government or innocent landowner cost recovery suit, or a
settlement of liability. [I] In Cooper Industries, the Supreme Court significantly altered this under-
standing."); see also supra note 72 and accompanying text.
85. See supra notes 71-73 and accompanying text.
86. See supra note 72; see also Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 33-58.
87. See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 50-54.
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107(a)(4)(B). 8 Other district courts after Aviall held that a PRP could
assert a direct 89 or implied9" claim under CERCLA section 107(a), or
permitted amended pleadings adding a section 107(a) claim pending
guidance from its circuit court of appeals. 91 The United States govern-
ment, which had filed an amicus curiae brief in Aviall arguing that a PRP
who had not first been sued under CERCLA was barred from bringing a
section 113(f)(1) contribution action, 92 contended in CERCLA cases
88. See, e.g., Aviall, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 55040, at *24, 29, 36 (granting Cooper's motion
for summary judgment following remand by U.S. Supreme Court based on the "plain meaning" of
the statute and pre-Aviall case law); Amcal Multi-Housing, Inc. v. Pacific Clay Products, No.
EDCV-06-280-SGL, 2006 WL 3016326, at *12 (C.D. Cal. Oct. 10, 2006) (holding that a PRP "can-
not bring a free-standing section 107 implied contribution claim [in light of pre-Aviall Ninth Circuit
precedent], and cannot bring a section 107 cost recovery claim as it has failed to allege sufficient
facts to bring it within one of the statutorily defined defenses to PRP designation status."); ITT
Indus. v. Borgwarner, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-674, 2006 WL 2460793, at *3-5 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 23,
2006) (granting motion to dismiss because Aviall did not undermine prior Sixth Circuit precedent
barring PRPs from bringing section 107(a) actions); Columbus McKinnon Corp. v. Gaffey, No. H-
06-1125, 2006 WL 2382463, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006) (granting defendant's motion to dis-
miss a PRP's section 107(a) claim because "under the prevailing law at this time [plaintiff] as a PRP
does not have a viable claim for cost recovery under § 107(a) of CERCLA"); Spectrum Int'l Hold-
ings, Inc. v. Universal Coops., Inc., Civ. No. 04-99 (MJD/AJB), 2006 WL 2033377, at *5 (D. Minn.
July 17, 2006) (granting defendant's motion for summary judgment based on pre-Aviall Eighth
Circuit precedent that a PRP is barred from asserting a section 107(a) claim). See also Aronovsky,
supra note 5, at 51 n.244 (identifying pre-May 2006 cases holding that, notwithstanding Aviall,
PRPs could not recover response costs under section 107(a)).
89. See, e.g., Glidden Co. v. FV Steel & Wire Co., Nos. 05C1355, 05C1356, 2006 WL
2724049, at *4-5 (E.D. Wis. Sept. 21, 2006) (reversing bankruptcy court ruling that PRP claimants
could not assert section 107(a) claims against bankruptcy estate); City of Martinsville v. Masterwear
Corp., No. 1:04-cv-1994-RLY-WTL, 2006 WL 2710628, at *2, 3 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 20, 2006) (holding
current landowner could maintain section 107(a) claim under Seventh Circuit's "innocent landowner
exception," discussed in Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 30-33, permitting section 107(a) claims by
landowners who did not contribute to site contamination); City of Bangor v. Citizens Comm'ns Co.,
437 F. Supp. 2d 180, 222-23 (D.Me.2006) (holding that a PRP may bring a section 107(a) action and
noting that "it is hard to imagine many cases in which purely 'innocent parties' would ever be moti-
vated to initiate an action under section 107."); see also Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 52 n.245 (iden-
tifying pre-May 2006 cases holding that, after Aviall, PRPs could recover costs under section
107(a)).
90. See, e.g., Raytheon Aircraft Co. v. United States, 435 F. Supp. 2d 1136, 1141-1151 (D.
Kan. 2006) (holding that a PRP who incurred cleanup costs pursuant to an administrative order on
consent should recover those costs under section 113(f)(3)(B), and as to other cleanup costs a PRP
who cannot state a claim under section 113(f) nonetheless has an implied contribution claim under
section 107(a)); Aggio v. Aggio, No. C 04-4357 PJH, 2005 WL 2277037, at *6 (N.D. Cal. Sept. 19,
2005) (holding that PRP has an implied right of contribution under section 107(a)).
91. See, e.g., Gen. Motors Corp. v. United States, No. Civ.A. 01-CV-2201, 2005 WL 548266,
*4-5 (D.N.J. Mar. 2, 2005) (dismissing plaintiff PRP's section 113(f)(1) claim in light of Aviall but
granting leave to amend complaint to add section 107(a) claim because defendant would suffer no
prejudice until Third Circuit decided whether to revisit holding in New Castle County v. Haliburton
NUS Corp., 111 F.3d 1116, 1121 (3d Cir. 1997), that a PRP may not bring a section 107(a) cost
recovery action).
92. See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 43-45. The United States is itself a PRP facing claims by
PRPs at sites across the country for billions of dollars in cleanup costs. Id. at 44. Aviall had argued
to the Supreme Court that the federal government in its capacity as a multi-site PRP could avoid
paying its fair share of cleanup costs at sites nationwide if PRPs could not sue the United States or
other PRPs for cost recovery under section 107(a) or contribution under section 113(f). Id. at 44
n.212. See also infra notes 106-12 and accompanying text.
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across the country (both as a defendant and as amicus curiae) that PRPs
could not recover cleanup costs under section 107(a).
93
The issue remained muddled as courts of appeals began to weigh in
on the debate and conflicts arose among the circuits. The Second Cir-
cuit, the first court of appeals after Aviall to address the issue, chose to
evaluate PRP section 107(a) claims on a case-by-case basis, focusing on
whether the PRP plaintiff "voluntarily" incurred claimed cleanup costs.
94
In Consolidated Edison Co. v. UGI Utilities,95 the Second Circuit held
that a PRP who incurred cleanup costs before entering into a voluntary
cleanup agreement with a state agency-without first having been sued,
allocated response costs by a court, or made to participate in an adminis-
trative proceeding-could bring a section 107(a)(4)(B) action.96 Shortly
thereafter, in Schaefer v. Town of Victor,9 7 the Second Circuit held that a
contaminated landfill owner could assert a CERCLA section 107(a)
claim 98 against defendants who disposed of waste at the landfill even
93. See, e.g., Brief of Appellee United States of America, At. Research Corp. v. United
States, No. 05-3152, 2005 WL 3568541 (8th Cir. Dec. 5, 2005) (argument by appellee United States
that district court properly dismissed CERCLA claims of PRP plaintiff under sections 107(a) and
113(0); Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae, Metro. Water Reclamation Dist. of Greater
Chicago v. N. Am. Galvanizing and Coatings, Inc., No. 05-3299, 2006 WL 1354188 (7th Cir. May
1, 2006) (brief of Department of Justice and Environmental Protection Agency arguing, in light of a
"reexamination" of government's position after Aviall, a PRP cannot bring a section 107(a)(4)(B)
claim because (1) the phrase "any other person" in section 107(a)(4)(B) refers to persons other than
section 107(a) "covered persons" as well as state, federal and tribal governments referenced in
section 107(a)(4)(A); (2) section 113(0 provides the exclusive authorization for CERCLA contribu-
tion claims; and (3) there should be no exception permitting current landowners who did not con-
tribute to site contamination to assert section 107(a)(4)(B) claims); Brief for the Federal Appellees,
E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. United States, No. 04-2096 (3d Cir. Apr. 22, 2005) (PRP could
not assert a cleanup cost contribution claim against the government pursuant to section 107(a) be-
cause (1) a cleanup cost claim by a PRP is necessarily a contribution claim, id. at 24-26; (2) section
107(a)(4)(B) standing alone does not provide an express right to contribution, id. at 27-28, 48-50;
(3) there is no implied right to a contribution under section 107(a)(4)(B), id. at 28-47; and (4) the
federal government's sovereign immunity bars any federal common law cleanup cost contribution
claim against it, id. at 51-52); see also Atl. Research, 459 F.3d at 836-37 (8th Cir. 2006) (holding
that PRP may assert section 107(a) claim against the United States, noting that a contrary ruling
would result "in an absurd and unjust outcome" because "the government could insulate itself from
responsibility for its own pollution by simply declining to bring a CERCLA cleanup action or refus-
ing a liable party's offer to settle"). But see E. 1. DuPont de Nemours and Company v. United
States, 460 F.3d 515, 541 n. 31 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that PRP DuPont may not bring section
107(a) action against the United States despite argument that such a ruling could allow the federal
government to avoid contribution liability at sites where it is a PRP, observing that "DuPont does
not, however, provide evidence that the EPA actually uses its enforcement discretion to avoid sub-
jecting other federal agencies to potential liability in a later contribution suit").
94. Consol. Edison Co. v. UGI Utils., 423 F.3d 90, 100-02 (2d Cir. 2005).
95. 423 F.3d 90 (2d Cir. 2005).
96. Consol. Edison, 423 F.3d at 100-02. The court found it inappropriate to impose an "inno-
cence" condition on the "any other person" language of section 107(a)(4)(B). Id. at 99. The court
distinguished its pre-Aviall decision in Bedford Affiliates v. Sills, 156 F.3d 416, 424 (2d Cir. 1998)
(holding that a CERCLA claim by a PRP who had entered into CERCLA consent decrees was "a
quintessential claim for contribution" which could be brought only under section 113(f)), on the
ground that the Bedford Affiliates plaintiff had incurred response costs only after having entered into
a consent decree). Id. at 100-03.
97. 457 F.3d 188 (2d Cir. 2006).
98. Schaefer, 457 F.3d at 201-02. The court went on to hold, however, that Schaefer's
CERCLA claim was barred by the statute of limitations. Id. at 210.
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though the owner had entered into a series of consent orders regarding
his site. 99 The court reasoned that because the owner had started incur-
ring response costs before entering into the consent orders, his response
costs were not incurred solely due to a court or administrative order im-
posing liability.
1 00
The Eighth Circuit took a different approach by directly addressing
the section 107(a) issue in Atlantic Research Corp. v. United States.
0'
The district court had granted the United States' motion to dismiss Atlan-
tic's section 107(a) claim based on Dico, Inc. v. Amoco Oil Co.,10 2 a pre-
Aviall Eighth Circuit decision holding that a PRP could not bring an ac-
tion under section 107(a).10 3 The Eighth Circuit reversed, concluding
that Dico's "analytic is undermined by Avialrl°"4 and holding that a PRP
who voluntarily incurred cleanup costs for which it may be held liable
may bring a direct cost recovery action under section 107(a). 1
05
The Third Circuit came to the opposite conclusion in E. I. DuPont
de Nemours and Company v. United States.10 6  DuPont voluntarily un-
dertook to clean up a site it owned in New Jersey that formerly had been
99. Id. at 192.
100. Id. at 201-02. By drawing such fine distinctions, the Second Circuit created new uncer-
tainty regarding PRP cleanup cost claims. After Consolidated Edison and Schaefer, district courts in
the Second Circuit wrestled with whether a PRP incurred response costs in a sufficiently "voluntary"
manner to permit their recovery under a section 107(a) claim. Compare, e.g., Seneca Meadows, Inc.
v. ECI Liquidating, Inc., 427 F. Supp. 2d at 284-88 (W.D.N.Y. 2006) (holding that a PRP who
incurred cleanup costs in connection with consent order with state agency could assert a several
liability section 107(a)(4)(B) claim because the PRP had not been sued, admitted liability or fault, or
been threatened with an imminent judicial or administrative liability finding), and City of New York
v. N.Y. Cross Harbor R.R. Terminal Corp., No. 98CV7227ARRRML, 2006 WL 140555, at *4 n.6
(E.D.N.Y. Jan. 17, 2006) (holding that although plaintiff if sued, would be held liable under section
107(a), it could maintain a section 107(a) claim because it conducted a voluntary investigation and
cleanup without first having been sued or made to participate in an administrative proceeding), with
Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Consol. Rail Corp., 436 F. Supp. 2d 398 at 402-04 (N.D.N.Y.
2006) (dismissing section 107(a) claim because costs were incurred pursuant to consent orders, and
dismissing section 113(f) claim because consent orders did not constitute settlements triggering
contribution rights under section 113(f)(3)(B)).
101. 459 F.3d 827 (8th Cir. 2006).
102. 340 F.3d 525 (8th Cir. 2003); see also supra note 72.
103. At. Research, 459 F.3d at 830.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 836-37. The court concluded that the phrase "any other person" in section
107(a)(4)(B) meant any person other than the statutorily enumerated United States, States, or Indian
tribes referenced in section 107(a)(4)(A), and that pre-Aviall restrictions of section 107(a)(4)(B) to
"innocent" plaintiffs represented nothing more than judicial "traffic directing" light of the pre-Aviall
analysis that "§ 113 was presumed to be available to all liable parties, including those which had not
faced a CERCLA action." Id. at 832. The court noted that section 107(a)(4)(B) does not compel full
recovery of response costs incurred by a PRP plaintiff, observing that "CERCLA, itself, checks
overreaching liable parties: If a plaintiff attempted to use § 107 to recover more than its fair share of
reimbursement, a defendant would be free to counterclaim for contribution under § 113(f)." Id. at
835. The court also held that "a right to contribution may be fairly implied from the text of section
107(a)(4)(B)," id. at 835, stating that "[c]ontribution is crucial to CERCLA's regulatory scheme."
Id. at 836. In light of these holdings, the court did not address Atlantic's argument that it had an
implied right to contribution as a matter of federal common law. Id. at 836 n.9.
106. 460 F.3d 515 (3d Cir. 2006); see also supra note 93 and accompanying text.
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owned and allegedly contaminated by the United States. 1°7  DuPont
brought a CERCLA response cost action against the United States.'
0 8
The Third Circuit affirmed by a 2-1 vote the district court's order grant-
ing the United States' motion for judgment on the pleadings on DuPont's
CERCLA claims. 109 The Third Circuit concluded that Aviall did not give
it cause to reconsider its pre-Aviall precedents holding that a PRP could
only seek contribution under section 113(f),110 reasoning further that
CERCLA's settlement scheme was inconsistent with an interpretation of
section 107(a)(4)(B) that would permit direct cost recovery actions by
PRPs.111 Accordingly, the Third Circuit held that DuPont, as a PRP,
could not bring a section 107(a) cost recovery action and that, because
DuPont had neither settled its CERCLA liabilities with the government
nor been sued under CERCLA, DuPont also could not bring a section
113(f) contribution claim in light of Aviall. 1
2
Similarly, both the Fifth and the Tenth Circuits indicated in post-
Aviall decisions that they would not permit a PRP to bring a section
107(a) claim. The Fifth Circuit in Elementis Chromium L.P. v. Coastal
States Petroleum Co. 3 baldly stated in dicta that a PRP could not bring
a section 107(a) claim.1 14  In Elementis, the court held that a district
court erred by imposing joint and several contribution liability on third-
party defendants in a CERCLA contribution action. 115 In reaching this
decision, the court cited a pre-Aviall Eleventh Circuit decision' 16 for the
proposition that "when one liable party sues another liable party under
CERCLA, the action is not a cost recovery action under § 107(a), and the
imposition of joint and several liability is inappropriate."
' 17
107. DuPont, 460 F.3d at 525.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 543-44.
110. In dissent, Judge Sloviter contended that Aviall "clearly undermined" the Third Circuit's
pre-Aviall precendents barring section 107(a) claims by PRPs because those decisions assumed that
all PRPs could assert a section 113(f) contribution action. Id. at 546-47. Noting that "[tihere is
nothing in the relevant language of § 107 that compels the result the majority reaches," id. at 546,
the dissent concluded that "permitting parties who voluntarily incur cleanup costs to bring suit under
§ 107 comports with the fundamental purposes of CERCLA," id at 548, because "[v]oluntary clean-
ups are vital to fulfilling CERCLA's purpose." Id. at 549.
111. Id. at 541.
112. Id. at 543-44.
113. 450 F.3d 607 (5th Cir. 2006).
114. Elementis, 450 F.3d at 612-13.
115. Id. at 613.
116. Redwing Carriers, Inc. v. Saraland Apartments, 94 F.3d 1489 (11 th Cir. 1996).
117. Elementis, 450 F.3d at 613 quoting Redwing Carriers, 94 F.3d at 1513). Elementis did
not decide whether a PRP could sue for cost recovery under section 107(a), nor did it even reference
Aviall. See Ad. Research, 459 F.3d at 834 n.7 (dismissing Elementis language as an "isolated quota-
tion" regarding an issue that the Fifth Circuit was not asked to decide); Aviall, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 55040, at *14 (granting Cooper's motion for summary judgment following remand from U.S.
Supreme Court, holding that Aviall as PRP could not maintain a section 107(a)(4)(B) claim, but
observing that Elementis "did not squarely decide whether a private PRP can bring a cost recovery
action against another PRP under § 107(a)"). Nevertheless, this passing sentence in the Elementis
opinion underscored post-Aviall uncertainty about PRP cleanup cost rights. For example, the Third
Circuit in DuPont, 460 F.3d at 542 n.32, in the course of holding that a PRP may not bring a section
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In Young v. United States," 8 the Tenth Circuit affirmed a district
court order granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant on the
plaintiffs' section 107(a) claim. The district court reasoned that the
plaintiffs could not maintain a section 107(a) claim because they were
PRPs. 119 The Tenth Circuit affirmed, concluding that plaintiffs' claimed
response costs were unnecessary and not consistent with the NCP.120 As
a result, the court observed that it did not need to "determine whether
Plaintiffs are PRPs under section 107(a) and thus unable to assert a cost-
recovery claim under the rule in this Circuit that a Plaintiff-PRP must
proceed under the contribution provisions of CERCLA section 113(f)
when the Plaintiff-PRP sues another PRP for response costs.' l2 1  In
short, after Aviall the availability of PRP cleanup cost rights under
CERCLA likely will remain uncertain until the Supreme Court or Con-
gress resolves the issue.
2. Impact on Voluntary Cleanups
The uncertainty Aviall created presented a series of stark choices to
owners of contaminated property (as well as other PRPs) faced with
agency remediation directives. 22  The landowner could cooperate by
voluntarily (i.e., short of judicial enforcement action) complying with a
regulatory cleanup directive. A landowner conducting a voluntary
cleanup, however, risks incurring cleanup costs without a well-settled
107(a) action, cited Elementis for the proposition that "at least one other Circuit Court has agreed
with our interpretation of § 107(a)... " The district court in Columbus McKinnon Corp. v. Gaffey,
No. H-06-1125, 2006 WL 2382463, at *4 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 16, 2006), granted defendant's motion to
dismiss a PRP's section 107(a) claim, relying in part on the "May 2006 statement of the Fifth Circuit
in Elementis" to conclude that "under the prevailing law at this time [plaintiff] as a PRP does not
have a viable claim for cost recovery under § 107(a) of CERCLA." Defendants in other cases also
pointed to Elementis as evidence of a circuit split regarding the availability of a section 107(a) claim
for a PRP plaintiff. For example, Elementis was cited by the United States in Atl. Research, 459
F.3d at 834 n.7 as support for the proposition that a PRP may not maintain a section 107(a) action,
and by UGI Industries, Inc. (the defendant in Consolidated Edison) in connection with its petition to
the U.S. Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari as evidence of a circuit split requiring the Court to
decide whether a PRP could assert a section 107(a) claim. Reply Brief of Petitioner UGI Utilities,
Inc. on Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit at
4, UTI Utilities, Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co. of New York, Inc., No. 05-1323, 2006 WL 1621796, at
*4 (U.S. June 12, 2006) ("The Fifth Circuit now also has ruled that, contrary to the decision below,
PRPs have no §107(a) cost recovery claim, but PRPs continue to litigate that issue across the Na-
tion."); see also David Ledbetter, Kathy Robb, Andrew Skroback, Cooper Industries v. Aviall: The
Aftermath, 26 ANDREWS ENVTL. LITIG. REP. 5 n.9 (July 14, 2006) ("Elementis Chromium cannot be
reasonably read as foreshadowing of how the 5th Circuit will rule if it revisits the Section 107 issue.
Frenzied parsing and speculation concerning this language say much, however, about the huge
stakes in play concerning the Section 107 issue.").
118. 394 F.3d 858 (10th Cir. 2005).
119. Young, 394 F.3d at 860.
120. Id. at 863.
121. Id. at 862. See Raytheon Aircraft Co. v. United States, 435 F. Supp.2d 1136, 1145 (D.
Kan. 2006) (quoting the statement from Young that "a PRP is unable to assert a cost recovery claim
"); Columbus McKinnon, 2006 WL 2382463, at *4 (citing Young for the proposition that the Tenth
Circuit after Aviall "implicitly recognized that the law in that circuit remained that a PRP could not
maintain a § 107 claim").
122. See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 50-57.
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CERCLA right to recover from other PRPs their fair share of cleanup
costs. 123  In the alternative, the landowner could refuse to comply with
agency directives and instead require the agency to initiate a judicial
enforcement action. 124  Such a strategy could result in a CERCLA law-
suit that would trigger section 113(f)(1) contribution rights. On the other
hand, this strategy could also reduce the landowner's negotiation power
with the agency, generate substantial litigation costs, expose the land-
owner to potentially severe penalties for non-compliance with agency
directives, 25 and delay site remediation. A landowner could attempt to
settle with the EPA or a state agency, giving rise to CERCLA section
113(0(3) contribution rights; 126 however, neither the EPA nor state regu-
latory agencies with the power to order cleanups have the resources to
negotiate settlements at tens (if not hundreds) of thousands of contami-
nated sites. 
127
3. Aviall and the Role of State Law Cleanup Cost Claims
After Aviall, most owners of contaminated property could no longer
count on a federal cleanup cost remedy under CERCLA. Because cur-
rent owners are liable parties under CERCLA, they may not, after Aviall,
obtain cleanup cost contribution under section 113(0 unless they first
have been sued under CERCLA or settled their CERCLA liabilities with
the government, and may not have a right to cost recovery under section
107(a). 128 Aviall, of course, addressed only federal law claims. In the-
123. Commentators expressed concern that Aviall would have a significant chilling effect on
PRPs cooperating with regulatory agencies in the absence of a CERCLA contribution remedy. See,
e.g., Charles F. Helsten et al., The Effect of Aviall on the Vitality of Brownfields Programs, A.B.A.
ENVTL. TRANSACTIONS & BROWNFIELDS COMM. NEWSL., Mar. 2005, at 4 (Aviall decision "has
raised many questions that may make developers leery of brownfields projects" in light of uncertain
cleanup cost contribution rights); Richard G. Leland & Toni L. Finger, The Supreme Court's Limita-
tion on Private Cost Recovery Actions Under Superfund: No Good Deed Goes Unpunished - Part 11,
METRO. CORP. COUNS., May 2005, at 8 (parties may choose not to enter into voluntary cleanup
agreements, particularly in states without state Superfund statute contribution rights); see also NAT'L
GOVERNORS ASS'N, POLICY POSITION STATEMENT NR-04: SUPERFUND POLICY § 4.4 (2000) (re-
vised Winter Meeting 2005) ("[A] recent U.S. Supreme Court decision [Aviall] has the potential to
diminish a significant incentive under CERCLA for responsible parties to properly perform volun-
tary cleanups under state oversight.").
124. See, e.g., Daniel M. Steinway, The Ramifications of the A viall Decision: Where Do We Go
From Here?, 20 TOxICS L. REP. (BNA) 190, 194-95 (2005) (potential techniques for a PRP to
obtain CERCLA contribution rights include inviting a "friendly" lawsuit from a regulatory agency).
125. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 9606(b)(1) (West 2006) (imposing $25,000 per day fines for non-
compliance absent "sufficient cause"); 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(c)(3) (authorizing EPA to seek punitive
damages of up to three times the response costs incurred as a result of failure to take proper action);
see also supra note 27 and accompanying text.
126. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
127. See Schnapf, supra note 65, at 612 ("[Piarties may have to offer some sort of 'carrots' to
state agencies to justify diverting limited resources by performing a more comprehensive cleanup
than normally would be required or perhaps implementing a supplemental environmental project.");
Albert M. Cohen, Certainty and Uncertainty in the Post Cooper v. Aviall Superfund World, 20
TOXICS L. REP. (BNA) 73, 77 n. 15 (2005) ("EPA could be cooperative and enter into such agree-
ments. On the other hand, it may see the lack of a right to contribution as a means to put additional
pressure on parties which refuse to settle.").
128. Cooper Indus., Inc. v. Aviall Servs., Inc., 543 U.S. 157, 167 (2004).
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ory, landowners could always look to state law as an alternative to a
CERCLA claim. Indeed, PRPs often had joined state law claims to
CERCLA cleanup cost claims, for a variety of reasons. First, CERCLA
does not provide a petroleum cleanup cost recovery remedy; 129 state law
is not so limited. Second, CERCLA does not provide damages for prop-
erty or personal injury caused by contamination;1 30 state law could.
Third, CERCLA limits private cleanup cost recovery to "necessary" re-
sponse costs that are "consistent with the national contingency plan;"'
' 31
state common law theories are free of the complicated, time-consuming
and often expensive requirements of the NCP.
So why does Aviall matter? It matters because state law often pro-
vides no remedy at all, especially for current landowners faced with con-
tamination left by their predecessors or contamination that occurred
years ago. The hundreds of thousands of contaminated sites across the
country represent a significant national problem requiring a comprehen-
sive solution. Voluntary cleanups are essential to solving this problem,
and contribution rights greatly facilitate voluntary cleanups. A federal
cleanup cost contribution remedy under CERCLA would ensure the
availability of contribution claims for sites in every state. But a federal
cleanup cost remedy is not necessarily preferable to a state law remedy.
To the contrary, state law remedies, in many ways, could be superior to
CERCLA. A federal "safety net" remedy is necessary, however, because
current state law fails to provide a coherent nationwide response to a
nationwide problem. 1
32
II. AN INCOHERENT PATCHWORK QUILT: THE CURRENT STATE OF
PRIVATE NUISANCE LAW AS APPLIED TO PRIVATE CLEANUP
COST DISPUTES
This section analyzes the unrealized potential of private nuisance as
a meaningful rule of decision in private cleanup cost disputes. It first
looks at the efficiencies and remedial flexibility that could be realized
through application of private nuisance law to contaminated property
disputes. This section then analyzes the doctrinal and policy limitations
of current private nuisance law that dramatically limit opportunities for it
to provide these benefits. Part 1111 of the article proposes an environ-
mental nuisance paradigm for soil and groundwater contamination dis-
putes that would eliminate shortcomings in current law and make reli-
ance on state law a meaningful alternative to a uniform private federal
remedy.
129. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(14) (West 2006).
130. See, e.g., Artesian Water Co. v. Gov't of New Castle County, 659 F.Supp. 1269, 1285 (D.
Del. 1987) ("Congress in enacting CERCLA clearly manifested an intent not to provide compensa-
tion for economic losses or for personal injury resulting from the release of hazardous substances.").
131. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(4)(B); see also supra note 54 and accompanying text.
132. See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 68-79 (arguing that a federal "safety net" remedy is
necessary in light of the inter-state inconsistencies and doctrinal limitations of current state law).
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A. Flexibility and Efficiency: The Potential Benefits of State Law as the
Primary Rule of Decision in Private Cleanup Cost Disputes
1. Efficiency
State law could provide a more attractive source for the rules of de-
cision governing private cleanup cost disputes than federal law. 133  Use
of state law to resolve all contamination dispute issues would promote
litigation efficiency. First, state law contamination disputes would be
heard in state courts134 before state court judges more likely to be famil-
iar with applicable state law than federal court judges. 135  Second, using
state law as the primary rule of decision in private cleanup cost disputes
would permit the application of a common body of state law to all con-
taminated property dispute questions, including claims for petroleum
cleanup costs, 13 6 property damages (beyond cleanup costs), and personal
injury damages that are not recoverable under CERCLA. Third, apply-
ing a common body of state law to all cleanup cost disputes would avoid
conflicts between federal and state law regarding alternative cleanup cost
allocations among PRPs, and differing measurements of recoverable
damages between costs that were and were not consistent with the
NCP. 137  Fourth, a common body of law in multi-party contamination
disputes would promote settlements by avoiding potential complications
that could arise from inconsistent rules governing settlements not involv-
ing all disputants. 138 Fifth, in light of the fact that state or local govern-
133. See id. at 60-68 (discussing potential flexibility and efficiency benefits of state law as
primary rule of decision in private cleanup cost disputes).
134. By contrast, CERCLA section 113(b) provides that federal courts have exclusive subject
matter jurisdiction over claims "arising under" CERCLA. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(b). State law claims
can be joined to CERCLA claims pursuant to a federal court's original (i.e., diversity) or supplemen-
tal subject matter jurisdiction. See, e.g., Arawana Mills Co. v. United Techs. Corp., 795 F. Supp.
1238, 1247-49 (D. Conn. 1992) (analyzing under 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(c) retention of supplemental
jurisdiction over state law claims joined with CERCLA claims).
135. A private cleanup cost or other contamination-related dispute based solely on state law
always could, of course, be filed in or removed to federal court based on diversity of citizenship
jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1332, 1441 (West 2006).
136. CERCLA excludes petroleum from the definition of the "hazardous substances" governed
by CERCLA. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(14) (West 2006).
137. See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 89 n.369.
138. Partial settlements (i.e., settlements involving fewer than all defendants) in multi-
defendant cleanup cost litigation typically are conditioned on issuance by the court of a "contribution
bar order" providing contribution protection for a settling defendant. A contribution bar order pro-
hibits contribution claims against the settling defendant by reducing any judgment against the non-
settling defendant in an amount corresponding to the settling defendant's fair share of liability. This
reduction in judgment can either be pro tanto (reducing the non-settling defendant's liability by the
amount paid in settlement), ordered by the court after a "fairness" hearing on the settlement, or pro
rata, reducing the non-settling defendant's liability by the settling defendant's equitable share of
liability as determined at trial. Federal courts are split as to whether to give pro tanto or pro rata
contribution protection in private cleanup cost cases. See, e.g., Eric DeGroff, Raiders of the Lost
ARCO: Resolving the Partial Settlement Credit Issue in Private Cost Recovery and Contribution
Claims Under CERCLA, 8 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 332, 397 (2000) (arguing for pro rata protection in
CERCLA contribution claims and pro tanto protection in cost recovery claims). Complications can
arise when the applicable federal claim contribution protection rule differs from the state law rule.
Using a common body of state law in private cleanup cost disputes would eliminate this problem.
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ment agencies take the regulatory lead at most sites, the availability of
state law claims would facilitate coordination of cost claim elements and
regulatory agency remediation requirements. Finally, tort-based state
law cleanup cost claims could be asserted against government entity
PRPs because federal and state tort claims statutes authorize private tort-
based cleanup cost claims. 139
2. Flexibility
Using state law as the primary rule of decision in private cleanup
cost disputes would also promote flexibility in addressing the nation's
many contaminated sites. For example, CERCLA limits private cleanup
cost recovery to only those response costs consistent with the NCP.
140
Compliance with NCP requirements' 4 1 for conducting an appropriate
investigation into the extent of the pollution and evaluating the feasibility
of remedial alternatives, 142 as well as affording a meaningful opportunity
139. The federal government has been identified as a PRP at thousands of sites across the
country, potentially involving billions of dollars in cleanup costs. Several amicus curiae briefs filed
with the U.S. Supreme Court in Aviall argued that a PRP right of contribution under CERCLA was
necessary to promote cost recovery from the federal government at sites where the United States was
a PRP. See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 44 n.212. State tort law claims may be asserted against the
federal government pursuant to the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA). 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 2671-2680
(West 2006); see Hoery v. United States, 324 F.3d 1220, 1224 (10th Cir. 2003) (holding landowner
timely filed FTCA claim for continuing trespass and nuisance under Colorado tort law arising from
groundwater contamination); see also Elizabeth Ann Coleman, In Re Hoery v. United States: Com-
pensating Homeowners For Loss of Property Value Due to Toxic Pollution Under the Continuing
Tort Doctrine, 16 VILL. ENvTL. L.J. 35, 44-47 (2005) (discussing application of FTCA to continuing
tort claim relating to groundwater contamination). Similarly, state law claims may be asserted
against state governments pursuant to comparable state tort claim act statutes or other state statutes
waiving sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Ayers v. Jackson Tp., 525 A.2d 287, 291-92 (N.J. 1987)
(affirming in part nuisance personal injury damage award in action brought by local residents against
municipality regarding contaminants leaching from town landfill into aquifer). By contrast, the
Eleventh Amendment and state sovereign immunity protect state government entities from CERCLA
claims which can only be brought in federal court because CERCLA section 113(b) provides exclu-
sive federal court jurisdiction for claims "arising under" CERCLA. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(b) (West
2006); see, e.g., Bumette v. Carothers, 192 F.3d 52, 60 (2d Cir. 1999) (holding private CERCLA
action against state barred by the Eleventh Amendment).
140. A private party response action is consistent with the NCP if it is in "substantial" compli-
ance with applicable requirements of the NCP. 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(3)(i) (2005).
141. Private cleanup actions that result in a "CERCLA-quality cleanup" are considered consis-
tent with the NCP. See Regional Airport Authority of Louisville v. LFG, LLC, 460 F.3d 697, 707
(6th Cir. 2006) (holding cleanup is consistent with NCP if, taken as a whole, it is in substantial
compliance with NCP and results in a CERCLA-quality cleanup). For a private response action to
constitute a "CERCLA-quality cleanup," the selected remedy must: (1) protect human health and the
environment; (2) employ permanent solutions and alternative treatment technologies to the maxi-
mum extent practicable; (3) be cost effective; (4) identify and attain applicable or relevant and ap-
propriate requirements (ARARs, i.e., cleanup standards) for the site; and (5) provide for meaningful
public participation in the remedy selection process. See National Oil and Hazardous Substances
Pollution Contingency Plan, 55 Fed. Reg. 8666-01, 8793 (Mar. 8, 1990); Franklin County Conven-
tion Facilities Auth. v. Am. Premier Underwriters, Inc., 240 F.3d 534, 543 (6th Cir. 2001) (identify-
ing "CERCLA-quality cleanup" NCP factors).
142. The NCP requires preparation of a remedial investigation and feasibility study (RI/FS),
which involves, inter alia, a thorough analysis of contamination conditions and remedial alterna-
tives. 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(e)(9) (2005). See Carson Harbor Vill., Ltd. v. County of Los Angeles,
433 F.3d 1260, 1268-69 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding feasibility study fully analyzing only one remedial
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for public participation in the remedial process, 143 can be time consum-
ing and expensive. 144 The additional costs and delays required for NCP
consistency (and for CERCLA cost recovery from polluters) can dis-
courage prospective purchasers from acquiring and developing brown-
field or other properties contaminated by others. 1
45
State common law theories, while imposing culpability and causa-
tion proof requirements inapplicable to CERCLA claims, do not condi-
tion cleanup cost recovery on consistency with the NCP.146  State law,
therefore, could provide an attractive cost claim alternative for current
landowners hoping to conduct a technically sound cleanup without the
delay and expense often resulting from NCP requirements.147 Similarly,
alternative did not substantially comply with NCP). The final remedy selected by the lead regulatory
agency is documented in a Record of Decision (ROD). 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(0(1).
143. Public participation requirements include creation of a public information and community
relations plan and providing sufficient opportunity for public comment on the RI/FS and a proposed
remedy. 40 C.F.R. § 300.700(c)(6). Failure to comply with NCP public participation requirements
may bar cost recovery. See, e.g., Regional Airport Authority, 460 F.3d at 703-08 (affirming sum-
mary judgment for prior owner because plaintiff current landowner's claimed costs were not "neces-
sary" within the meaning of section 107(a)(4)(B) and were not consistent with the NCP because,
inter alia, plaintiff failed to permit public comment on the selected remedy); Carson Harbor Viii.,
433 F.3d at 1266-67 (holding plaintiff failed to show compliance with public participation require-
ment; "minor and ministerial" involvement of public agency did not provide effective substitute for
public participation); Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Reilly Indus., 215 F.3d 830, 835 (8th Cir. 2000) ("Fail-
ure to provide a meaningful opportunity for public participation and comment in the selection of a
remedial action at a particular cleanup site is inconsistent with the NCP.").
144. See, e.g., Richard G. Opper, The Brownfield Manifesto, 37 URB. LAW. 163, 182-83 (2005)
(noting that NCP requirements apply on their face to all sites regardless of their complexity, and
arguing for amending the NCP to streamline brownfield and other low-risk site regulation); see also
WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., 4 RODGERS' ENVIRONMENTAL LAW § 8:9 (2006 Update) ("It deserves
emphasis that the remedial implementation process for NPL sites can be slow (10 to 12 years from
initiation of the RI to site cleanup), ponderous (an average of 8 years of study before cleanup be-
gins), expensive (RI/FS cost $750,000 on average with a high of $7 million; remedies average $25
million, several have exceeded $100 million, and a few are approaching $ 1 billion), legally profuse
(139 RODs and 4 ROD amendments were signed during Fiscal Year 1989), labor consumptive
(some sites will go through 4 or 5 Remedial Project Managers in the years of implementation), and
unfailingly complex (single sites can generate multiple RI/FSs and multiple RODs (as many as
twenty) for each piece of the cleanup pie." (footnotes omitted)).
145. See Opper, supra note 144, at 183 ("The NCP needs to be updated to fit the new brown-
fields paradigm, or else it should adopt language to allow a finding of 'consistency' after little or no
elaborate process for certain types of common urban projects."); Schwenke, supra note 24, at 297
("The potential liability for environmental contamination continues to stand as a major impediment
to acquisition, financing, and development of these vacant or abandoned sites.").
146. In PMC, Inc. v. Sherwin-Williams Co., 151 F.3d 610, 617-18 (7th Cir. 1998), the Seventh
Circuit held that a plaintiff unable to recover response costs under CERCLA section 113(0(1) be-
cause of inconsistency with the NCP could not recover those costs derivatively under the Illinois
Contribution Act, reasoning that plaintiff PMC's attempted "invocation of Illinois' contribution
statute is an attempt to nullify the sanction that Congress imposed for the kind of CERCLA violation
that PMC committed." See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 93-99 (discussing PMC decision and argu-
ing that the NCP should not provide basis for CERCLA to preempt state statutory or common law
direct cleanup cost remedies).
147. See, e.g., Richard G. Opper, Managing Risks at Brownfield Sites, 20 NAT. RESOURCES &
ENv'T 32, 36 (2006). Mr. Opper observed that:
There is sometimes less risk, and a greater chance of success, for private cost-recovery
plaintiffs in a common law nuisance case than there is in using CERCLA. The use of a
continuing nuisance theory, incepting after mitigation measures are complete, can be ef-
ficient and effective in state court. It can be a cheaper and faster path through the litiga-
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without the specter of NCP consistency hovering over current landown-
ers looking to recover the costs of voluntary cleanup from other PRPs,
states could have greater flexibility with which to experiment and pro-
mote effective alternative site cleanup policies. 148
B. Theory Meets Reality. Current Doctrinal Limitations Prevent State
Law from Solving the National Problem of Encouraging Voluntary
Cleanups
In theory, state law remedies could encourage the voluntary cleanup
of contaminated sites as well as or better than a PRP cleanup cost remedy
under CERCLA. In fact, current state law is not up to the task. 149 The
doctrinal limitations of current state statutory and common law theories,
and the significant variations among state law tort regimes, make mean-
ingful state law cleanup cost remedies unavailable at many multi-PRP
sites across the country.
Nuisance casts the widest liability and remedial net among state law
claims potentially applicable to private cleanup cost disputes 150 because
it is not subject to limitations that constrict other state law theories. For
example, a trespass claim requires proof of intentional conduct and can
be defeated by a possessor consent defense. 5' Moreover, because the
tort of trespass is based on the unauthorized invasion of the possessory
interest of another in real property, trespass cannot be asserted by a cur-
tion than federal court, and it does not require compliance with the National Contingency
Plan, providing for cost savings during the cleanup.
Id
148. See Tom Kuhnle, The Rebirth of Common Law Actions for Addressing Hazardous Waste
Contamination, 15 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 187, 221 (1996) ("[s]tate and local laws are better than federal
laws at reflecting local preferences for environmental quality and at encouraging valuable environ-
mental policy experimentation" (citing Richard B. Stewart, Pyramids of Sacrifice? Problems of
Federalism in Mandating State Implementation of National Environmental Policy, 86 YALE L. J.
1196, 1210 (1977) ("[s]tate and local governments can better reflect geographical variations in
preferences for collective goals like environmental quality."))).
149. See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 68-79.
150. See supra notes 30-34 and accompanying text; infra notes 151-61 and accompanying text;
see also WARREN FREEDMAN, HAZARDOUS WASTE LIABILrrY 121 (1992) ("[N]uisance is a more
reliable theory of liability than trespass or negligence for the hazardous waste disposal situation.");
Klein, supra note 12, at 353-54 (noting that "[i]n light of CERCLA's failures, legal commentators
have increasingly suggested that courts supplement or replace the legislative regime through an
expanded use of common law tort actions-in particular, nuisance law," and citing the observation
of RODGERS, supra note 144, at 112-13, that "[t]here is no common law doctrine that approaches
nuisance in comprehensiveness or detail as a regulator of land use and of technological abuse.");
Roger Meiners & Bruce Yandle, Common Law and the Conceit of Modern Environmental Policy, 7
GEO. MASON L. REV. 923, 926 (1999) ("The nuisance cause of action provides the backbone of
common law environmental (pollution) litigation."). More than one common law theory, of course,
may apply to a private cleanup cost dispute. See, e.g., Joseph F. Falcone III & Daniel Utain, You
Can Teach an Old Dog New Tricks: The Application of Common Law In Present-Day Environ-
mental Disputes, 11 VILL. ENVTL. L.J. 59, 88 (2000) (noting that "cases have recognized that inva-
sions of property that amount to a trespass may also constitute a nuisance").
151. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 158 cmt. e (1965) (intentional conduct is
required for trespass, but intrusion with consent of a possessor is privileged); Edgcomb v. Lower
Valley Power and Light, Inc., 922 P.2d 850, 859 (Wyo. 1996) (consent of possessor is an absolute
defense to a trespass action under Wyoming law).
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rent landowner seeking to recover cleanup costs from a prior owner or
tenant who disposed of contaminants while possessing the property.'52
Negligence claims require proof that the defendant's conduct did not
conform to an applicable standard of care 53 and may not fall within the
continuing tort doctrine in order to avoid a statute of limitations de-
fense. 154 Strict liability for an abnormally dangerous activity can be un-
predictable because of the multi-factored balancing analysis required to
show that an activity is abnormally dangerous, 155 and in some states this
doctrine is inapplicable to contaminated property disputes. 156  None of
these limitations generally apply to a nuisance claim.
152. See, e.g., Wellesley Hills Realty Trust v. Mobil Oil Corp. 747 F. Supp. 93, 99 (D. Mass.
1990) ("Mobil owned and was in possession of the property when it allegedly released the oil caus-
ing the contamination. Thus, Mobil's releases of oil were not unprivileged, and Mobil clearly was
not intruding on land in the possession of another. Mobil's releases of oil on its own land, therefore,
cannot constitute a trespass."); Capogeannis v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. App. 4th 668, 674 (Cal. Ct.
Ap. 1993) ("Manifestly one cannot commit an actionable interference with one's own possessory
right."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821 D cmt. d (1965) ("A trespass is an invasion of the
interest in the exclusive possession of land, as by entry upon it."); see also Falcone & Utain, supra
note 150, at 100 ("While a small minority ofjurisdictions are willing to permit current landowners to
sue previous owners for contamination under claims of nuisance and strict liability, there are an even
smaller number of jurisdictions willing to allow them to sue under a claim for trespass under similar
conditions.").
153. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 282 (1965) ("[N]egligence is conduct
which falls below the standard established by law for the protection of others against unreasonable
risk of harm."). Contamination caused by waste disposal practices that at the time reflected state of
the art technology may not be actionable years late under a negligence theory. See Aronovsky,
supra note 5, at 70 n.304.
154. See, e.g., Andritz Sprout-Bauer, Inc. v. Beazer E., Inc., 12 F. Supp. 2d 391, 417 (M.D. Pa.
1998) (finding current landowner's negligence claim against former owner and operator of site time-
barred; continuing tort doctrine applies only to trespass and nuisance, not negligence); Church v.
General Elec. Co. 138 F. Supp. 2d 169, 174 (D. Mass. 2001) (under Massachusetts law, continuing
tort doctrine is limited to nuisance and trespass claims and does not apply to negligence or strict
liability claims). But see Nat'l. Tel. Co-op. Ass'n. v. Exxon Corp., 38 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6-7 (D.D.C.
1998) (holding under District of Columbia law that continuing tort theory applied to toll five year
limitations period on commercial property owner's negligence and strict liability for ultra-hazardous
activity claims alleging that gasoline leaking from a neighbor's underground storage tanks). Appli-
cation of the discovery rule, coupled by a tolling of the statute of limitations following discovery of
contamination during site evaluation could reduce the risk that a negligence-based cleanup cost
claim could become time barred. See Melanie R. Kay, Environmental Negligence: A Proposal for a
New Cause of Action for the Forgotten Innocent Owners of Contaminated Land, 94 CAL. L. REV.
149, 172 (2006) (proposing environmental negligence cause of action that would toll statute of
limitations during pendency of site investigation).
155. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 520 (1977); supra note 37 (identifying the six
factors to consider in determining whether an activity is abnormally dangerous); see, e.g., Nnadili v.
Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 435 F. Supp. 2d 93, 103 (D.D.C. 2006) (applying District of Columbia law
and section 520 balancing factors to grant defendant's motion for summary judgment on the ground
that storage of gasoline in defendant's underground storage tanks did not constitute an abnormally
dangerous activity); cf Klass, supra note 34, at 963 (noting the continued problem of unpredictabil-
ity in applying section 520 multi-factor analysis).
156. See, e.g., Nat'l Tel. Coop. Ass'n v. Exxon Corp., 38 F. Supp. 2d 1, 8 (D.D.C. 1998) (ob-
serving that strict liability for abnormally dangerous activity had not yet been explicitly adopted in
the District of Columbia); Jones v. Texaco, Inc., 945 F. Supp. 1037, 1050 (S.D. Tex. 1996) (noting
Texas courts have rejected doctrine of abnormally dangerous activities as a basis for strict liability in
the context of hazardous wastes); Arawana Mills Co. v. United Techs. Corp., 795 F. Supp. 1238,
1251 (D. Conn. 1992) (concluding Connecticut law would not recognize storage and use of hazard-
ous materials as abnormally dangerous).
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Nuisance law similarly avoids many of the limitations of "state
Superfund" statutes. For example, some of these statutes limit private
cost recovery to costs consistent with the NCP. 157 Some state Superfund
statutes apply only to releases occurring after the statute was enacted. 1
58
Like CERCLA, 159 some state Superfund statutes do not apply to petro-
leum. 160  Finally, like CERCLA section 113(f), some State Superfund
statutes only permit contribution claims during or after judicial or admin-
istrative proceedings against a PRP. 161
As discussed below, nuisance law has great promise as a rule of de-
cision in private cleanup cost disputes because its flexibility corresponds
well to the complexity of soil and groundwater contamination prob-
lems. 162  Moreover, nuisance law avoids doctrinal limitations presented
157. See, e.g., KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-400 (West 2006); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 58:10-
23.11t3 (West 2006). Some state Superfund statutes do not require NCP consistency for cost recov-
ery. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 49-285(B) (West 2006); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 7, § 9105
(West 2006); FLA. STAT. § 403.727 (West 2006); GA. CODE ANN. § 12-8-96.1 (West 2006); MICH.
COMp. LAWS ANN. § 324.20126 (West 2006). Because state Superfund statutes often largely mirror
the structure and liability scheme of CERCLA, see infra notes 159-61, state Superfund statutes
permitting contribution for cleanup costs that are not consistent with the NCP could be subject
(properly or otherwise) to a preemption challenge on the ground that using a "state version of
CERCLA" to permit recovery of non-NCP costs would undermine the goals of CERCLA. Such an
overbroad preemption analysis would be ill-considered. See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 90-98.
158. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25366(a) (Deering 2005) (no liability for
actions before January 1, 1982 if the actions were not in violation of then-existing state or federal
law); lAW. REV. STAT. § 128D-6 (2005) (no private recovery of costs arising from a release occur-
ring before July 1, 1990).
159. State Superfund statutes often adopt or incorporate provisions from CERCLA. See, e.g.,
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25323.5 (Deering 2005) (incorporating CERCLA definitions of
"responsible party" and "liable person"); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-4-8 (West 2006) (incorporating
CERCLA definition of liable parties); UTAH CODE ANN. § 19-6-302(20) (West 2006) ("remedial
investigation" means a remedial investigation and feasibility study as defined in the NCP).
160. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 46.09.900 (2005); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25317
(Deering 2005); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 224.01-400(l)(a) (West 2006); VA. CODE ANN. § 10.1-
1400 (West 2006).
161. See, e.g., Wacker Chem. Corp. v. Bayer Cropscience, Inc., No. 05-72207, 2006 WL
2404502, at *5 (E.D. Mich. Aug. 18, 2006) (relying on Aviall to interpret Mich. Comp. Laws §
324.20129(3) to permit contribution actions only during or after civil actions brought under Michi-
gan state Superfund statute); 35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 6020.705(a) (West 2006). Amending state Super-
fund statutes to ensure cleanup cost contribution rights for all PRPs, including current landowners,
could serve the same "safety net" function as confirming a similar right under CERCLA. Attempt-
ing to amend a state Superfund statute, however, could be frustrated by the same risk of "opening
Pandora's box" and confronting the often competing demands of contaminated property dispute
stakeholders that have frustrated efforts to amend core provisions of CERCLA for the past twenty
years. See Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 81. In any event, state Superfund statute cleanup cost con-
tribution rights (like CERCLA contribution rights) would not provide the litigation efficiency and
remedial flexibility benefits available under the proposed private nuisance paradigm, such as the
application of a common body of tort law to both cleanup cost and other claims raised in private
contaminated property disputes and the absence of the NCP consistency and petroleum exclusion
limitations sometimes found in state Superfund statutory schemes.
162. See infra note 175 and accompanying text; see also Denise E. Antolini, Modernizing
Public Nuisance: Solving the Paradox of the Special Injury Rule, 28 ECOLOGY L.Q. 755, 771 (2001)
("Although amorphous in definition, all nuisance actions have in common three important doctrinal
aspects that provide unique scope to their application by the courts: substantiality of interference,
unreasonableness of the defendant's conduct, and equitable flexibility."); Kuhnle, supra note 148, at
221-23 (arguing that nuisance liability is more contextual, less predictable than CERCLA, not lim-
ited by legislative line-drawing).
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by other state law theories. 163 Nevertheless, the current state of nuisance
law fails as a meaningful alternative to a uniform federal rule of decision
in private cleanup cost disputes for the promotion of voluntary cleanups.
Simply put, nuisance law has not evolved to meet the realities of modern
contaminated property problems. 164
C. The Inadequate State of Current Nuisance Law
1. Nuisance-A Brief Overview
Nuisance law dates back to the twelfth century; 65  its well-
documented history 166 does not require repetition here. William Prosser
famously observed that "[t]here is perhaps no more impenetrable jungle
in the entire law than that which surrounds the word 'nuisance.',' 167 As
one court observed, "in order to alleviate some of the confusion [sur-
rounding the use of the term "nuisance"], it is important to distinguish
'private' and 'public' nuisance, which 'bear little relationship to each
other. Although some rules apply to both, other rules apply to one but
not the other." 168
163. See infra notes 151-61 and accompanying text; cf Kay, supra note 154, at 162-68 (argu-
ing for an "environmental negligence" cause of action because, among other things, doctrinal limita-
tions make current nuisance law unavailable or inadequate to meet common contamination prob-
lems); Klein, supra note 12, at 339 (arguing that "shifting costs through nuisance law is no more
efficient than shifting costs through CERCLA-created liability" and proposing instead a broad-based
system of revenue collection to fund cleanups).
164. See, e.g., G. Nelson Smith III, Nuisance and Trespass Claims in Environmental Litiga-
tion: Legislative Inaction and Common Law Confusion, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 39 (1995). Mr.
Smith argued that:
The use of common law nuisance and trespass claims to address environmental problems
is an outdated method since much of the case law relied upon precedes the enactment of
many of the environmental statutes. Consequently, the cases do not direct the courts on
how to confront the complicated problems that are associated with pollution.
Id. at 70.
165. See, e.g., id. at 41 (describing twelfth century origins of nuisance); Falcone & Utain,
supra note 150, at 65 ("The legal theory of nuisance dates back to the twelfth century.").
166. See, e.g., Antolini, supra note 162, at 767-68; Robert G. Bone, Normative Theory and
Legal Doctrine in American Nuisance Law: 1850-1920, 59 S. CAL. L. REV. 1101, 1139-41 (1986);
H. Marlow Green, Common Law, Property Rights and the Environment: A Comparative Analysis of
Historical Developments in the United States and England and a Model for the Future, 30 CORNELL
INT'L L.J. 541, 545-46 (1997); Jeff L. Lewin, Boomer and the American Law of Nuisance: Past,
Present and Future, 54 ALB. L. REV. 189, 192-96 (1990); William A. McRae, Jr., The Development
of Nuisance in the Early Common Law, 1 U. FLA. L. REv. 27 (1948); William H. Wilson, Comment,
Nuisance as a Modern Mode of Land Use Control, 46 WASH. L. REv. 47, 54-55 (1970).
167. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAWOFTORTS 571 (4th ed. 1971).
168. United States v. Hooker Chems. & Plastics Corp., 722 F. Supp. 960, 964 (W.D.N.Y.
1989) (quoting State of New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1050 (2d Cir.1985)).
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Public and private nuisance differ in significant respects. 169 A pub-
lic nuisance is "an unreasonable interference with a right common to the
general public."'' 70  Government entities may bring an action to enjoin
and compel the abatement of a public nuisance. 171  Private parties af-
fected by a public nuisance (e.g., the owner of property impacted by a
contaminated groundwater plume) must show an injury different than
that suffered by other affected property owners to state a prima facie
public nuisance claim. 172  Major contaminated groundwater problems
affecting an entire neighborhood or public water supply would cause or
threaten to cause harm to a common interest of the general public and
thus qualify as a public nuisance. Most contaminated property disputes,
however, do not involve a public nuisance. For example, contaminated
soil problems (usually limited to a single parcel of polluted property) and
discrete contaminated groundwater problems (i.e., those involving at
most only a handful of properties down-gradient from the source prop-
erty and not threatening a public water supply) likely would not be con-
sidered a public nuisance. The environmental nuisance paradigm pro-
posed by this article focuses on private nuisance contaminated property
disputes, rather than public nuisance. 1
73
169. See, e.g., Antolini, supra note 162, at 774-75. Professor Antolini observed that:
Public nuisance offers plaintiffs several important strategic advantages. Its primary ad-
vantage is a more direct focus on the merits-the existence of the nuisance, the injury,
and the appropriate remedy-than is available in many statutory cases, where the focus is
often on procedure or violations of permits or standards. Moreover, public nuisance gives
plaintiffs the opportunity to obtain damages and injunctive relief, lacks laches and other
common tort defenses, is immune to administrative law defenses such as exhaustion,
avoids the private nuisance requirement that the plaintiff be a landowner/occupier of af-
fected land, eliminates a fault requirement, and circumvents any pre-suit notice require-
ment.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
170. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821B(1) (1979).
171. Id. § 821C(2)(b).
172. See id. § 821C(l) ("In order to recover damages in an individual action for a public nui-
sance, one must have suffered harm of a kind different from that suffered by other members of the
public exercising the right common to the general public that was the subject of interference.").
Distinctions between public and private nuisance vary among the states, including the requirement
that a private plaintiff suffer a "special injury" providing standing to bring a public nuisance claim,
may further restrict the availability of private cleanup cost remedies at contaminated groundwater
sites. See Antolini, supra note 162, at 761 (discussing the development and various applications of
the special injury requirement for private standing to bring a public nuisance claim). For example,
some courts have found that cleanup costs incurred by a current landowner constitute such a "special
injury," see, e.g., Westwood Pharm., Inc. v. Nat'l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1272, 1281-
82 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying New York law to hold that incurring NCP-consistent response costs
constituted special injury providing standing to maintain public nuisance action), while others do
not, see, e.g., Philadelphia Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 316 (3d Cir. 1985) (applying
Pennsylvania law and holding that a current landowner lacked standing to maintain a public nuisance
claim because cleanup costs incurred to remediate contamination for which plaintiff is liable as
current property owner did not constitute injury suffered exercising right common to general public);
Hamlin Group, Inc. v. Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 759 F. Supp. 925, 935 (D. Me. 1990) (applying
Maine law and holding that response costs incurred by current landowner to cleanup own property
did not constitute special injury suffered exercising right common to general public).
173. Public and private nuisance address different interests (rights common to the general
public as compared to the use and enjoyment of private property) and employ a variety of different
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Section 822 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts addresses the
scope of private nuisance:
[o]ne is subject to liability for a private nuisance if, but only if, his
conduct is a legal cause of an invasion of another's interest in the
private use and enjoyment of land, and the invasion is either (a) in-
tentional and unreasonable, or (b) unintentional and otherwise ac-
tionable under the rules controlling liability for negligent or reckless
conduct, or for abnormally dangerous conditions or activities. 
174
Courts have considerable flexibility in fashioning private nuisance reme-
dies, including money damages or injunctive relief tailored to the nature
and scope of the underlying invasion. 175
Soil or groundwater contamination often results in a substantial in-
terference with the use and enjoyment of property and thus falls squarely
within the definition of private nuisance. 176 For example, the current
rules (e.g., private actions to enjoin a public nuisance generally are not barred by statutes of limita-
tions and can be brought by a current owner against the former owner of the same property). A
detailed analysis of public nuisance is beyond the scope of this article. A large proportion of con-
taminated property disputes would fall within the scope of private nuisance law; the environmental
nuisance paradigm proposed by this article addresses the application of private nuisance to contami-
nated property disputes.
174. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 822 (1979). Private nuisance requires proof of
culpability, i.e., intentional and unreasonable, negligent, reckless, or "abnormally dangerous" con-
duct by the defendant. Cf RODGERS, supra note 144, § 2.4 ("Nuisance law is continuing on the road
to becoming a strict liability tort although there is more than a little meander in the chosen path.").
In some jurisdictions, culpable conduct by the plaintiff may present an obstacle to recovery. See,
e.g., Copart Indus., Inc. v. Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y., 362 N.E.2d 968, 970 (N.Y. 1977)
("[A]lthough contributory negligence may be a defense where the basis of the nuisance is merely
negligent conduct, it would not be where the wrongdoing is founded on the intentional, deliberate
misconduct of defendant."); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840E cmt. d (explaining
that where plaintiff contributes to pollution and, if the harm is capable of apportionment, the appor-
tionment will be made and the defendant will be held liable to the extent of his own contribution, but
where apportionment cannot be made the plaintiff's own responsibility for the entire harm will bar
recovery). Under the proposed environmental nuisance paradigm, plaintiff's culpability would be
relevant to fashioning an appropriate remedy under comparative responsibility principles. See infra
notes 440-41 and accompanying text.
175. See, RODGERS supra note 144, § 2.13 (describing available private nuisance remedies and
observing that "[t]he balancing associated so prominently with nuisance law comes to the fore in the
fashioning of remedies" (footnote omitted)); see also James B. Brown & Michael V. Sucaet, Envi-
ronmental Cleanup Efficiency: Private Recovery Actions for Environmental Response Costs, 7 T.M.
COOLEY L. REv. 363, 381 (1990) ("The common-law action of nuisance encompasses a wide variety
of injuries. This type of action is particularly significant in the environmental context due to the
availability of both equitable relief and damages."). When available, the flexibility of private nui-
sance remedies can tailor the allocation of cleanup cost responsibilities to specific remediation
dispute circumstances. The severe doctrinal limitations of current private nuisance law, however,
bar its application to many common contaminated property dispute problems. See infra notes 177-
360 and accompanying text.
176. See, e.g., Williams Pipe Line Co. v. Bayer Corp., 964 F. Supp. 1300, 1330 (S.D. Iowa
1997) (stating that under Iowa law, "[c]hemical contamination of land, such as underground gaso-
line, can qualify as a nuisance."); MSOF Corp. v. Exxon Corp, 934 So. 2d 708, 721 (La. Ct. App.
2005) (reversing the trial court's granting of summary judgment for the defendant and holding that
potential contamination and health advisories arising from defendant's waste disposal support pri-
vate nuisance claim); Wood v. Picillo, 443 A.2d 1244, 1248 (R.I. 1982) (maintaining hazardous
waste dump site constituted public and private nuisance where "defendants' dumping operations
have already caused substantial injury to defendants' neighbors and threaten to cause incalculable
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owner of a contaminated site may need to incur cleanup costs to comply
with regulatory requirements, restore the value and utility of the prop-
erty, or pursue property development opportunities. Private nuisance,
therefore, would appear well-suited to provide a basis for a current land-
owner to recover from other PRPs who caused or contributed to site con-
tamination their fair share of cleanup costs. An analysis of private nui-
sance law across the United States, however, reveals four significant
doctrinal limitations that severely limit the effectiveness of nuisance as a
rule of decision in private cleanup cost disputes: (1) most states limit
private nuisance claims to disputes involving neighboring property uses;
(2) in many states the doctrine of caveat emptor bars private nuisance
claims against predecessor owners; (3) many states employ an anachro-
nistic interpretation of the continuing nuisance doctrine to render time-
barred private nuisance claims at older contamination sites; and (4) the
misplacement of the burden of proof regarding whether a nuisance is
permanent or continuing can extinguish claims for unabated contamina-
tion and create a series of perverse incentives against proactive site in-
vestigation and informal cleanup cost dispute resolution. The following
subsections will analyze each of these doctrinal limitations. Part III de-
scribes an environmental nuisance paradigm that solves each problem.
2. Geographic Limitations: Same Property Pollution Disputes
Many private cleanup cost disputes concern contamination caused
or contributed to by former occupants of the contaminated property, as
opposed to contamination that originated on neighboring property.
"Same property" pollution arises in many settings, such as former land-
fills and properties that once housed manufacturing facilities or retail
establishments (such as dry cleaners or service stations) that handled
hazardous substances. Current landowners at these sites are left with
"predecessor pollution" that impairs the value of the property and re-
quires compliance with regulatory cleanup requirements. Most states,
however, bar same property private nuisance claims by a current land-
owner seeking damages or equitable relief for contamination originating
on her property. 
177
damage to the general public. The Picillos' neighbors have displayed physical symptoms of expo-
sure to toxic chemicals and have been restricted in the reasonable use of their property. Moreover,
expert testimony showed that the chemical presence on defendants' property threatens both aquatic
wildlife and human beings with possible death, cancer, and liver disease.").
177. See, e.g., Evans v. Lochmere Recreation Club, Inc., 627 S.E.2d 340, 342 (N.C. Ct. App.
2006) ("[A] private nuisance exists in a legal sense when one makes an improper use of his own
property and in that way injures the land or some incorporeal right of one's neighbor."); Pestey v.
Cushman, 788 A.2d 496, 502 (Conn. 2002) (quoting Nailor v. C.w. Blakeslee & Sons, Inc., 167 A.
548 (Conn. 1933)) ("The law of private nuisance springs from the general principle that '[i]t is the
duty of every person to make a reasonable use of his own property so as to occasion no unnecessary
damage or annoyance to his neighbor."'); Demont v. Abbas, 32 N.W.2d 737, 738 (Neb. 1948)
("Generally, an owner of property has a right to make any use of it he sees fit. It is only where his
use prevents his neighbors from the enjoyment of their property to their damage that an owner's use
may be restricted."); Hydro-Mfg., Inc. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 640 A.2d 950, 957 (R.I. 1994) ("Under
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a. Majority View: No Same Property Private Nuisance
Claims
The vast majority of states restrict private nuisance claims to dis-
putes between neighboring landowners. 178  The seminal case barring
Rhode Island law it is well settled that a cause of action for a private nuisance 'arises from the un-
reasonable use of one's property that materially interferes with a neighbor's physical comfort or the
neighbor's use of his real estate.' The offensive condition therefore must originate outside the
plaintiff's land." (quoting Weida v. Ferry, 493 A.2d 824, 826 (R.I. 1985))); Sans v. Ramsey Golf &
Country Club, Inc., 149 A.2d 599, 605 (N.J. 1959) ("The question is not simply whether a person is
annoyed or disturbed, but whether the annoyance or disturbance arises from an unreasonable use of
the neighbor's land or operation of his business."); Beckman v. Marshall, 85 So. 2d 552, 554 (Fla.
1956) (quoting Antonik v. Chamberlain, 78 N.E.2d 752, 758 (Ohio Ct. App. 1947) for the proposi-
tion that "Nuisance, in law, for the most part consists in so using one's property as to injure the land
or some incorporeal right of one's neighbor ....'); Sewell v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 197 F. Supp.
2d 1160, 1171-72 (W.D. Ark. 2002) (granting summary judgment for defendant on same property
private nuisance claim, citing Southeast Arkansas Landfill, Inc. v. State, 858 S.W.2d 665, 667 (Ark.
1993) for the proposition that "the Arkansas Supreme Court defines nuisance to contemplate sepa-
rate parcels of property"); State v. Jacob Decker & Sons, 196 N.W. 600, 601 (Iowa 1924) ("The
essential element in nuisance is the injury to one's neighbors, and involves an invasion of the legal
rights of persons sustaining peculiar relations to the property or thing in question, or threatening or
impending danger to the public."). Some states that bar "same property" private nuisance claims
will nevertheless permit a private plaintiff who has suffered the "special injury" required for stand-
ing to seek recovery for "same property" contamination constituting a public nuisance. See, e.g.,
Westwood Pharm., Inc. v. Nat'l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1272, 1282 (W.D.N.Y. 1990)
(applying New York law); see also infra notes 378-79 and accompanying text. In Moore v. Texaco,
Inc., 244 F.3d 1229 (10th Cir. 2001), the Tenth Circuit affirmed summary judgment under Okla-
homa law in favor of defendant former landowner against public and private nuisance claims
brought by a current landowner in connection with soil contamination caused by petroleum. The
court noted that while a public nuisance claim could be asserted against Texaco, the former land-
owner, plaintiff Moore had adduced no evidence that Texaco had either caused the pollution on the
property or failed to abate prior pollution about which it had knowledge prior to selling the property
to Moore. Moore, 244 F.3d at 1231-32. The Tenth Circuit further held that Moore could not main-
tain a private nuisance claim based on the petroleum pollution and the construction of berms on the
property, finding it "likely that Oklahoma would reach the same conclusion reached by nearly every
other court to consider the issue: that an action for private nuisance is designed to protect neighbor-
ing landowners from conflicting uses of property, not successor landowners from conditions on the
land they purchased." Id. at 1232. Similarly, some courts have recognized an exception to the
private nuisance neighboring property limitation for private nuisance claims by a landlord against a
tenant. Compare, e.g., Graham Oil Co. v. BP Oil Co., 885 F. Supp. 716, 725 (W.D. Pa. 1994) (deny-
ing motion to dismiss private nuisance claim under Pennsylvania law brought by landlord against
tenant who operated gas station that allegedly caused contamination on leased property), with, e.g.,
Patton v. TPI Petroleum, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 2d 921, 931-32 (E.D. Ark. 2005) (dismissing landlord's
private nuisance claim against commercial tenant because under Arkansas law nuisance claims
limited to neighboring property disputes).
178. See, e.g., Falcone & Utain, supra note 150, at 78-84 (describing restriction of nuisance
claims disputes between neighboring landowners as the "majority approach"); see also 9 RICHARD
R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 64.02[3] (Michael Allan Wolf ed., 2000) ("Unreason-
ableness has a role to play in private nuisance law in that plaintiffs are not expected to tolerate un-
reasonable interference with use and enjoyment of their real property .... The conclusion of 'unrea-
sonableness' depends then upon liability-inviting conduct of the defendant plus a finding that this
conduct violates a protected interest of the neighbor-plaintiff."); Edward Rabin, Nuisance Law:
Rethinking Fundamental Assumptions, 63 VA. L. REV. 1299, 1319 (1977) ("An interference is not a
nuisance unless, among other things, it substantially interferes with the use and enjoyment of
neighboring land."); Andrew Jackson Heimert, Keeping Pigs Out of Parlors: Using Nuisance Law to
Affect the Location of Pollution, 27 ENVTL. L. 403, 406 (1997) ("Nuisance actions to abate interfer-
ences with an owner's interest in land have existed for over eight hundred years. The pre-
Revolutionary body of American nuisance law accepted the oft-repeated maxim, sic utere tuo ut
alienum non laedes ('one should use his own property in such a manner as not to injure that of an-
other')." (footnotes omitted)). By contrast, CERCLA makes the owner or operator of contaminated
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private nuisance claims for same property hazardous substance contami-
nation is the Third Circuit's 1985 decision in Philadelphia Elec. Co. v.
Hercules, Inc.' 79 Philadelphia Electric Company (PECO) acquired prop-
erty in Chester, Pennsylvania, that had once been used as a hydrocarbon
resin manufacturing plant and at which a former owner had disposed of
resins and by-products.' 8 0 Following discovery of the contamination, the
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Resources directed PECO to
remediate the site. 181 PECO sued Hercules (as successor to the former
owner of the PECO property), asserting public and private nuisance
claims under Pennsylvania law. 182  PECO sought to recover cleanup
costs and lost property rentals caused by the contamination, and obtain
an injunction directing Hercules to abate any remaining contamina-
tion. 8 3 A jury awarded cleanup cost and delay damages to PECO and
the district court issued the requested injunction against Hercules.' 8 4 On
appeal, the Third Circuit reversed, holding that Pennsylvania law did not
permit a same property private or public nuisance claim. 1
85
The Third Circuit started its private nuisance analysis by turning to
the Restatement (Second) of Torts. The court assumed that the prior
owner had created a nuisance within the meaning of section 821 D of the
Restatement (Second) of Torts, which "defines a 'private nuisance' as 'a
nontrespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and en-
joyment of land."",186 The court found that "[t]he crucial and difficult
question for us is to whom Hercules may be liable."'' 8 7 The court con-
cluded that while Hercules might be liable in nuisance for a claim
brought by a neighboring property owner, Hercules owed no duty under
nuisance law to a successor owner of the Chester site, such as PECO. '88
The court reasoned that barring same property nuisance claims "is con-
sonant with the historical role of private nuisance law as a means of effi-
ciently resolving conflicts between neighboring, contemporaneous land
uses. '189 The court noted that:
property at the time of disposal of a hazardous substance liable for response costs without limiting
direct or derivative private response cost recovery rights to neighboring property owners. 42
U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(2), (4) (West 2006).
179. Phila. Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1985).
180. Phila. Elec. Co., 762 F.2d at 306.
181. Id. at 307.
182. Id. at 307-08.
183. Id. at 308.
184. Id.; see also Phila. Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 587 F. Supp. 144, 147 (E.D. Pa. 1984).
185. The Third Circuit affirmed that Hercules was the successor to the prior owners of the
PECO property under a defacto merger theory, but held that PECO could not state a same property
nuisance claim under Pennsylvania law. Phila. Elec. Co., 762 F.2d at 312-14.
186. Phila. Elec. Co., 762 F. 2d at 313.
187. Id.
188. Id. at 314. The court noted that while "PECO also owned an adjoining piece of land, and
thus was a neighbor of Hercules .... [PECO did] not, however, allege that pollution of the Chester
site interfered with its use and enjoyment of this adjoining site." Id. at 314 n.8.
189. Id. at 314.
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[A]ll of the very useful and sophisticated economic analyses of pri-
vate nuisance remedies published in recent years proceed on the basis
that the goal of nuisance law is to achieve efficient and equitable so-
lutions to problems created by discordant land uses. In this light nui-
sance law can be seen as a complement to zoning regulations,... and
not as an additional type of consumer protection for the purchasers of
realty. Neighbors, unlike the purchasers of land upon which a nui-
sance exists, have no opportunity to protect themselves through in-
spection and negotiation. The record shows that PECO acted as a
sophisticated and responsible purchaser-inquiring into the past use
of the Chester site, and inspecting it carefully. We find it inconceiv-
able that the price it offered Gould did not reflect the possibility of
environmental risks, even if the exact condition giving rise to this suit
was not discovered. 
190
The court concluded that to "extend private nuisance beyond its histori-
cal role would render it little more than an epithet, 'and an epithet does
not make out a cause of action."' 91 Finally, the court underscored its
discomfort with extending private nuisance to same property disputes by
referencing the nascent state of federal and state environmental statutes,
observing that "[s]uch an extension of common law doctrine is particu-
larly hazardous in an area, such as environmental pollution, where Con-
gress and the state legislatures are actively seeking to achieve a socially
acceptable definition of rights and liabilities."'
92
The court also found PECO's public nuisance claim unavailing. On
the one hand, the court rejected Hercules' contention that the neighbor-
ing property dispute limitation on private nuisance claims applied
equally to public nuisance claims, 93 noting that the "doctrine of public
nuisance protects interests quite different from those implicated in ac-
tions for private nuisance, . . . [and that] an action for public nuisance
may lie even though neither the plaintiff nor the defendant acts in the
exercise of private property rights."' 94 The court nevertheless concluded
that under Pennsylvania law spending money to remediate predecessor
pollution did not constitute the "special injury" or "particular damage"
190. Id. (citation omitted). The court further held that the doctrine of caveat emptor barred
PECO's claim. Id. at 312-13. See infra notes 221-43 and accompanying text. The court also found
analogous a series of Pennsylvania cases (later overruled) that did not permit "tenants to circumvent
traditional limitations on the liability of lessors by the expedient of casting their cause of action for
defective conditions existing on premises (over which they have assumed control) as one for private
nuisance." Phila. Elec. Co., 762 F.2d at 313. The court noted that although these tenant-landlord
cases had been overruled by the time of the Philadelphia Electric decision, they nevertheless re-
flected "sound tort theory." Id. at 314 n.8.
191. Id. at 315 (citation omitted).
192. Id. at 315 n. 13; see also infra notes 379-82 and accompanying text.
193. Phila. Elec. Co., 762 F.2d at 315 n.13.
194. Id. at 315.
20061
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different in kind from that suffered by the general public required for
PECO to assert a public nuisance claim. 
195
Over the next two decades, courts around the country embraced the
reasoning of Philadelphia Electric to reject same property pollution pri-
vate nuisance claims under the laws of other states.'1 96 These decisions
tended to rely on the traditional role of private nuisance as a vehicle for
resolving disputes between neighboring land uses; they typically neither
identified nor rested on positive law that barred same property private
nuisance claims.
195. Id. at 316.
196. See, e.g., Lilly Indus., Inc. v. Health-Chem Corp., 974 F. Supp. 702, 706-08 (S.D. Ind.
1993) (applying Indiana law); Truck Components, Inc. v. K&H Corporation, No. 94 C 50250, 1995
WL 692541, at *12 (N.D. II1., Nov. 22, 1995) (applying Illinois law); Metro. Water Reclamation
Dist. of Greater Chicago v. Lake River Corp., 365 F. Supp. 2d 913, 918-19 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (stating
that under Illinois law the purpose of private nuisance action is to resolve disputes between
neighboring, contemporaneous landowners); Amland Props. Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F.
Supp. 784, 808 (D.N.J. 1989) ("Because New Jersey courts have read private nuisance to encompass
only instances of danger to the public or interference with the use of adjoining land, Amland's claim
here must fall."); Wellesley Hills Realty Trust v. Mobil Oil Corp., 747 F. Supp. 93, 98-99 (D. Mass
1990) ("Because the law of private nuisance requires that the interference be to persons outside the
land upon which the condition is maintained, the Massachusetts Court of Appeals has held that a
vendee of land does not have a private nuisance action against a vendor for its contamination prior to
the sale."); Hanlin Group, Inc. v. Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 759 F. Supp. 925, 935 (D. Me.
1990) (applying Maine law); Berry v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 780 F. Supp. 1097, 1103 (S.D. Miss.
1991) (applying Mississippi law to grant summary judgment on private nuisance claim, stating that
"[the common law of nuisance does not protect a landowner from interference or harm resulting
from a previous use of his property by a prior landowner."); Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 642
A.2d 180, 190 (Md. 1994) (affirming summary judgment on ground that Maryland law was consis-
tent with holding in Philadelphia Electric and other courts that "a cause of action for private nui-
sance requires an interference with a neighbor's use and enjoyment of the land."); Hydro-Mfg., Inc.
v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 640 A.2d 950, 957 (D.R.I. 1994) (applying Rhode Island law); Dartron Corp.
v. Uniroyal Chem. Comp., Inc., 893 F. Supp. 730, 741 (N.D. Ohio 1995) (applying Ohio law); Cross
Oil Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 944 F. Supp. 787, 792-93 (E.D. Mo. 1996) (stating that "[t]he law
of nuisance evolved as a means of resolving conflicts between neighboring contemporaneous land
users" and holding that under Missouri law a current property owner may not recover against a prior
owner under a private nuisance theory for a condition created on the property by the prior owner);
Reg'l Airport Auth. of Louisville & Jefferson County v. LFG, LLC, 255 F. Supp. 2d 688, 691 (W.D.
Ky. 2003) ("We believe that were a Kentucky court to consider this issue, it would follow the lead of
the majority of the courts, which have consistently rejected allowing a subsequent landowner to
recover in private nuisance from a prior land owner [sic]."); Rudd v. Electrolux Corp., 982 F. Supp.
355, 368 (M.D.N.C. 1997) (noting that under North Carolina law, "a nuisance is the improper use of
one's own property in a way which injures the land or other right of one's neighbor"); Middlebury
Office Park Ltd. P'ship. v. Timex Corp., No. 3:95-CV-2160 (EBB), 1998 WL 351583, at *4 & n. 2
(D. Conn. June 16, 1998) (dismissing private nuisance claim because "[i]n Connecticut, the tort of
nuisance is only applicable where a person is 'making use of his own property so as to occasion
unnecessary damage or annoyance to his neighbor' and because "claims asserted by a landowner
against a former owner of property are barred by the doctrine of caveat emptor unless they fall
within two limited exceptions: first, the defects existing in the property were not discoverable upon
reasonable inspection by the purchaser, and, second, the seller was chargeable with knowledge of the
defects").
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b. Minority View: Same Property Nuisance Claims Permitted
A small minority of states recognize same property private nuisance
pollution remediation claims. 197 Indeed, reported decisions applying the
law of just two states--California and Minnesota-have recognized such
claims. 198 In 1991, the California Court of Appeal in Mangini v. Aerojet-
General Corp. (Mangini 1)199 held that a current owner could sue a prior
lessee for contamination originating on the current owner's property.200
In Mangini I, the owners of 2,400 acres of land near Sacramento, Cali-
fornia sued Aerojet-General, which had leased the property years before
from the prior owner, for allegedly contaminating the property with
waste rocket fuel materials. 20 1 Plaintiffs asserted claims under nine legal
theories, including private nuisance.20 2 The trial court sustained defen-
dant's general demurrer without leave to amend.20 3 The California Court
of Appeal reversed.2°
Aerojet-General, relying on general tort law principles, tort law
treatises, and Philadelphia Electric,20 5 argued that private nuisance law
did not permit a claim by a current owner for injuries resulting from acts
by a defendant committed on the same property.20 6 The Court of Appeal
rejected these arguments as not reflective of California law, noting that
197. See Falcone & Utain, supra note 150, at 84-91 (describing as the minority view that a
property owner may sue predecessors-in-interest of the same property for private nuisance).
198. Indiana law regarding same property private nuisance claims is unclear. In Gray v. West-
inghouse Electric Corp., 624 N.E.2d 49 (Ind. Ct. App. 1993), plaintiffs lived next to a former landfill
site at which they alleged that defendant Westinghouse disposed of PCBs. Plaintiffs sued Westing-
house, asserting, among other things, a claim for private nuisance. Id. at 51-52. Westinghouse
argued that it could not be liable to abate the nuisance because it did not own the landfill. Id. at 52-
53. The Indiana Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's order granting a motion to dismiss,
holding that "the creator of a nuisance of land which it does not own can be required to abate the
nuisance." Id. at 53. The court also stated that "[w]e hold that the party which causes a nuisance
can be held liable, regardless of whether the party owns or possesses the property on which the
nuisance originates." Id. Subsequently, the federal district court in Lilly Industries, Inc. v. Health-
Chem Corp., 974 F. Supp. 702 (S.D. Ind. 1993) held that Indiana law did not recognize same prop-
erty private nuisance claims, citing to and relying on the reasoning in Philadelphia Electric. Id. at
706-08. The court found Gray distinguishable because it did not involve a same property nuisance
claim. Id. at 706. See also Wickens v. Shell Oil Co., No. 1:05-CV-645-SEB-JPG, 2006 WL
3254544, at *6 (S.D. Ind. Nov. 9, 2006) (citing Lilly Industries and granting summary judgment for
defendant on a same property private nuisance claim and observing that "[r]ecently, heretofore
undiscovered environmental pollution on real property seems to have fostered imaginative attempts
to construct or expand on a common law tort theory of recovery. But these efforts have not found
support under Indiana law since the state courts have declined to utilize trespass or nuisance doc-
trines to resolve environmental clean-up disputes.").
199. Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. (Mangini 1), 230 Cal. App. 3d 1125 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
200. Mangini 1, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 1133-37.
201. Id. at 1131-32.
202. Id. at 1132-33.
203. Id. at 1133.
204. Id. at 1156.
205. Id. at 1133-34.
206. Id.
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"California nuisance law is a creature of statute." 207  California Civil
Code section 3479 defines a nuisance as:
[a]nything which is injurious to health, or is indecent or offensive to
the senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to inter-
fere with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, or unlawfully
obstructs the free passage or use, in the customary manner, of any
navigable lake, or river, bay, stream, canal, or basin, or any public
park, square, street, or highway, is a nuisance.
208
The court traced the origins of section 3479 to nineteenth century statutes
enacted during California's Gold Rush, which "recognized that a prop-
erty owner could sue for nuisance where miners entered the owner's
property without consent and dug ditches that interfered with the free use
of the property. ' 20 9 The court acknowledged that California's statutory
definition of nuisance might be broader than the traditional scope of
common law nuisance, noting that "[t]he statutory definition of nuisance
appears to be broad enough to encompass almost every conceivable type
or interference with the enjoyment or use of land or property. ' 210  The
court concluded that "[t]he California nuisance statutes have been con-
strued, according to their broad terms, to allow an owner of property to
sue for damages caused by a nuisance created on the owner's property.
Under California law it is not necessary that a nuisance have its origin in
neighboring property., 211  Subsequent California cases extended
Mangini I to private nuisance claims against former property owners as
well as former tenants.212
Minnesota law similarly has been interpreted to permit same prop-
erty private nuisance claims. In Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Reilly
Industries, Inc.,213 Union Pacific, the owner of real property in Minne-
sota, sued Reilly Industries, the successor of Republic Creosoting Com-
pany, to recover the past and future costs of cleaning up contamination
caused by Republic's former creosoting operations on the property.
214
Union Pacific included a private nuisance claim in its complaint. Reilly
moved for summary judgment on that claim, arguing that private nui-
207. Id. at 1134.
208. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3479 (West 2006). California Civil Code section 3480 provides that
"[a] public nuisance is one which affects at the same time an entire community or neighborhood, or
any considerable number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance or damage inflicted upon
individuals may be unequal." Id. § 3480. Civil Code section 3481 provides that "[e]very nuisance
not included in the definition of the last section is private." Id. § 3481.
209. Mangini I, 230 Cal. App. 3d at 1135.
210. Id. at 1136 (citations omitted).
211. Id. at 1134.
212. See, e.g., Capogeannis v. Superior Court, 12 Cal. App. 4th 668, 672-73 (Cal. Ct. App.
1993) (allowing private nuisance claim by current owner against former owner and tenant); Newhall
Land & Farming Co. v. Superior Court, 19 Cal. App. 4th 334, 340-43 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (allowing
private nuisance claim by current owner against former owner).
213. Union Pac. R.R. Co. v. Reilly Indus., Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 860 (D. Minn. 1998).
214. Id. at 862-63.
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sance applies only to neighboring property use disputes. 215  The court
denied Reilly's motion.
216
The court acknowledged that, "as a general matter," a claim for
"private nuisance resolves conflicts between neighboring or adjacent
landowners," but observed that Minnesota law imposed no such limita-
217tion. The court noted that under Minnesota's nuisance statute:
Anything which is injurious to health, or indecent or offensive to the
senses, or an obstruction to the free use of property, so as to interfere
with the comfortable enjoyment of life or property, is a nuisance. An
action may be brought by any person whose property is injuriously
affected or whose personal enjoyment is lessened by the nuisance,
and by the judgment the nuisance may be enjoined or abated, as well
as damages recovered.
21 8
Based on the broadly-worded Minnesota statute, the court concluded that
"Union Pacific may maintain a nuisance claim even though the claim
does not involve adjacent property of neighboring property holders. 219
No other state has recognized a same property private nuisance
claim brought by the current owner of property against a former owner or
tenant. 220 Accordingly, in the vast majority of states, the owner of con-
taminated property cannot use nuisance law to recover a PRP's fair share
of cleanup costs regarding contamination that originated on the property
rather than on a neighboring property. Under this rule, the current owner
of most brownfield sites, former industrial facilities, and former landfills
would be barred from recovering cleanup costs under a private nuisance
theory and, after Aviall, could have no right to cleanup cost contribution
at all.
3. Market-Based Limitations: The Doctrine of Caveat Emptor
The neighboring property requirement bars landowners in most
states from recovering cleanup costs from predecessor PRPs under a pri-
vate nuisance theory. A closely related barrier to recovery also faced by
landowners is the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor.221 The commentary
215. Id. at 863, 867.
216. Id. at 867.
217. Id.
218. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 561.01 (West 2006).
219. Union Pac. R.R., 4 F. Supp. 2d at 867.
220. Some courts have permitted a landlord to recover cleanup costs from a tenant under a
private nuisance theory. See, e.g., Arawana Mills Co. v. United Techs. Corp., 795 F. Supp. 1238,
1250 (D. Conn. 1992) (applying Connecticut law). Other relationship-based theories may also be
available to a landlord for recovery of cleanup costs from a tenant, including waste (failure to restore
property to pre-leasehold condition) or breach of contract (e.g., breach of warranty regarding prop-
erty usage or breach of lease provision requiring restoration of property to pre-leasehold condition).
221. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 12, at 356 (observing that historically "private nuisance has
had virtually no application in cases where current waste site owners and operators seek contribution
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to the Restatement (Second) of Torts, section 352, summarizes the appli-
cation of caveat emptor ("let the buyer beware") to the vendor of land:
Under the ancient doctrine of caveat emptor, the original rule was
that, in the absence of express agreement, the vendor of the land was
not liable to his vendee, or a fortiori to any other person, for the con-
dition of the land existing at the time of transfer. As to sales of land
this rule has retained much of its original force, and the implied war-
ranties which have grown up around the sale of chattels never have
developed. This is perhaps because great importance always has been
attached to the deed of conveyance, which is taken to represent the
full agreement of the parties, and to exclude all other terms and li-
abilities. The vendee is required to make his own inspection of the
premises, and the vendor is not responsible to him for their defective
condition, existing at the time of transfer.
222
Caveat emptor proponents embrace economic arguments to support its
application to cleanup cost claims by a vendee against a vendor of real
property. They argue that the doctrine encourages: (a) thorough inspec-
tion of the property by the vendee; (b) full disclosure of property defects
by the vendor to avoid misrepresentation liability; and (c) the clear, effi-
cient shifting of risk regarding property conditions without wasteful liti-
gation transaction costs.
2 23
Indeed, many states recognize caveat emptor as a defense to claims
by the purchaser of real property against the seller with regard to prop-
erty conditions existing on the transferred land, including private nui-
sance claims relating to hazardous substance contamination.224 For ex-
from previous landowners for the costs of cleaning waste. The reason behind this lack of application
is the adherence of the courts to the doctrine of caveat emptor.").
222. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 352, cmt. a (1965).
223. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 12, at 365-67 (arguing in favor of applying caveat emptor to
private party nuisance claims); Michael Andrew O'Hara, The Utilization of Caveat Emptor in
CERCLA Private Party Cleanups, 56 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 149, 160 (1993) ("As a defense,
caveat emptor completely disallows any recovery to a plaintiff who has had ample opportunity to
examine the item under consideration. Allowing the defense of caveat emptor creates an incentive
for the purchaser to inspect closely the good being purchased. This incentive is desirable from an
equity standpoint because it promotes a true 'meeting of the minds' in transactions, placing the
purchaser and seller on equal terms."); see also Truck Components, Inc. v. K-H Corp., No. 94-C
50250, 1995 WL 692541, at *12 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 22, 1995) (rejecting same property private nuisance
claim and observing without expressly referencing caveat emptor that "[a] suit for private nuisance
between successive owners of the same property would effectively displace the market's allocation
of risks and subject sellers to unbargained for future liability to remote buyers.").
224. See Klein, supra note 12, at 356 ("Historically, however, private nuisance has had virtu-
ally no application in cases where current waste site owners and operators seek contribution from
previous landowners for the costs of cleaning waste. The reason behind this lack of application is the
adherence of the courts to the doctrine of caveat emptor."); cf, e.g., James B. Brown & Glen C.
Hansen, Nuisance Law and Petroleum Underground Storage Tank Contamination: Plugging the
Hole in the Statutes, 21 ECOLOGY L. Q. 643, 683-94 (1994) (arguing in favor of predecessor owner
liability for leaking underground storage tank contamination). See also, e.g., Gordon v. Nat'l R.R.
Passenger Corp., No. CIV. A. 10753, 1997 WL 298320, at *10 (Del. Ch. Mar. 19, 1997) (stating that
under Delaware law, caveat emptor applied to private nuisance claim by vendee of contaminated
property against vendor); Wilson Auto Enters., Inc. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 778 F. Supp. 101, 107
(D.R.I. 1991) (granting motion for judgment on the pleadings, because "[wlhen Wilson purchased
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ample, the Third Circuit embraced caveat emptor as an alternative
ground to bar PECO's private nuisance claim under Pennsylvania law in
Philadelphia Electric Co. v. Hercules, Inc.225  In Philadelphia Electric,
the court recognized that Pennsylvania law had abolished the rule of ca-
veat emptor as to the sale of new homes by a builder-vendor.226 The
court nevertheless concluded that where "corporations of roughly equal
resources contract for the sale of an industrial property, and especially
where the dispute is over a condition on the land rather than a structure,
caveat emptor remains the rule. 227  Similarly, in Amland Properties
Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of America,228 a federal district court in New
Jersey held that caveat emptor barred a property owner from asserting a
private nuisance claim against the vendor / prior owner for the cost of
remediating polychlorinated biphenyl (PCB) contamination. 29 Like-
wise, a New York federal district court in Westwood Pharmaceuticals,
Inc. v. National Fuel Gas Distribution Corp., 230 granted a motion to dis-
miss on the ground that New York courts would apply the doctrine of
caveat emptor to preclude a private nuisance claim by a current property
owner against a former owner for the costs of remediating soil and
groundwater contamination. 231 The Westwood court, however, would
not apply caveat emptor to dismiss the current owner's damages claim
on a public nuisance theory. The court attempted to distinguish private
nuisance caveat emptor cases by concluding that
the property from LRRC in an arms-length transaction, he lost any possible standing to sue the
previous owners and lessees in negligence, nuisance, trespass, or strict liability"); Rosenblatt v.
Exxon Co., U.S.A., 642 A.2d 180, 188 n.7 (Md. 1994) (rejecting same property private nuisance
claim, and noting that "the common law rule of caveat emptor, although legislatively abrogated in
the context of residential property, is still applicable in Maryland with regard to the sale of commer-
cial property"); Middlebury Office Park Ltd. P'ship. v. Timex Corp., No. 3:95-CV-2160 (EBB),
1998 WL 351583, at *4 n.2 (D. Conn. 1998) (dismissing private nuisance claim because "[i]n Con-
necticut, the tort of nuisance is only applicable where a person is 'making use of his own property so
as to occasion unnecessary damage or annoyance to his neighbor"' and because "claims asserted by
a landowner against a former owner of property are barred by the doctrine of caveat emptor unless
they fall within two limited exceptions: first, the defects existing in the property were not discover-
able upon reasonable inspection by the purchaser, and, second, the seller was chargeable with
knowledge of the defects").
225. Phila. Elec. Co. v. Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 312-13 (3d Cir. 1985) (holding that
caveat emptor barred current landowner's claim against successor to former owner).
226. Phila. Elec. Co., 762 F. 2d at 312.
227. Id. at 313.
228. Amland Props. Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F. Supp. 784 (D.N.J. 1989).
229. AmlandProps. Corp., 711 F. Supp. at 808.
230. Westwood Pharm., Inc. v. Nat'l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1272 (W.D.N.Y.
1990).
231. WestwoodPharmn. Inc., 737 F. Supp. at 1282-84. The Westwood court stated:
While the New York Court of Appeals has abolished the defense of caveat emptor in
cases involving contracts for the construction and sale of homes.... Westwood has pro-
vided no convincing reason for this court to assume that the Court of Appeals would
likewise refuse to apply the doctrine where, as in the present case, the vendor and the
vendee of the property at issue are both sophisticated commercial enterprises who agreed
to a purchase price based, apparently in large part, on the condition of the property at the
time of conveyance.
Id. (citation omitted).
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[i]n light of the different interests and public-policy concerns in-
volved in public-nuisance actions, the court has not been convinced
that New York courts would dismiss Westwood's claim. This con-
clusion is bolstered by the nature of the alleged public nuisance in-
volved here, contamination of the environment by hazardous sub-
stances. Knowledge about the hazards to public health and to the en-
vironment posed by hazardous wastes is increasing constantly, and
this court is not willing to assume that the New York law of public
nuisance is too inflexible to meet the growing public need for ave-
nues to address these hazards, including lawsuits where public inter-
ests are being protected through a cause of action brought by a pri-
vate party.
232
Some states have refused to apply caveat emptor to private nuisance
claims relating to hazardous substance contamination.233
For example, in Hanlin Group, Inc. v. International Minerals &
Chemical Corp.,234 the purchaser of a chemical manufacturing plant sued
the seller in a Maine federal court to recover cleanup costs under a vari-
235 e oe odsety of theories, including private nuisance. The seller moved to dis
miss the buyer's tort claims, arguing that sections 352236 and 353237 of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts barred vendor liability to the
232. Id. at 1282; ef Klein, supra note 12, at 361-62 (noting that, while courts that apply caveat
emptor to private nuisance claims will not do so to private claims for public nuisance, application of
the special injury rule may have same limiting effect on actions against prior owner as caveat emptor
does in private nuisance cases). Although public and private nuisance address different interests, a
private party bringing a public nuisance claim nevertheless seeks a remedy (damages or injunctive
relief) relating to a private injury (e.g., the "special injury" that gave the plaintiff standing to bring
the claim). Id.
233. See, e.g., Sealy Conn., Inc. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 989 F. Supp. 120, 125 (D. Conn. 1997)
(holding that caveat emptor did not bar nuisance claim by lessor against lessee, but did bar nuisance
claim by vendee against vendor); Hanlin Group, Inc. v. Int'l Minerals & Chem. Corp., 759 F. Supp.
925, 932-33 (D. Me. 1990) (applying Maine law).
234. 759 F. Supp. 925 (D. Me. 1990).
235. Hanlin Group, Inc., 759 F. Supp at 927.
236. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 352 (1965) (providing that: "[eixcept as stated in §
353, a vendor of land is not subject to liability for physical harm caused to his vendee or others while
upon the land after the vendee has taken possession by any dangerous condition, whether natural or
artificial, which existed at the time that the vendee took possession").
237. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 353 (1965) provides:
(1) A vendor of land who conceals or fails to disclose to his vendee any condition,
whether natural or artificial, which involves unreasonable risk to persons on the land, is
subject to liability to the vendee and others upon the land with the consent of the vendee
or his subvendee for physical harm caused by the condition after the vendee has taken
possession, if
(a) the vendee does not know or have reason to know of the condition or the risk in-
volved, and
(h) the vendor knows or has reason to know of the condition, and realizes or should real-
ize the risk involved, and has reason to believe that the vendee will not discover the con-
dition or realize the risk.
(2) If the vendor actively conceals the condition, the liability stated in Subsection (1) con-
tinues until the vendee discovers it and has reasonable opportunity to take effective pre-
cautions against it. Otherwise the liability continues only until the vendee has had reason-
able opportunity to discover the condition and to take such precautions.
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vendee.238 The court denied the motion to dismiss on the basis of caveat
emptor.239  The court noted that the Maine Law Court previously had
declined to apply caveat emptor to the sale of new houses by a builder
vendor and had not yet addressed a private nuisance claim for chemical
contamination of land caused by a vendor.240 The court concluded that it
could not assume that Maine state courts would apply caveat emptor to
contaminated property tort disputes.241
Buyers and sellers of real property should be able to expressly and
knowingly allocate responsibility between them for addressing contami-
nation found on transferred property.242 Applying caveat emptor to same
property contamination private nuisance cases accepts the primacy of the
economic theory underlying the doctrine by automatically effecting a
default allocation of cleanup cost risks to the buyer as a matter of law.
There remains, however, an underlying tension between, on the one
hand, economic theory assuming that a real property transfer resulting
from arm's length, misrepresentation-free bargaining reflects an efficient
allocation of risk that the law should respect, and on the other hand, envi-
ronmental policy encouraging proactive remediation through the equita-
ble allocation of cleanup cost responsibilities. The issue is not whether
transactional circumstances and market forces are relevant to private
cleanup cost disputes. They are. Instead, the question with which courts
must wrestle is how these factors should affect the allocation of cleanup
cost responsibilities, i.e., should caveat emptor (or related issues such as
purchaser knowledge of site conditions reflected, perhaps, in a dis-
counted purchase price) provide a complete defense to vendor liability or
instead affect the nature and scope of any remedy.243
238. Hanlin Group, Inc., 759 F. Supp. at 932.
239. Id. at 933. The court nevertheless granted the seller's motion to dismiss on the ground
that Maine law only permitted private nuisance claims in disputes involving neighboring properties.
Id. at 935.
240. Id. at 932-33.
241. Id. at 933.
242. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(e)(1) (West 2006) (nothing in subsection barring agreements to
transfer liability under CERCLA "shall bar any agreement to insure, hold harmless, or indemnify a
party to such agreement for any liability under this section"); SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Rohm &
Haas Co., 89 F.3d 154, 158 (3d Cir. 1996) (business purchase agreement indemnification agreement
enforceable against seller as "responsible parties can lawfully allocate CERCLA response costs
among themselves while remaining jointly and severally liable to the government for the entire
clean-up"); see also infra notes 404-07 and accompanying text.
243. See, e.g., Seneca Meadows, Inc. v. ECI Liquidating, Inc., 983 F. Supp. 360, 364
(W.D.N.Y. 1997) (denying motion to dismiss private and public nuisance and trespass claims for
property damage regarding contamination that migrated from neighboring property, rejecting defen-
dant's argument that pre-purchase knowledge of contamination barred liability but noting that proof
of such knowledge may be considered by the jury in determining damages); W. Props. Serv. Corp. v.
Shell Oil Co., 358 F.3d 678, 691 (9th Cir. 2004) (buyer aware of environmental hazards as evi-
denced by reduced purchase price precluded from recovering entire cost of cleanup); see also Joseph
Y. Ybarra, Refining California 's "Consent" Defense in Environmental Nuisance Cases: Determin-
ing the Proper Scope ofLiability for Responsible Former Owners, 74 S. CAL. L. REV. 1191, 1215-21
(2001) (analyzing role of "consent" defense to private nuisance claims in context of cases involving
(a) release agreements in recent transfers of property, (b) older transfers of property; (c) "as is"
20061
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4. Temporal Limitations: The Doctrine of Continuing Nuisance
Many polluted sites were contaminated decades ago. Under
CERCLA, the fact that a PRP contaminated a site long ago would not
present a statute of limitations problem because (1) CERCLA imposes
retroactive liability and (2) the limitations periods for recovering costs
under CERCLA sections 107(a) and 113(f) are measured from the com-
pletion of remedial activity244 or the date of a CERCLA settlement or
judgment creating rights to contribution, 245 respectively. After Aviall,
however, a federal law cleanup cost remedy may no longer be available
to most PRPs.
Under state law, the statute of limitations can present insurmount-
able problems at older contamination sites. The limitations period for a
nuisance claim generally begins to run when the nuisance is created
246
or, under the discovery rule, when the potential plaintiff knew or rea-
sonably should have known of the claim.247
Because tortious injury to property is considered an injury to the
property itself rather than to the property owner, the limitations period
does not begin to run anew every time ownership of the property changes
hands. 248 As a result, a current landowner who only recently discovered
agreements; and (d) purchaser awareness of contamination at the time of sale); cf, e.g., N.Y. Tel.
Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp. 473 N.Y.S.2d 172, 174 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (under New York law, prior
owner nuisance liability was terminated if there was reasonable opportunity for the new owner to
discover harmful conditions on the property).
244. Section 1 13(g)(2) provides that a section 107(a) claim to recover the cost of a removal
action must be brought within three years of the completion of a removal action and a section 107(a)
claim to recover the costs of a remedial action must be brought within six years "after initiation of
physical on-site construction of remedial action." 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(g)(2) (West 2006); see also
42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(23) (defining "removal"); 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(24) (defining "remedial").
245. Section 113(g)(3) provides that no action for response cost contribution may be com-
menced more than three years after the date of: (a) entry of judgment under CERCLA for recovery
of response costs; (b) a de minimis settlement under CERCLA section 122(g); (c) a cost recovery
settlement under CERCLA section 122(h); or (d) entry of a judicially approved response cost settle-
ment. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(g)(3).
246. See, e.g., Mangini 1, 281 Cal. Rptr. 827, 838 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991) ("[W]here a private
citizen sues for damage from a permanent nuisance, the statute of limitations begins to run upon
creation of the nuisance.").
247. See, e.g., McKelvey v. Boeing N. Am., Inc., 86 Cal. Rptr. 2d 645, 651 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999) (under California law, "the period of limitations will begin to run without regard to whether
the plaintiff is aware of the specific facts necessary to establish his claim, provided that he has...
'notice or information of circumstances to put a reasonable person on inquiry."' (citations omitted)).
CERCLA section 309(a)(1) applies a "federally required commencement date" to state statutes of
limitation when the state law commencement date would provide a shorter limitations period. 42
U.S.C.A. § 9658(a)(1) (West 2006). The "federally required commencement date" is defined in
CERCLA section 309(b)(4) as "the date the plaintiff knew (or reasonably should have known) that
the personal injury or property damages [allegedly caused by a CERCLA hazardous substance,
pollutant, or contaminant] were caused or contributed to by the hazardous substance or pollutant or
contaminant concerned." 42 U.S.C.A. § 9658(b)(4); see also Freier v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.,
303 F.3d 176, 196-97 (2d Cir. 2002) (federally required commencement date preempts state statute
of limitations if state law otherwise would provide for earlier commencement date).
248. See, e.g., Beck Dev. Co. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518, 556 (Cal. Ct. App.
1996) ("In an action involving tortious injury to property, the injury is considered to be to the prop-
erty itself rather than to the property owner, and thus the running of the statute of limitations against
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contamination or learned of its significance may find a nuisance claim
time-barred if a prior landowner had discovered the problem years be-
fore.
Otherwise time-barred nuisance claims for older contamination
problems may survive depending on whether the nuisance is character-
ized as "continuing" rather than "permanent., 249 Broadly speaking, if an
interference with the use or enjoyment of property "will not terminate or
be abated, the nuisance is said to be permanent., 250  If a nuisance is char-
acterized as permanent, the plaintiff must recover all past, present, and
future damages from the activity in a single action. 251 Once the limita-
tions period has expired, however, all claims for permanent nuisance
damages are time-barred.
a claim bars the owner and all subsequent owners of the property."); see also Bauer v. Weeks, 600
S.E.2d 700, 702 (Ga. Ct. App. 2004) (affirming summary judgment for the defendant on a property
damage tort claim regarding defective synthetic stucco exterior cladding even though limitations
period expired before the plaintiff purchased property because, under Georgia law, "if a homeowner
sells a house after the statute of limitations has run, the conveyance does not revive the cause of
action" for defects in the house); cf Pinole Point Props., Inc. v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 596 F. Supp.
283, 292-93 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (applying California law to dismiss private nuisance claim as time
barred where the plaintiff, who acquired property beyond the three year California limitations period
and four years after the release of pollutants ceased, failed to allege lack of knowledge about the
state of property or justifiable delay in discovering contamination). For same property private nui-
sance claims, the statute of limitations presumably could not begin to run until the owner responsible
for contaminating the site sold the property. The limitations period then would begin to run when
the successor owner discovered or should have discovered the contamination under the applicable
state or federal discovery rule. See supra note 247. Statutes of limitations applicable to nuisance
claims traditionally look to historic conduct (when the last act constituting the cause of action oc-
curred) or the consequence of historic conduct (when the contamination caused by defendant was
abated). Alternatively, states could take a prospective approach to environmental nuisance statutes
of repose, with the trigger for the limitations period based not on historic acts but on remedial con-
duct, e.g., a designated period of time after plaintiff first incurs cleanup costs. Cf, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A.
§9613(g) (West 2006) (CERCLA section 107(a) cost recovery statutes of limitations triggered by
dates of removal or remedial expenditures); see also Kay, supra note 154, at 172 (proposing envi-
ronmental negligence cause of action that would toll statute of limitations during pendency of site
investigation). Under such an approach, subsequent property owners would still be able to assert a
nuisance-based claim for cleanup costs if the statute of limitations began to run afresh for each
landowner who incurred cleanup costs. On the other hand, this variation on the discovery rule would
conflict with policies of finality underlying statutes of limitations and present complications arising
from different statutes of limitations applying to nuisance claims depending on the nature of the
damages sought.
249. See infra notes 272-349 and accompanying text. Some jurisdictions refer to a "continu-
ing" nuisance as a "temporary" nuisance.
250. See DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 468 (2000). The distinction between perma-
nent and continuing nuisance can vary dramatically by state. See supra notes 259-334 and accom-
panying text.
251. JAMES M. FISCHER, UNDERSTANDING REMEDIES § 84(b)(ii) (permanent nuisance damages
include diminution in property value and lost opportunity to sell the property); see, e.g., Baker v.
Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 218 Cal. Rptr. 293, 294 (Cal. 1985) (all past, present and
future permanent nuisance damages to be recovered in single action); Mitchell Energy Corp. v.
Bartlett, 958 S.W.2d 430, 444 (Tex. Ct. App. 1997) (submitting claim for future damages to jury
constituted election to proceed on permanent nuisance theory); City of Clanton v. Johnson, 17 So. 2d
669, 672 (Ala. 1944) (all permanent nuisance damages, including diminution in property value, must
be sought in single suit).
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In contrast, a "continuing nuisance" broadly speaking is an interfer-
ence with the use and enjoyment of property that can be terminated.252 A
plaintiff may bring successive continuing nuisance actions so long as the
harmful inference continues; new causes of action effectively continue to
accrue until the inference comes to an end.253 Because a continuing nui-
sance can stop or be abated at some point in the future, continuing nui-
sance remedies typically are limited to injunctive relief to abate the nui-
sance, an action for damages that accrued during the nuisance limitations
period, or both.254 As discussed below, characterization of a nuisance as
252. See, e.g., Capogeannis v. Super. Ct., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 801 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (under
California law, a nuisance is continuing if offensive condition can be discontinued or reasonably
abated at any time); N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 122 N.W.2d 26, 30-31 (Minn. 1963) (under
Minnesota law, "[w]here a structure is erected or junk is stored and the harmful effect is 'one that
may be abated or discontinued at any time,' there is 'a continuing wrong so long as the offending
object remains,' and the courts regard such as a continuing trespass." (footnote omitted)).
253. See, e.g., Wilshire Westwood Ass'n v. At. Richfield Co., 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 563, 569 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1993) ("[W]here the nuisance involves a use which may be discontinued at any time, it is
characterized as a continuing nuisance, and persons harmed by it may bring successive actions for
damages until the nuisance is abated."); Tri-County Inv. Group, Ltd. v. So. States, Inc., 500 S.E.2d
22, 25 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998) (quoting City Council of Augusta v. Lombard, 28 S.E. 994, 998 (Ga.
1897), to show that under Georgia law, "where a nuisance is not permanent in its character, but is
one which can and should be abated by the person erecting or maintaining it, every continuance of
the nuisance is a fresh nuisance for which a fresh action will lie").
254. See, e.g., FISCHER, supra note 251, § 84(b)(i) ("For a temporary nuisance, i.e., a nuisance
that a plaintiff may seek to abate or, at its election, seek damages, when the plaintiff elects damages,
the award will cover losses only up to the date of the commencement of the action or the date of
trial."). Continuing nuisance damages typically are limited to damages consistent with the non-
permanent nature of the nuisance (e.g., abatement costs, lost rental, lost use) suffered during the
limitations period. For example, in a state with a three year statute of limitations for nuisance, a
continuing nuisance plaintiff could only recover damages suffered during the three years before the
suit was filed. See, e.g., Lyons v. Twp. of Wayne, 888 A.2d 426, 434 (N.J. 2005) ("One who suffers
a continuing nuisance, therefore, is able to collect damages for each injury suffered within the limita-
tions period." (citation omitted)); Silvester v. Spring Valley Country Club, 543 S.E.2d 563, 567
(S.C. Ct. App. 2001) (continuing nuisance damages limited to previously unrecovered damages
suffered during limitations period). These courts typically hold that prospective damages (e.g.,
diminution in property value, stigma to property value) are unavailable to a continuing nuisance
plaintiff. See, e.g., Spaulding v. Cameron, 239 P.2d 625, 629 (Cal. 1952) (directing trial court to
determine whether landslide onto plaintiff's property constituted a permanent nuisance; if so, the
court should award diminution in property damages and if not, the court should award injunctive
relief to abate the nuisance); Baker v. Burbank-Glendale-Pasadena Airport Auth., 705 P.2d 866, 869
(Cal. 1985) ("[I]f a nuisance is a use which may be discontinued at any time, it is considered con-
tinuing in character and persons harmed by it may bring successive actions for damages until the
nuisance is abated. Recovery is limited, however, to actual injury suffered prior to commencement
of each action. Prospective damages are unavailable." (citation omitted)). Some courts, however,
have treated a nuisance as continuing only for statute of limitations purposes, choosing to award a
"permanent" (i.e., prospective) nuisance damage remedy. See, e.g., Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp.,
358 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1012 (D. Colo. 2004) (presence on plaintiffs' property of plutonium released
from nearby nuclear weapons plant constituted continuing nuisance and trespass for statute of limita-
tions purposes, and could provide basis for prospective, diminution in value damages effectively
purchasing an easement for invasion to continue); Beatty v. Wash. Metro Area Transit Auth., 860
F.2d 1117, 1125 (D.C. Cir. 1988) ("[N]uisances may be classified for two distinct purposes, one for
the assessment of damages, and the other for the application of the statute of limitations."); cf
Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. (Mangini 111), 912 P.2d 1220, 1230 (Cal. 1996) (holding that plaintiff
failed to prove nuisance was continuing and, because permanent nuisance claim was time-barred,
declining to decide whether the same characterization of a nuisance as permanent or continuing
should apply for both limitations and damages purposes). See infra note 439 and accompanying
text.
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permanent or continuing thus has three distinct consequences: (a) when
the claim accrues (i.e., is claim barred by the applicable statute of limita-
tions); (b) whether a series of successive nuisance suits is permitted (i.e.,
whether the doctrine of res judicata bars a subsequent nuisance suit for
later accruing damages caused by an unabated nuisance); and (c) whether
damages are available for future or only past injuries."'
At first blush, the "continuing nuisance" doctrine would seem to
eliminate statute of limitations problems for private nuisance claims aris-
ing from the remediation of older contamination. Closer examination,
however, demonstrates dramatic variation regarding how courts define a
continuing nuisance 256 and, indeed, whether the continuing nuisance
doctrine is available at all. 257  These variations, in turn, can determine
whether any state common law private cleanup cost remedy exists for
older contamination conditions.258
A review of continuing nuisance law across the country reveals a
range of different approaches to distinguishing between a "continuing"
and a "permanent" nuisance. These standards vary depending on
whether the focus of the inquiry is on: (a) the failure of the defendant to
abate the offensive condition; (b) the nature of the conduct creating the
255. See, e.g., DAN B. DOBBS, DOBBS LAW OF REMEDIES: DAMAGES-EQUITY-RESTITUTION §
5.11(l) (2d ed. 1993).
256. See, e.g., Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264, 272-73 (Tex. 2004) ("in
other jurisdictions there is no consensus as to where the line between permanent and temporary
nuisances should be... or how it should be applied .. "); Kay, supra note 154, at 166-67 (discuss-
ing different definitions of continuing nuisance); see also Robert E. King, Chemical Contamination
in California: A Continuing Nuisance, 1997 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 483, 489-90 (1997) (arguing that
failure of California legislature or courts to define standards distinguishing between permanent and
continuing nuisance in contaminated property cases has led to conflicting judicial outcomes); G.
Nelson Smith, Nuisance and Trespass Claims in Environmental Litigation: Legislative Inaction and
Common Law Confusion, 36 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 39, 48-49 (1995) (noting that plaintiffs turn to
common law nuisance and trespass actions to address petroleum contamination because of CERCLA
and California state Superfund statute petroleum exclusion but that "what constitutes a nuisance or
trespass is not defined in the California Code, particularly as applied to environmental matters. As a
result, courts are compelled to hypothesize as to the true meaning of an environmental nuisance or
trespass, and as to when a cause of action under such theories accrues. Such lack of statutory guid-
ance has led to inconsistent interpretations, many times within the same jurisdiction, causing both
plaintiffs and defendants in environmental nuisance and trespass litigation to question the actual
availability of such remedies.").
257. See infra notes 330-34 and accompanying text.
258. Most states recognize both "continuing nuisance" and "continuing trespass" theories and
apply a common distinction between "permanent" and "continuing" torts to each cause of action.
See, e.g., Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. (Mangini 1), 281 Cal. Rptr. 827, 841-42 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (applying common standard for distinguishing between permanent and continuing trespass
and nuisance). Some states do not extend the "continuing tort" doctrine to negligence or strict liabil-
ity for ultra-hazardous activity claims, thereby limiting the availability of these theories for disputes
involving older contamination sites. Compare, e.g., Church v. Gen. Elec. Co., 138 F. Supp. 2d 169,
174 (D. Mass. 2001) (under Massachusetts law, continuing tort doctrine is limited to nuisance and
trespass claims and does not apply to negligence or strict liability claims), with Nat'l Tel. Co-op.
Ass'n v. Exxon Corp., 38 F. Supp. 2d 1, 6-7 (D.D.C. 1998) (under District of Columbia law, con-
tinuing tort theory applied to toll five year limitations period on commercial property owner's negli-
gence and strict liability for ultra-hazardous activity claims alleging that gasoline leaking from a
neighbor's underground storage tanks).
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offensive condition; (c) any social benefit derived from the condition, or
(d) the prospective impact or form of the condition.
a. Continued Abatable Harm
In some states, the "continuing" nature of a nuisance turns on
whether the offensive condition is "abatable.,, 259 In these jurisdictions, a
new cause of action accrues every day, in effect, because of the defen-
dant's continued failure to abate a nuisance for which the defendant is
liable, resulting in the continued presence of an offensive condition. The
Mangini decisions illustrate the abatability standard.
As described above, in 1991, the California Court of Appeal in
Mangini I held that California's broad statutory definition of private nui-
sance allows a current landowner to maintain a private nuisance action
against the former tenant of a prior landowner. 260  That holding, how-
ever, did not clear the way for the plaintiffs nuisance claim to proceed
because the defendant also argued that the plaintiffs claim should be
dismissed as a time-barred permanent nuisance action. 261 The court
agreed that a permanent nuisance claim was time-barred but allowed
plaintiff to file an amended complaint alleging continuing nuisance.262
The court stressed that under California law "the crucial distinction be-
tween a permanent and continuing nuisance is whether the nuisance may
be discontinued or abated, 263 and observed that:
[P]laintiffs land may be subject to a continuing nuisance even
though defendant's offensive conduct ended years ago. That is be-
259. See, e.g., Valdez v. Mtn. Bell Tel. Co., 755 P.2d 80, 84 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) (presence of
utility pole that could be "easily removed at a reasonable expense" constitutes a temporary nui-
sance); Fletcher v. City of Indep., 708 S.W.2d 158, 178 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (nuisance should be
characterized as "temporary" if it is "scientifically possible and reasonably practicable" to abate);
Knight v. City of Missoula, 827 P.2d 1270, 1277 (Mont. 1992) ("We have held that a nuisance is a
continuing nuisance when: ... at all times, the [defendant] could have abated the nuisance by taking
curative action. Since the nuisance was so terminable, it cannot be deemed to be a permanent nui-
sance as of the creation date .... "); N. States Power Co. v. Franklin, 122 N.W.2d 26, 30 (Minn.
1963) ("[T]he harmful effect is 'one that may be abated or discontinued at any time."'); Russo
Farms, Inc. v. Vineland Bd. of Educ., 675 A.2d 1077, 1086 (N.J. 1996) ("[N]uisance is continuing
when it is the result of a condition that can be physically removed or legally abated. In such a case, it
is realistic to impute a continuing duty to the defendant to remove the nuisance, and to conclude that
each new injury includes all elements of a nuisance, including a new breach of duty."); Caron v.
Margolin, 147 A. 419, 420 (Me. 1929) (describing continuing nuisance as a nuisance that "is not of
such a permanent nature that it can not readily be removed and thus abated"); City of Phoenix v.
Johnson, 75 P.2d 30, 34-35 (Ariz. 1938) ("If it is within the power of the person by the exercise of
skill and labor to abate the nuisance, he must do so. If he fails in his duty, but allows the same to
continue, he is responsible for maintaining a continuing nuisance .... If one responsible for main-
taining a nuisance is unable by the exercise of skill and labor to abate it, then it is to be regarded as
permanent, because it will continue indefinitely without change . .
260. See supra notes 199-211 and accompanying text.
261. Mangini 1, 281 Cal. Rptr. at 837.
262. Id. at 841. The court also held that the continuing/permanent distinction applies equally to
private nuisance claims and to private suits for damages based on public nuisances. Id. at 839, 842
n.15.
263. Id. at 840.
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cause the "continuing" nature of the nuisance refers to the continuing
damage caused by the offensive condition, not to the acts causing the
offensive condition to occur.264
Mangini I held that a nuisance was continuing if it was "abat-
able., 265 The court, however, did not define what it meant for a nuisance
to be "abatable." This issue was not clarified until after the remanded
case proceeded to trial and a jury awarded plaintiffs $13.2 million in
damages.266 The California Court of Appeal overturned the jury's ver-
dict in Mangini II, ruling that the trial court should have granted defen-
dant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict because the
plaintiffs had failed to prove that the contamination was a continuing
nuisance, i.e., that it was "abatable. 2 67 In 1996, the California Supreme
Court affirmed the Court of Appeal (Mangini 111).268 The court con-
cluded that evidence of "mere technological feasibility" alone could not
prove abatability.269 Instead, the court held that a nuisance was "abat-
able"-and thus continuing-if it could be "remedied at a reasonable
cost by reasonable means. 270 No such evidence was offered at trial;
indeed, there was no evidence of how the site actually would be remedi-
ated.271  The court concluded that defendant was entitled to judgment
notwithstanding the verdict because:
[W]e do not know how much land or water has to be decontaminated.
We do not know how deep the decontamination would have to go.
We have no idea how much it would cost but know only that it would
cost unascertainable millions of dollars. [T] On this record, there is
no substantial evidence that the nuisance is abatable.
27 2
264. Id. at 841. The court applied the same "abatability" standard to conclude that plaintiff
could file an amended complaint alleging a continuing trespass claim. Id.; see also supra note 258.
265. Id. at 840.
266. Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. (Mangini Il), 912 P.2d 1220, 1221 (Cal. 1996).
267. Id. at 1224; see also Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. (Mangini I), 31 Cal. Rptr. 2d 696,
708 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004). Pursuant to California Rule of Court 976(d)(1), the Court of Appeal
decision in Mangini H could not be considered published once the California Supreme Court granted
Mangini's petition for review. See CAL. RULES OF COURT R. 976(d)(1).
268. Mangini 111, 912 P.2d at 1221.
269. Id. at 1227.
270. Id. at 1229.
271. The Plaintiffs' own experts testified that there was not enough known yet to assess what
remedial measures would be necessary or effective, and the plaintiffs' counsel in closing argument
acknowledged a lack of evidence about the extent of site contamination or what it would take to
decontaminate plaintiff's property. Id. at 1225, 1227. The court also noted that there was no evi-
dence that a government regulatory agency had set cleanup levels for the site. Id. at 1227. Some
courts have looked to site cleanup levels set by a regulatory agency as evidence that site contamina-
tion presumptively was abatable and as evidence of the degree of cleanup required to effect reason-
able abatement. See, e.g., Wilshire Westwood Assocs. v. Atl. Richfield Co., 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 562,
569 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (agency letter advising that cleanup satisfied agency concerns demon-
strated that nuisance was abatable and thus continuing); Capogeannis v. Super. Ct., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d
796, 805 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) ("We are satisfied to presume that cleanup standards set by responsi-
ble public agencies sufficiently reflect expert appraisal of the best that can be done to abate contami-
nation in particular cases.").
272. Mangini 111, 912 P.2d at 1230.
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Absent evidence that the contamination could be abated at a reasonable
cost and by reasonable means, the court deemed the plaintiffs' claim to
be a claim for permanent nuisance and thus barred by the statute of limi-
tations.273
b. Continued Presence of Harmful Condition
Some courts have held that contamination constitutes a continuing
nuisance as long as it remains on the plaintiffs property, without regard
to whether the contamination is reasonably abatable. For example, in
Hoery v. United States,274 the plaintiff sued the United States in a Colo-
rado federal court under the Federal Tort Claims Act alleging that toxic
chemicals negligently released into the ground at an Air Force base had
migrated onto the plaintiff's residential property. 275 The government
moved to dismiss the plaintiffs nuisance and trespass claims as time-
barred under Colorado's two year statute of limitations, arguing that all
government operations causing the release of the chemicals had stopped
by 1994 and that while the plaintiff knew or should have known about
273. Id. at 1221. Other states have similarly embraced reasonable abatability as the standard
for continuing nuisance. See, e.g., Traver Lakes Cmty. Maint. Ass'n v. Douglas Co., 568 N.W.2d
847, 853 (Mich. Ct. App. 1997) (continuing nuisance is "abatable by reasonable curative or remedial
action"); Hudson v. Peavey Oil Co., 566 P.2d 175, 179 (Or. 1977) ("Temporary injury, or injury
which is reasonably susceptible of repair, justifies damages measured by the loss of use or rental
value during the period of the injury, or the cost of restoration, or both, depending on the circum-
stances."); City of Sioux Falls v. Miller, 492 N.W.2d 116, 118 (S.D. 1992) ("[I]f a structure, even
though permanent, can be changed, repaired, or remedied at a reasonable expense to abate a nui-
sance, the condition is temporary." (quoting 58 AM. JUR. 2D § 30)); Pate v. City of Martin, 614
S.W.2d 46, 48 (Tenn. 1981) ("A nuisance which can be corrected by the expenditure of labor or
money is a temporary nuisance. Where the nuisance is temporary, damages to property affected by
the nuisance are recurrent and may be recovered from time to time until the nuisance is abated."
(citation omitted)); Hedgepath v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 559 S.E.2d 327, 337 (S.C. Ct. App. 2001) ("A
continuing nuisance is defined as a nuisance that is intermittent or periodical. It is described as one
which occurs so often that it is said to be continuing although it is not necessarily constant or unceas-
ing. A nuisance is continuing if abatement is reasonably and practically possible."); Valdez v. Mtn.
Bell Tel. Co., 755 P.2d 80, 83 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988) ("Courts have also distinguished between a
permanent or temporary structure or nuisance. A permanent structure or nuisance is one that may not
be readily remedied, removed or abated at a reasonable expense, or one of a durable character evi-
dently intended to last indefinitely, costing as much to alter as to build."); Taylor v. Culloden Pub.
Serv. Dist., 591 S.E.2d 197, 203 (W. Va. 2003) ("A nuisance is temporary or continuing where it is
remediable, removable, or abatable, or if abatement is reasonably and practicably possible, or, ac-
cording to some cases, where it is abatable at a reasonable cost, or by the expenditure of labor or
money, by the defendant, or by legal process at the instance of the injured party, against the will of
the person creating it."); Campbell v. Anderson, 866 S.W.2d 139, 143 (Mo. Ct. App. 1993) ("When
a nuisance can be reasonably and practicably abated, it is a temporary nuisance."); Idaho Gold
Dredging Corp. v. Boise Payette Lumber Co., 22 P.2d 147, 150-51 (Idaho 1933) (discharge of oil
and grease into waterway constituted permanent nuisance where jury could conclude that abatement
would be impractical); cf Isnard v. City of Coffeeyville, 917 P.2d 882, 889 (Kan. 1996) (nuisance
was not abatable and thus permanent); accord KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.530 (West 2006) (defin-
ing permanent nuisance as "any private nuisance that: (a) cannot be corrected or abated at reasonable
expense to the owner; and (b) is relatively enduring and not likely to be abated voluntarily or by
court order"); KY REV. STAT. ANN. § 411.540 (West 2006) ("Any private nuisance that is not a
permanent nuisance shall be a temporary nuisance.").
274. 64 P.3d 214 (Colo. 2004).
275. Hoery, 64 P.3d at 215-16.
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the release by 1995, the suit was not filed until 1998.276 The court
granted the government's motion, rejecting the plaintiffs argument that
the continued presence and migration of chemicals constituted a continu-
ing nuisance.277 The plaintiff appealed, and the Colorado Supreme Court
accepted a request by the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals to answer two
questions pertaining to Colorado state law: "(1) Does the continued mi-
gration from defendant's property to plaintiffs property, allegedly
caused by chemical releases by the defendant, constitute continuing tres-
pass and/or nuisance under Colorado law? (2) Does the ongoing pres-
ence of those toxic chemicals on plaintiffs property constitute continu-
ing trespass and/or nuisance under Colorado law?, 278  The court an-
swered both questions in the affirmative.279
The Colorado Supreme Court concluded that:
[i]f the defendant causes the creation of a physical condition that is of
itself harmful, even after the activity that created it has ceased, a per-
son who carried on the activity that created the condition is subject to
continuing liability for the physical condition. [T] For continuing in-
trusions - either by way of trespass or nuisance - each repetition or
continuance amounts to another wrong, giving rise to a new cause of
action. The practical significance of the continuing tort concept is
that for statue of limitation purposes, the claim does not begin to ac-
crue until the tortuous conduct has ceased.
280
In contrast, the court distinguished cases characterizing irrigation ditches
and the location of railway lines as permanent nuisances 281 because those
structures were designed to promote the state's economic develop-
276. ld. at 216-17.
277. Jd. at 217.
278. Id. at 215.
279. Id. at 218.
280. Id. (citations omitted). The court relied on comment (e) to section 834 of the Restatement
(Second) of Torts, which provides, in pertinent part, that:
Activities that create a physical condition differ from other activities in that they may
cause an invasion of another's interest in the use and enjoyment of land after the activity
itself ceases. When the invasion continues only so long as the activity is carried on, a per-
son who ceases to have any part in the activity is not liable for the continuance of the in-
vasion by others. But if the activity has resulted in the creation of a physical condition
that is of itself harmful after the activity that created it has ceased, a person who carried
on the activity that created the condition or who participated to a substantial extent in the
activity is subject to the liability for a nuisance, for the continuing harm. His active con-
duct has been a substantial factor in creating the harmful condition and so long as his
condition continues the harm is traceable to him. This is true even though he is no longer
in a position to abate the condition and to stop the harm. If he creates the condition upon
land in his possession and thereafter sells or leases it to another, he is subject to liability
for invasions caused by the condition after the sale or lease as well as for those occurring
before. When the vendor or lessor has created the condition his liability continues until
the vendee or lessee discovers it and has reasonable opportunity to take effective precau-
tions against it.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 834 cmt. e (1965).
281. Hoery, 64 P.3d at 219-20.
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ment.282 Accordingly, the court concluded that the only exception under
Colorado law to a continuing nuisance where a defendant fails to elimi-
nate an ongoing harmful physical condition wrongfully placed on plain-
tiff's land is where the invasion serves a "socially beneficial" purpose
intended to be permanent.283 The court found the exception inapplicable
in Hoery. The court reasoned that:
public policy favors the discontinuance of both the continuing migra-
tion and the ongoing presence of toxic chemicals into Hoery's prop-
erty and irrigation well. Under Colorado law, a tortfeasor's liability
for continuing trespass and nuisance creates a new cause of action
each day the property invasion continues. Hence, the alleged tortfea-
sor has an incentive to stop the property invasion and rem6ve the
cause of damage.
284
Unlike the Mangini III decision, the Hoery analysis did not further re-
quire a showing that contamination could be abated by reasonable means
at a reasonable cost as a condition to characterizing it as a continuing
281nuisance.
282. Id. at 220.
283. Id.; accord Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 358 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1007 (D. Colo. 2004)
(applying Hoery and Colorado law and holding that a tort based on property invasion that continues
in fact is a continuing tort unless the invasion will continue indefinitely and the invasion "is integral
to an enterprise vital to the development of the state."); see also infra note 354. The Hoery court
also recognized as a separate basis for finding a continuing nuisance the fact that the toxic pollution
continued to migrate unabated onto plaintiff's land. Hoery, 64 P.3d at 222. See infra notes 315-24
and accompanying text. Other courts have focused on the continued presence of a harmful condition
to characterize a nuisance as continuing. See, e.g., Bradley v. Am. Smelting and Ref. Co., 709 P.2d
782, 791-92 (Wash. 1985) (applying Washington law); Kulpa v. Stewart's Ice Cream, 534 N.Y.S.2d
518, 520 (N.Y. App. Div. 1988) (continuing nuisance claim stated where contamination that mi-
grated from underground storage tanks removed from neighboring property remained in plaintiff's
well). Applying Ohio law, the Sixth Circuit in Nieman v. NLO, Inc., 108 F.3d 1546 (6th Cir. 1997),
also employed a continued presence approach in the context of a continuing trespass case. The court
reversed a district court order granting a motion to dismiss a continuing trespass claim based on
continued presence of contaminants on plaintiff's property because "under Ohio law, a claim for
continuing trespass may be supported by proof of continuing damages and need not be based on
allegations of continuing conduct" and noted that defendants "may be ordered to remove the ura-
nium waste if the trespass is determined to be continuing and abatable." Nieman, 108 F. 3d at 1559.
In dissent, Judge Krupansky argued that under Ohio law the dumping of waste constitutes a perma-
nent trespass and nuisance, contending that the majority opinion "unjustifiably licenses the plaintiff
to assert a stale permanent tort claim which could and should have been litigated within four years of
Nieman's constructive discovery of the alleged radiation emissions caused by the defendants." Id. at
1568 (Krupansky, J., dissenting).
284. Hoery, 64 P.3d at 223. In a dissenting opinion, Justice Kourlis argued that a continuing
tort "theory that concentrates on the nature of the conduct of the tortfeasor is the one that comports
best with general tort law and the concepts of predictability and deterrence." Id. at 224.
285. The court did observe that "the record at this stage of the litigation indicates that the
contamination is not permanent - that is, it is remediable or abatable. Although the United States did
not address the factual issue, Hoery's expert opined under oath that Hoery's property could be reme-
diated." Id. at 222-23 (footnote omitted). See Coleman, supra note 139, at 53-54 ("In summary, the
[Hoery] court noted five reasons for reaching its conclusion. First, the TCE pollution is an ongoing
presence and migrates continuously onto Hoery's property. Second, the daily migration and pres-
ence of TCE on Hoery's property constitute the continuing tort. Third, the undisputed record shows
that the contamination is not permanent because it is abatable and remediable. Fourth, the pollution
is neither socially nor economically beneficial. Finally, public policy favors termination of the
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c. Continued Harmful Conduct
Other courts find that a continuing nuisance standard based on the
continued presence of contamination "would clearly undermine the pur-
poses behind statutes of limitations., 286  Instead, these courts focus on
the defendant's continued polluting conduct or instrumentalities (e.g., a
currently leaking underground storage tank) as the basis for characteriz-
ing a nuisance as continuing rather than permanent. 287 For example, in
Union Pacific Railroad Company v. Reilly,288 the current owner of Min-
nesota property brought a nuisance action in a Minnesota federal court
against the successor to the former property owner, alleging creosote that
had leached from storage tanks previously located on the property consti-
tuted a nuisance. 289 The defendant moved for summary judgment on the
ground that the nuisance claim was time-barred. 290  The court found a
genuine issue of material fact regarding whether the plaintiff discovered
the contamination within the limitations period, 29 ' but ruled that the con-
tinued presence of the creosote contamination did not constitute a con-
292tinuing nuisance. The court concluded that under Minnesota law:
continued migration and ongoing presence of TCE in Hoery's property." (footnote omitted)); Dana
L. Eismeier, Continuing Trespass and Nuisance for Toxic Chemicals, 32 COLO. LAW. 107, 110
(2003) (observing that the Colorado Supreme Court left unanswered in Hoery whether it "will adopt
a 'reasonableness' legal standard regarding what nuisances or trespasses can be abated"); cf Tatum
v. Basin Res., Inc., 141 P.3d 863, 867 (Colo. Ct. App. 2005) (stating, without supporting citation or
elaboration, that Hoery identified reasonable abatability as a permanent injury claim factor).
286. Breiggar Props. L.C. v. H. E. Davis & Sons, Inc., 52 P.3d 1133, 1136 (Utah 2002) (grant-
ing summary judgment for defendant contractor on ground that continued presence of debris dumped
on plaintiff landowner's property beyond the limitations period constituted a permanent rather than
continuing trespass). See infra notes 287-300 and accompanying text.
287. See, e.g., Hicks Family Ltd. Partnership v. 1 st Nat. Bank of Howell, No 268400, 2006 WL
2818514, at *9 (Mich. App. Oct 3, 2006) (stating that under Michigan law a plaintiff alleging con-
tinuing nuisance or trespass must show "continuing tortious acts, not merely continual harmful
effects from a completed act"); Wilson v. McLeod Oil Co., Inc., 398 S.E.2d 586, 594-95 (N.C. 1990)
(under North Carolina law, continued harm from migration of gasoline from present or former USTs
is a "renewing" nuisance rather than a "continuing," i.e., permanent, nuisance.); Soo Line R.R. Co.
v. Tang Indus., Inc., 998 F. Supp. 889, 896-97 (N.D. I11. 1998) (private nuisance claim against a
tenant for contamination arising from tenant waste disposal time barred because under Illinois law
continuing tort is occasioned by continuing unlawful acts or conduct, not continued harm, so nui-
sance became permanent when lease expired and tenant vacated site); Blake v. Gilbert, 702 P.2d
631, 639-40 (Alaska 1985) overruled on other grounds by Bibo v. Jeffrey's Rest., 770 P.2d 290, 292
n.9 (Alaska 1989) (continuing nuisance (or trespass) only where "repeated and continued tortious
acts are committed."); Anderson v. State, 965 P.2d 783, 789 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998) ("[A] continuing
tort is defined as one inflicted over a period of time; it involves a wrongful conduct that is repeated
until desisted, and each day creates a separate cause of action. A continuing tort sufficient to toll a
statute of limitations is occasioned by continual unlawful acts, not by continual ill effects from an
original violation, and for there to be a continuing tort there must be a continuing duty."); Carpenter
v. Texaco, Inc., 646 N.E.2d 398, 399 (Mass. 1995) ("[A] continuing trespass or nuisance must be
based on recurring tortious or unlawful conduct and is not established by the continuation of harm
caused by previous but terminated tortious or unlawful conduct.").
288. 4 F. Supp. 2d 860 (D. Minn. 1998).
289. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 4. F. Supp. 2d. at 862-63.
290. Id. at 863.
291. Id. at 865.
292. Id. at 867.
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[t]he continuous presence of the contaminants is insufficient to con-
stitute a recurring damage. The disposal of creosote was in the na-
ture of a permanent tort, rather than a continuing tort. To the extent
that leakage from storage tanks or basins could constitute a continu-
ing wrong, such wrong ceased when the storage tanks and settling
basins no longer existed. There is no evidence of contamination or
damage as a consequence of conduct or events which recurred on or
after December 22, 1988. Thus, the court agrees with defendant that
the "continuing wrong" doctrine is inapplicable to plaintiff's
claims. 293
Similarly, in Carpenter v. Texaco, Inc.,294 the Supreme Judicial
Council of Massachusetts held that the continued presence of gasoline
contamination on the plaintiffs' property did not constitute a continuing
nuisance. In Carpenter, the plaintiffs' property was contaminated by
gasoline that had leaked from an underground storage tank formerly lo-
cated on a nearby property. 295 Defendant Texaco had owned a gas sta-
tion on that property but sold the station in 1980; the tank was removed
in 1981 and no continuing release of gasoline from the gas station prop-
erty had occurred after 1984.296 The plaintiffs discovered the contamina-
tion in 1982 but did not bring their consolidated actions until 1991 and
1992.297 The defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground
that the plaintiffs' claims were time-barred under Massachusetts' three-
year statute of limitations for permanent nuisance; plaintiffs contended
that the ongoing presence of the gasoline on their property constituted a
continuing nuisance. 298 The trial court granted the defendant's motion
for summary judgment. The trial court's ruling was affirmed by the Su-
preme Judicial Council, which held that "a continuing trespass or nui-
sance must be based on recurring tortious or unlawful conduct and is not
established by the continuation of harm caused by previous but termi-
nated tortious or unlawful conduct. 29 9 The court viewed the gasoline
seepage as a single encroachment that had stopped by 1985 and thus be-
came a permanent nuisance.3 °°
293. Id.
294. 646 N.E.2d 398 (Mass. 1995).





300. Id. at 400 & n.4. The Carpenter court distinguished Sixty-Eight Devonshire, Inc. v.
Shapiro, 202 N.E.2d 811, 815 (Mass. 1964) (gutter repeatedly poured water onto the plaintiff's
property); and Asiala v. Fitchburg, 505 N.E.2d 575, 577 (Mass. App. Ct. 1987) (continuing damage
from ongoing encroachment by defective retaining wall) as cases where "rights were being invaded
from time to time, and thus there were continuing trespasses or continuing nuisances" Carpenter, 646
N.E.2d at 400 n.4. The Carpenter court also distinguished Wishnewsky v. Saugus, 89 N.E.2d 783,
786 (Mass. 1950) (recurrent drainage system flooding harmed plaintiff's land); Wells v. New Haven
& Northampton Co., 23 N.E. 724 (Mass. 1890) (culvert repeatedly channeled water onto plaintiff's
property); and Prentiss v. Wood, 132 Mass. 486, 487 (1882) (dam repeatedly set water back on
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d. Predictability of Future Damage
Texas takes a "fairly unique" 30' approach to distinguishing between
permanent and "temporary" nuisances by looking at the predictability of
future harm arising from the nuisance rather than abatability or continued
harmful conduct. In 2004, the Supreme Court of Texas discussed this
standard at length in Schneider National Carriers, Inc. v. Bates.302 In
Schneider National Carriers, nearby residents sued industrial plant op-
erators, alleging that air contaminants, odors, lights, and noise emitted
from the plants for many years interfered with the use and enjoyment of
the plaintiffs' property.30 3 The trial court granted the defendants' mo-
tions for summary judgment on the ground that the plaintiffs' nuisance
claims were time-barred because these long-standing conditions consti-
tuted a permanent nuisance. 304 The court of appeals reversed, finding
issues of fact regarding the frequency of nuisance conditions and the
feasibility of injunctive relief.305 The Texas Supreme Court reversed the
court of appeals after granting a petition for review in order "to try to
clarify the distinction [between permanent and temporary nuisance], one
of the oldest and most complex in Texas law.,
306
The court found that the distinction between a temporary and a
permanent nuisance "must take into account the [three] reasons for which
that distinction is drawn, ' , 307 i.e., when a nuisance claim accrues, whether
a series of nuisance suits should be permitted, and whether damages for
future as well as past harm should be allowed.30 8 The court held that:
[I]f a nuisance occurs several times in the years leading up to a trial
and is likely to continue, jurors will generally have enough evidence
of frequency and duration to reasonably evaluate its impact on
neighboring property values. In such cases, the nuisance should be
treated as permanent, even if the exact dates, frequency, or extent of
future damage remain unknown. Conversely, a nuisance as to which
any future impact remains speculative at the time of trial must be
deemed "temporary."
30 9
Based on this distinction, the court found that a nuisance should be
deemed permanent "if it is sufficiently constant or regular (no matter
how long between occurrences) that future impact can be reasonably
plaintiff's property) as cases involving "continuing nuisances that were not barred by the statute of
limitations because of the recurring nature of the harm." Id. at 400 n.4.
301. Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264, 271 (Tex. 2004).
302. 147 S.W.3d at 264.
303. Schneider Nat'! Carriers, Inc., 147 S.W.3d at 268.
304. Id. at 269.
305. Id.
306. Id. at 268.
307. Id.
308. Id. at 275.
309. Id. at 280 (footnote omitted).
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evaluated., 310 Under this standard, there would be no need for a series of
successive suits if future damages could be reasonably ascertained in one
action. 31 1  The court also held that "the characterization of a nuisance as
temporary or permanent should not depend on whether it can be
abated. 31 2 The court reasoned that a nuisance should be enjoined only if
the plaintiff did not have an adequate legal remedy (i.e., damages); to
award both future damages and enjoin the nuisance would amount to a
double recovery by the plaintiff.313  It further reasoned that abating an
otherwise permanent nuisance would not necessarily render its effects
temporary, observing that harm such as stigma arising from the nuisance
might impact the value of plaintiff's property for the foreseeable fu-
ture.3 14
e. Impact of Harmful Condition Varies Over Time
Some courts have based the distinction between a continuing and
permanent tort on whether the form or effect of the offensive condition
changes over time so that, in effect, a new cause of action accrues with
every change in condition. 31 5 For example, the California Court of Ap-
peal in Field-Escandon v. DeMann 316 observed that "[t]he salient feature
of a continuing trespass or nuisance is that its impact may vary over
time., 31 7  In Field-Escandon, the plaintiff argued that because a sewer
pipe buried on the plaintiffs property years before plaintiff acquired the
land could be removed at any time, it constituted a continuing tres-
318pass. The court affirmed summary judgment in favor of defendants on
the ground that the trespass was permanent and the plaintiffs claim was
310. Id. at 281.
311. Id. at 283.
312. Id. at 284.
313. Id.
314. Id. at 285-86.
315. See, e.g., Field-Escandon v. DeMann, 251 Cal. Rptr. 49, 53 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988) ("The
salient feature of a continuing trespass or nuisance is that its impact may vary over time."); see also
Kuhnle, supra note 148, at 197 n.61 (changing over time standard "appears to be controlling in
hazardous waste cases"); f Briggs & Stratton Corp. v. Concrete Sales & Servs., 29 F. Supp. 2d
1372, 1378 (D. Ga. 1998) (granting summary judgment for counterclaim defendant on ground that
presence of 300 barrels of chemical waste on property no longer owned by counterclaimant and
without evidence of continued leaching from barrels did not support claim for continued nuisance,
observing that "[a] cause of action for continuing nuisance is limited to situations where the con-
tamination has continued to spread: the fact that Briggs & Stratton's barrels remained on the PMI
property is insufficient to constitute a continuing nuisance."); City of Phoenix v. Johnson, 75 P.2d
30, 35 (Ariz. 1938) ("Permanent nuisance expresses the idea that a nuisance may continue in the
same state, unless the person obligated to abate it performs his duty and changes its form so as to
destroy its character as a nuisance.").
316. 251 Cal. Rptr. 49 (Cal. Ct. App. 1988).
317. Field-Escandon, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 53. The Supreme Court of California in Mangini III
quoted this language from Field-Escandon but did not question or overrule its continuing nuisance
standard in the course of affirming entry of judgment notwithstanding the verdict for defendant on
the ground that plaintiff failed to meet its burden of offering substantial evidence that the nuisance
was reasonably abatable. See Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. (Mangini 111), 912 P.2d 1220, 1223
(Cal. 1996); see also supra notes 337-45 and accompanying text.
318. Field-Escandon, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 52.
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time-barred because the pipe's impact on the property did not vary or
increase over time. 319 In Spar v. Pacific Bell,320 the court took the rea-
soning of Field-Escandon one step further to hold that utility lines that
the defendant already had voluntarily removed from plaintiffs property
nevertheless constituted a permanent nuisance and trespass.12 1 The court
noted that "because defendant is a public utility, it might have been able
to keep the facilities on plaintiffs property by paying just compensation
to plaintiff.
3 22
Under the "varying impact over time" standard, whether a private
nuisance (or trespass) claim for older contamination is timely as a con-
tinuing tort or time-barred as a permanent tort could depend on the media
contaminated by the defendant. Groundwater contamination conditions
vary over time, as a plume of contaminated groundwater migrates and
spreads through plaintiffs property and, perhaps, beyond.323  Unlike
groundwater contamination, soil contamination from a now-terminated
source may not change materially over time. For example, some hazard-
ous substances, such as DDT or PCBs, are relatively insoluble in water,
readily sorb to soil and, absent the introduction of a chemical solvent or
other catalyst, rarely will leach or migrate in the subsurface.324 Even
though abatement of soil contamination typically is much faster and less
expensive than groundwater remediation, under a "varying over time"
standard an older groundwater contamination nuisance claim could sur-
vive a statute of limitations challenge as a continuing tort while an older
soil contamination claim would likely be dismissed as time-barred.
319. Id. at 53.
320. 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 480 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991).
321. Spar, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 484.
322. Id. at 483.
323. In Hoery v. United States, 64 P.3d 214 (Colo. 2004), the Colorado Supreme Court ruled
that the continued migration of contaminated groundwater onto plaintiff's property constituted a
continuing nuisance. Hoery, 64 P.3d at 222. The court also found that the continued presence of
wrongfully placed contaminants on plaintiff's property provided an alternative basis for characteriz-
ing the nuisance as continuing for statute of limitations purposes. Id.; see also supra notes 272-85
and accompanying text. Similarly, in Arcade Water Dist. v. United States, 940 F.2d 1265 (9th Cir.
1991), the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court order granting a motion to dismiss as time barred a
private nuisance claim based on California law brought under the Federal Tort Claims Act, alleging
that contamination of a water district well from the operations of a former military laundry consti-
tuted a nuisance. Arcade Water Dist., 940 F.2d at 1267. The court held that continuing damage
rather than continuing wrongful activity was required to establish a continuing nuisance but, without
expressly stating that changing nuisance conditions were relevant to determining whether a nuisance
was permanent or continuing, stressed that "the most salient allegation is that contamination contin-
ues to leach into Arcade's Well 31." Id. at 1268; see also Stanley Works v. Snydergeneral Corp.,
781 F. Supp. 659, 665-67 (E.D. Cal. 1990) (denying defendant's statute of limitations summary
judgment motion on plaintiff's groundwater contamination continuing nuisance claim based on
disposals that occurred years before, observing "[t]he fact that the area of contamination is getting
bigger as the years go by does not convert the nuisance into a permanent nuisance. As noted above,
'the salient feature of a continuing trespass or nuisance is that its impact may vary over time."'
(quoting Field-Escandon, 251 Cal. Rptr. at 53)).
324. See, e.g., ROBERT D. MORRISON, ENVIRONMENTAL FORENSICS: PRINCIPLES AND
APPLICATIONS § 1.5 (2000) (describing immobility of hydrophobic compounds like DDT and PCBs
and their remobilization through cosolvency by the introduction of a solvent such as gasoline or oil).
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f. Multi-Factor Balancing
Given the wide range of tests applied by courts across the country, it
is not surprising that some courts have concluded that no one factor
should be determinative of whether a nuisance is continuing or perma-
nent. Instead, a number of courts have employed a multi-factored bal-
ancing test to arrive at a case-by-case determination of whether a nui-
sance is continuing or permanent. 325 The California Court of Appeal's
decision in Beck Development Co. v. Southern Pacific Transportation
Co., 326 illustrates such a multi-factored approach. In Beck, the owner of
contaminated property sued the former owner to recover cleanup costs
and obtain an injunction compelling remediation of oil contamination
placed on the property decades before.32 7 In determining that the nui-
sance was permanent rather than continuing, the California Court of Ap-
peal considered a variety of different factors: (a) whether the defendant's
offending activities had been discontinued (it had); (b) whether the nui-
sance would vary or change over time (tar-like petroleum contamination
in the soil would not); (c) whether the contaminants would continue to
migrate and cause new damage (it would not); (d) whether the nuisance
could be abated at any time (it could) and, if so; (e) whether abatement
was the best alternative in light of its cost (more than the value of the
property), technical feasibility (excavation was feasible), legitimate
competing interests (local agencies opposed excavation in light of mini-
mal risk to groundwater or human receptors), benefits of abatement
(remediated property), and risk of abatement (transporting contaminants
to another location for disposal). 328 After balancing each of these factors,
the court concluded that the contamination constituted a permanent nui-
sance and that Beck's claim was time-barred. 329 Multi-factored balanc-
ing on a case-by-case basis permits the court substantial flexibility in
determining whether a claim should be time-barred as a permanent nui-
sance; it also is an unpredictable standard that does not promote consis-
tent adjudication.
325. See, e.g., Beck Dev. Co. v. S. Pac. Transp. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996)
(multi-factor balancing test under California law); City of Sioux Falls v. Miller, 492 N.W.2d 116,
118 (S.D. 1992) (applying South Dakota law and defining continuing nuisance by whether nuisance
can be discontinued at any time, is intermittent or periodical in character, or involves a solid struc-
ture or a structure that can be modified); L'Enfant Plaza E., Inc. v. John McShain, Inc., 359 A.2d 5,
6 (D.C. 1976). ("Three factors for determining permanency are articulated in D. Dobbs, Remedies §
5.4 (1973): '(1) is the source of the invasion physically permanent, i.e., is it likely, in the nature of
things, to remain indefinitely? (2) is the source of the invasion the kind of thing an equity court
would refuse to abate by injunction because of its value to the community or because of relations
between the parties? (3) which party seeks the permanent or prospective measure of damages?').
326. 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
327. Beck Dev. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 526.
328. Id. at 557-60.
329. Id. at 560.
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g. Continuing Nuisance Unavailable
Finally, in some states the continuing tort doctrine is simply un-
available to address property contamination problems. For example, in
Citizens & Southern Trust Co. v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,330 the Georgia
Court of Appeals affirmed summary judgment for the defendants in an
action alleging that gasoline leaking from defendants' underground stor-
age tanks had contaminated plaintiffs commercial property, ruling that
the continuing tort doctrine only applied to cases involving personal in-
jury and was inapplicable to cases involving only property damage.33' In
New York, the state legislature in Civil Practice and Rules section 214-c
effectively abolished the doctrine of continuing torts for any "action to
recover damages for ... injury to property caused by the latent effects of
exposure to any substance or combination of substances" by imposing an
absolute discovery rule-based three-year statute of limitations for such
claims. 332 In Jensen v. General Electric Co., 3 3 3 the New York Court of
Appeals interpreted section 214-c to bar a continuing nuisance money
damages claim brought by property owners against an electric utility that
allegedly released hazardous substances that contaminated the plaintiffs'
property, but not to bar a continuing nuisance claim for injunctive re-
lief.
334
The absence of a continuing tort doctrine dramatically limits the
availability of a tort-based cleanup cost claim for sites at which the con-
tamination was created years ago. The discovery rule could preserve a
nuisance-based cleanup cost claim for landowners at sites recently sold
by parties who caused the contamination years before. Otherwise, with-
out a continuing tort doctrine, a current property owner who is voluntar-
ily cleaning up an older contamination site could not turn to state tort law
to obtain from other PRPs their fair share of cleanup costs.
5. Procedural Limitations: Burden of Proving Continuing Nuisance
The continuing nuisance doctrine theoretically can preserve private
cleanup cost claims for older contamination otherwise barred by the stat-
330. 385 S.E.2d 426 (Ga. Ct. App. 1989).
331. Citizens & S. Trust Co., 385 S.E.2d at 427-28.
332. N.Y. C.P.L.R. § 214-c (McKinney 2006). Section 214-c states, in pertinent part:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 214, the three year period within which an ac-
tion to recover damages for personal injury or injury to property caused by the latent ef-
fects of exposure to any substance or combination of substances, in any form, upon or
within the body or upon or within property must be commenced shall be computed from
the date of discovery of the injury by the plaintiff or from the date when through the ex-
ercise of reasonable diligence such injury should have been discovered by the plaintiff,
whichever is earlier.
Id.
333. 623 N.E.2d 547 (N.Y. 1993).
334. Jensen, 623 N.E.2d at 548-49; see also Syms v. Olin Corp., 408 F.3d 95, 110 (2d Cir.
2005) (under Jensen and section 214-c, continuing tort doctrine is unavailable for Federal Tort
Claims Act nuisance claim for cleanup cost and diminution in value damages).
2006]
DENVER UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
ute of limitations. In application, however, the ability of a current land-
owner to recover cleanup costs from other PRPs may turn on which party
has the burden of proof (i.e., the burden of production and burden of per-
suasion) about whether a nuisance is permanent or continuing. The sig-
nificance of the burden of proof, in turn, depends on the continuing nui-
sance standard employed by the court.
Few reported cases address the burden of proving whether a nui-
sance is permanent or continuing. Perhaps this is because the burden of
proof on the issue of continuing nuisance is less likely to present a chal-
lenge to a plaintiff in jurisdictions that employ a continued harmful activ-
ity standard. Absent a dispute regarding the source of contamination, in
these jurisdictions once defendant's conduct or structure causing the con-
tamination on plaintiff's property has stopped or been removed, the con-
tinuing nuisance doctrine would no longer apply. Similarly, in courts
that focus on whether the nuisance has changed over time, evidence of
the basic characteristics of the contamination (e.g., immobile soil con-
tamination as compared to ongoing leaching or contaminated groundwa-
ter migration) should resolve whether the nuisance is continuing.
The burden of proof, however, can be determinative in continuing
nuisance cases in courts that employ an abatability of harm standard (or
include abatability as part of a multi-factored balancing analysis), par-
ticularly those that require proof that a nuisance can be abated by reason-
able cost and by reasonable means. To address the abatability of soil or
groundwater contamination, a court may well require at least three types
of evidence.
First, the court may expect evidence of what a cleanup that is mini-
mally acceptable to relevant government regulatory agencies would look
like. This would require evidence of an adequate site characterization,
i.e., identifying the extent and nature of the contamination. It would also
require evidence of applicable cleanup standards, i.e., at what point
would regulatory agencies consider the site remediated.335 In the ab-
sence of applicable government cleanup standards, the court may turn to
the testimony of expert witnesses regarding appropriate cleanup levels.
Second, the court may expect evidence of whether it is technologi-
cally feasible to remediate the site to the court's satisfaction. This would
require evidence of a detailed plan for accomplishing the cleanup and the
335. In theory, abatement of a chemical contamination nuisance could mean complete removal
of all detectable contaminants. It is unlikely that a regulatory agency would require such a cleanup
in most instances; moreover, complete removal of all contaminants at sites with groundwater or
extensive soil contamination could prove technically impossible as well as unnecessary to protect
public health and the environment. See Capogeannis v. Super. Ct., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 805 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1993) ("[W]e are satisfied to presume that cleanup standards set by responsible public
agencies sufficiently reflect expert appraisal of the best that can be done to abate contamination in
particular cases.").
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likelihood that the contemplated technique would effect the desired
remediation.
Third, the court may expect evidence of the cost of remediation. To
the extent that the court will be evaluating the "reasonableness" of the
proposed abatement, the court may also require evidence about the cur-
rent value of the contaminated property as compared to the property's
value after remediation.
A party cannot satisfy this burden of production unless (a) environ-
mental professionals have adequately characterized the site; and (b) a
regulatory agency has participated in developing a cleanup plan. At a
small site with discrete soil contamination that will require only excava-
tion and proper disposal, this burden of production could easily be met.
At a larger site with complicated contamination problems, however, the
burden of production could present a significant challenge. For example,
development of cleanup standards could be delayed because of regula-
tory agency inattention or understaffing. At sites involving contaminated
groundwater, fully characterizing the nature, extent, and source(s) of
groundwater contamination and developing a remediation plan could
take years.336 The party who must produce evidence that the contamina-
tion constitutes a continuing nuisance runs the risk of not having neces-
sary evidence to present at trial or to defeat summary judgment, or to
persuade the court for a trial date continuance (or perhaps multiple con-
tinuances) in order to gather the necessary abatability evidence.
Courts have commonly placed the burden of proving a continuing
nuisance on plaintiffs.337 Two California appellate decisions illustrate
the consequences of plaintiffs' failure to meet this burden. In Mangini v.
Aerojet-General Corp. (Mangini JJ),338 the Supreme Court of California
affirmed a Court of Appeal decision overturning a $13.2 million jury
verdict 339 for the plaintiffs-owners of contaminated property on the
ground that plaintiffs failed to meet their burden of producing evidence
that the contamination constituted a continuing nuisance, i.e., that it was
reasonably abatable.340
336. See, e.g., EPA, CLEANING UP THE NATION'S WASTE SITES, supra note 21, at 49-57 (de-
scribing remediation techniques used at NPL sites); id. at 269-83 (describing source location and
remediation problems at contaminated groundwater sites where dense non-aqueous phase liquid
contamination is present).
337. See Coleman, supra note 139, at 46 ("To establish a continuing tort, the plaintiff must
show a 'substantial nexus' between the violations outside and within the limitations period. If the
violations are 'sufficiently related' they are treated as one continuous violation and the statute of
limitations will not be tolled because the tortious act has not ceased." (footnote omitted)).
338. 912 P.2d 1220 (Cal. 1996); see also supra notes 266-73 and accompanying text.
339. Mangini 111, 912 P.2d at 1230; Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. (Mangini II), 31 Cal. Rptr.
2d 696, 700 (Cal. Ct. App. 1994) (damage award was not for cleanup costs but for "a reduction in
the value of the use of the property within the limitations period").
340. Plaintiffs had won the right to proceed with a same property continuing nuisance claim in
Mangini v. Aerojet-General Corp. (Mangini 1), 281 Cal. Rptr. 827 (Cal. Ct. App. 1991). See supra
notes 199-211 and accompanying text.
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The court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that they had met their
burden by offering evidence that the property was contaminated and that
the technology existed to decontaminate the property.34' Instead, the
court required the plaintiffs to have offered evidence that the property
could be remediated by reasonable means and without unreasonable ex-
pense.342 The court agreed that something less than total decontamina-
tion could suffice to show abatability but found that plaintiffs had failed
to submit evidence of cleanup levels acceptable to or ordered by agencies
for the property,343 or expert evidence about the means and cost of site
remediation. 344  Because the plaintiffs failed to prove that the nuisance
was reasonably abatable, it was deemed permanent and their nuisance
claim was time-barred.345
Less than one month after the Supreme Court of California decided
Mangini III, the California Court of Appeal in Beck Development Co. v.
Southern Pacific Transportation Co. 346 held that the plaintiff had failed
to carry its burden of proving that a nuisance was continuing.347 Beck
had attempted to develop a large tract of land in Tracy, California, on
which Southern Pacific, a prior owner, had built a reservoir to store up to
3,000,000 barrels of oil. 348 Beck sued Southern Pacific for an injunction
and damages relating to oil contamination on the property. The trial
court found that the oil contamination constituted a continuing nuisance,
issued an injunction requiring Southern Pacific to determine the extent of
contamination and remediate the contamination identified to standards
provided by regulatory agencies, and ordered Southern Pacific to pay
Beck $1,205,613.18 in damages. 349 The California Court of Appeal re-
versed Beck's continuing nuisance judgment against Southern Pacific.350
341. Mangini 111, 912 P.2d at 1227.
342. Id.
343. Id. at 1226-27. Indeed, no such evidence was available. Although the EPA and state
agencies had entered into a consent decree with Aerojet-General in 1988 to complete a remedial
investigation and feasibility study to identify and evaluate remedial alternatives for the site, the study
had not been prepared by the time of trial, and apparently was not expected to be ready until 1998.
Id. at 1231 (Mosk, J. dissenting).
344. Id. at 1224. To the contrary, plaintiffs' expert testified that the site had not been suffi-
ciently characterized to know what remedial measures would be necessary or whether they could be
effectively accomplished, describing the potential range of cleanup costs as over $20 million and
perhaps as high as $75 million. Id. The court also noted that plaintiffs' counsel had acknowledged
to the jury during closing argument that "'[N]obody really knows how much is there, where it is,
what the chemicals are, or how much it's going to cost to abate the chemicals .... So I guess the
bottom line, if you ask yourself the question, how bad really is this site, the answer's got to be you
just don't know."' Id. at 1224-25.
345. Mangini Il, 912 P.2d at 1230. Plaintiffs apparently did not object to bearing the burden
that the nuisance was continuing as an element of their cause of action, but did object to proving that
the contamination could be remediated by reasonable means and at a reasonable cost. Id. at 1226.
346. 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
347. Beck Dev. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 560.
348. Id. at 526-27.
349. Id. at 533.
350. Id. at 560. Beck also sued both the California Department of Toxic Substances Control
(DTSC), seeking a writ of mandate compelling the DTSC to make a determination regarding
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The court employed a multi-factor balancing analysis to determine
whether the oil contamination constituted a continuing nuisance.35' Re-
lying on Mangini III, the court included in that analysis whether the con-
tamination could be abated at "reasonable cost by reasonable means.
' 352
The court emphasized the testimony of Beck's experts that the site had
been insufficiently characterized to draw firm conclusions about either
the extent of contamination or the cost of remediation, and that the range
of remediation costs (between $6,500,000 and $16,200,000) estimated by
Beck's consultant exceeded the value of the land after remediation.353
The court also noted that a regulatory agency had concluded that nothing
further needed to be done with the contamination and instead had cau-
tioned that excavating, treating, and disposing of the contaminated soil at
an off-site location "would be significantly burdensome and from a pub-
lic and regulatory point of view may not be the most advisable op-
tion., 354 The court found that "the result of the uncertainty in the record
is that there is no substantial evidence of abatability," 3" and that because
Beck had the burden to prove reasonable abatability the oil contamina-
tion was deemed to constitute a permanent nuisance and Beck's private
nuisance claim was time-barred.356
Few authorities place the burden of proving whether a nuisance is
permanent or continuing on the defendant.357 An Iowa Supreme Court
whether the property constituted a hazardous waste site or a site presenting no known environmental
hazard, and the City of Tracy (the "City"), seeking an order that the City accept and process Beck's
proposed development plan. Id. at 526. For several years, Beck had submitted technical reports to
the DTSC at its request only to have the DTSC respond with requests for still more reports, while the
City refused to process Beck's development plan until the DTSC had made a determination about
the environmental condition of the property. Id. at 528-32. The trial court issued the requested writ
to the DTSC but refused to order the City to process Beck's development plan. Id. at 526-27. The
California Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment against the DTSC and reversed the judgment in
favor of the City. Id. at 540, 547.
351. Id. at 560; see also supra notes 325-29 and accompanying text.
352. Id. at 559 (quoting Mangini 111, 51 Cal. Rptr. at 281).
353. Id. at 560. The court noted that the record lacked an estimate of the actual detriment that
Beck would suffer if the property was not remediated. Id. For example, the court's opinion does not
address the potential profitability that Beck would have derived from development of remediated
property.
354. Id. at 559-60. In Hoery v. United States, 64 P.3d 214, 220 (Colo. 2004), the Colorado
Supreme Court held that the presence of contaminants on plaintiff's property constituted a continu-
ing nuisance unless the contamination could and should be removed. In the abstract, the presence of
contaminants in soil or groundwater does not serve any socially beneficial purpose. On the other
hand, the court's concerns in Beck might reflect an instance where, under the Hoery standard, leav-
ing the soil contamination in place would serve such a purpose, i.e., when removing the contamina-
tion would create a greater risk of harm than leaving it alone.
355. Beck Dev. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 560.
356. Id. at 560. The court also concluded that the oil contamination was not a nuisance per se
under California statutes, id. at 551, and that Beck failed to prove that the contamination posed a risk
to drinking water supplies or other pathways to the public in order to constitute a public nuisance.
Id. at 554.
357. See Brown & Hansen, supra note 224, at 698-99 (arguing that defendants should bear
burden of proving that underground storage tank contamination constitutes a permanent nuisance
rather than plaintiffs bearing the burden that the site constitutes a continuing nuisance, likening the
issue to the defendant's burden of proving an affirmative defense that a claim is barred by the statute
of limitations); see also Smith, supra note 164, at 60 (noting that, while plaintiffs typically bear
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decision in 1903 regarding whether an improperly placed building con-
stituted a permanent or continuing nuisance turned on which party bore
the burden of proof. In Pettit v. Incorporated Town of Grand Junction,
Greene County,358 the court held that a private landowner could maintain
a public continuing nuisance action for an injunction ordering the re-
moval of public buildings improperly located in a street:
As the statute did not authorize the construction of the buildings in
the streets, the intention to permanently locate them there is not, in
the absence of evidence to the contrary, to be inferred; that is, the
burden is upon the party asserting that an obstruction in the highway
is a permanent nuisance, instead of a continuing one, to establish the
fact by proof. This was not done. These buildings were frame, and
such as could readily have been removed by the use of modem ma-
chinery, practically without injury. The character of the foundation
was not shown, and no evidence concerning the feasibility of re-
moval was introduced. Moreover, as already observed, they were
placed in a situation where the municipality had no right to locate
them; and in this respect the case is distinguishable from most of
those cited, where the nuisance consisted in negligently makinjan
improvement where the party at fault had the right to construct it. 
9
Pettit, however, appears to be the exception. Plaintiffs typically bear the
burden of production that a nuisance is continuing-a burden that can be
determinative in cases involving a current landowner who voluntarily
cleans up older contamination and wants to obtain from other PRPs their
fair share of cleanup costs.
3 60
burden of proving damages within continuing tort limitations period, statute of limitations usually is
an affirmative defense).
358. 93 N.W. 381 (Iowa 1903).
359. Pettit, 93 N.W. at 383.
360. See e.g., Morsey v. Chevron, USA, Inc., 94 F.3d 1470, 1476-77 (10th Cir. 1996) (apply-
ing Kansas law to hold that the plaintiff failed to carry burden of proof that harm to leasehold was
remediable, removable, or abatable and thus constituted temporary rather than time-barred perma-
nent nuisance damages). Some courts will presume in the face of ambiguous pleading that an al-
leged nuisance is continuing (or temporary). For example, in King v. City of Independence, 64
S.W.3d 335, 339-40, 343 (Mo. Ct. App. 2002), overruled on other grounds, George Ward Builders,
Inc. v. City of Lee's Summit, 157 S.W.3d 644, 650 (Mo. Ct. App. 2004), the court directed a tempo-
rary nuisance judgment for plaintiff notwithstanding plaintiffs failure to specify in the complaint
whether the nuisance was permanent or temporary. The court concluded that:
If allegations are doubtful as to whether the pleaded cause of action is for a permanent
nuisance or a temporary nuisance, courts should treat the nuisance as temporary. This is
so "because adjudication of a permanent nuisance amounts to a grant of an easement to
the wrongdoer to continue to interfere with the plaintiffs land.
King, 64 S.W.3d at 339-40 (quoting Scantlin v. City of Pevely, 741 S.W.2d 48, 50 (Mo. Ct. App.
1987)).
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D. Uncertainty and Opportunity after Aviall: The Unrealized Potential
of Private Nuisance Law in Cleanup Cost Allocation Disputes
Private nuisance has the potential to provide a flexible legal frame-
work well-suited to resolving cleanup cost allocation disputes between
the current owners of contaminated property and others who contributed
to site contamination. Providing current landowners with the means to
require other PRPs to pay or contribute to cleanup costs is essential to
helping solve the national problem of encouraging voluntary cleanups at
the nation's hundreds of thousands of contaminated sites. The current
state of private nuisance law, however, is not up to the task. The dra-
matic variations in nuisance law among the states and significant doc-
trinal limitations affecting the application of nuisance law to many com-
mon contamination problems make current nuisance law an unsatisfac-
tory response to this national problem. Moreover, the incoherent patch-
work quilt of private nuisance law across the country undermines the
ability of state law to restore the reliance interest equilibrium among
contaminated property dispute stakeholders upended by Aviall, and, of
perhaps greater importance, the capacity for state law to offer flexible,
efficient rules of decision in contaminated property disputes that federal
law cannot provide.
States can respond in one of two ways to the current deficiencies in
private nuisance law. The first is to do nothing. State courts and legisla-
tures can simply stand by and let the uncertainties created by Aviall about
the role of federal law in private cleanup cost disputes sort themselves
out. Perhaps Congress will amend CERCLA to ensure cleanup cost con-
tribution rights for all PRPs, not just PRPs who have already been sued
under CERCLA sections 106 or 107(a) or settled with the government.
Or perhaps the United States Supreme Court will definitively resolve
whether a PRP may recover from other PRPs their fair shares of cleanup
costs under CERCLA section 107(a)(4)(B).
If all PRPs ultimately are found to lack a federal right to recover
cleanup costs from other PRPs, then private cleanup cost disputes will
descend into a Balkanized state of confusion, with the cleanup cost re-
covery rights of a PRP who voluntarily cleans up property dependant on
which of 50 differing rules of decision happens to apply to a particular
dispute by happenstance of geography. In the vast majority of states, no
private nuisance action will be available for same property cleanup cost
disputes, either because of traditional interpretations of ancient nuisance
law or because of the operation of the similarly ancient doctrine of ca-
veat emptor. In many states, the availability of cleanup cost claims relat-
ing to older contamination sites will turn on which of the many compet-
ing "continuing nuisance" tests a state may happen to employ. Current
landowners in states with nuisance doctrine inhospitable to cleanup cost
claims will be discouraged from voluntarily taking the lead in site
cleanup. Instead, cleanup cost allocation disputes will increasingly shift
2006]
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from direct to derivative claims, as current property owners wait for---or
seek out-litigation against them as a trigger for cleanup cost contribu-
tion rights under federal or state law.
On the other hand, the chilling effect on voluntary cleanups created
by Aviall will largely disappear if federal legislation or court decisions
provide all PRPs with CERCLA cleanup cost contribution rights. Con-
firmation of CERCLA cleanup cost rights, however, would do nothing to
effect the efficiency and flexibility benefits that potentially could be
available under nuisance law, including: (a) application of a common
body of state law to the cleanup cost and other issues raised in contami-
nated property disputes; (b) encouragement of technically sound, effi-
cient cleanups; and (c) avoidance of the remediation and litigation trans-
action costs associated with NCP consistency requirements under
CERCLA. 
361
The second option is for states to seize the initiative and re-examine
the current state of nuisance law in their jurisdictions. Limiting private
nuisance claims to disputes between contemporaneous neighboring prop-
erty owners, employing overly-restrictive continuing nuisance standards,
and applying outmoded interpretations of nuisance that undermine
prompt site remediation ignore the realities of environmental contamina-
tion problems and private cleanup cost disputes. States should adopt a
new environmental nuisance paradigm that applies to all private cleanup
cost disputes faced by the current owners of contaminated property. The
next section of this article proposes such a paradigm.
III. AN ENVIRONMENTAL NUISANCE PARADIGM FOR PRIVATE CLEANUP
COST DISPUTES
Before Aviall, states allowed federal law to serve as the primary rule
of decision in private cleanup cost disputes in large part by clinging to
narrow, anachronistic interpretations of private nuisance law. The uncer-
tain status of current landowner federal law cleanup cost contribution
rights after Aviall has provided an opportunity for states to make private
nuisance law relevant to a wide range of contaminated property disputes.
State courts and legislatures can revitalize private nuisance law by revis-
iting unnecessary doctrinal limitations barring its application to same
property and older contamination problems through adoption of the envi-
ronmental nuisance paradigm described below. Combining such a mod-
ernized liability framework with its traditional remedial flexibility would
transform private nuisance into a valuable tool for allocating remediation
responsibilities at sites across the country. Moreover, it can assure
cleanup cost contribution rights to CERCLA-liable but non-culpable
361. See supra notes 140-45 and accompanying text.
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current owners of contaminated property. 362 This section identifies and
analyzes the environmental nuisance paradigm components required to
bring the efficiency and flexibility of private nuisance law to virtually all
cleanup cost disputes faced by the current owners of contaminated prop-
erty.
A. The Proposal
Every state, whether by statute or case law, should modernize its
law of private nuisance as applied to contaminated property disputes in
accordance with the following environmental nuisance paradigm:
(1) A claim for private nuisance should be available in same property
as well as neighboring property contamination disputes.
(2) The doctrine of caveat emptor should be abolished as a defense to
private nuisance liability in environmental nuisance cases, but the
underlying circumstances surrounding a plaintiff's acquisition of
contaminated property should be relevant to awarding and fashioning
a private nuisance remedy.
(3) Soil and groundwater contamination should presumptively consti-
tute a continuing nuisance capable of abatement.
(4) The burden of proof as to both liability and damages regarding
whether a nuisance is permanent or continuing should be on the party
(plaintiff or defendant) contending that a nuisance is permanent.
(5) A party seeking to meet this burden of proving that an environ-
mental nuisance is permanent would be required to show that the
contamination cannot be abated by reasonable means and at a reason-
able cost as measured against the highest and best potential use of the
property as remediated.
This environmental nuisance paradigm serves several goals. First, it
creates a template that allows every state to adopt a nuisance-based
cleanup cost remedy, providing current landowners with an incentive to
initiate prompt characterization and remediation efforts.363 Second, it
362. Because the current owner of contaminated property is a liable party under CERCLA
section 107(a)(1) regardless of whether she contributed to site contamination, she may not after
Aviall obtain cleanup cost contribution from other PRPs under section 113(f) unless she first has
been sued under CERCLA or settled with the government, and may not have a right to cost recovery
at all under section 107(a). See supra notes 72-121 and accompanying text. Current private nui-
sance law would bar this non-culpable but CERCLA-liable current owner from recovering cleanup
costs in same property or many older contamination disputes. The paradigm proposed by this article
would provide cleanup cost recovery rights for this non-culpable current owner.
363. A nuisance-based paradigm requires that a plaintiff seeking to recover cleanup costs must
have a property interest in the contaminated site. It thus would provide a remedy for current prop-
erty owners at multi-PRP sites but would not benefit PRPs who incur cleanup costs but who are not
current landowners, e.g., former owners, arrangers, transporters, neighbors. This paradigm neverthe-
less should address most private cleanup cost disputes. Regulatory agencies often look to the current
owner of property to take the lead in site cleanup. Agencies would look to PRPs other than the
current site owner to take the lead in cleaning up a site in a limited set of circumstances, e.g., the
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encompasses same property contamination problems, not just neighbor-
ing property disputes. Third, it encourages site cleanup rather than pay-
ment of prospective damage awards that effectively constitute the pur-
chase of permanent contamination easements. Fourth, it encourages in-
formal resolution of cleanup cost disputes by allowing equitable cost
allocation and presumptively making available successive continuing
nuisance actions if abatable contamination is not remediated. Finally, it
is consistent with the basic structure and tradition of nuisance law. Al-
though it could most efficiently be implemented by statute, courts in
many states could adopt the paradigm by interpreting the existing com-
mon law of private nuisance law to reflect the realities of soil and
groundwater contamination. 364  The following discussion looks in more
detail at each component of the proposed paradigm.
B. Same Property Environmental Nuisance Disputes
A private right of action for environmental nuisance should include
same property contamination disputes. Properties often have been con-
taminated in whole or in part as a result of hazardous substance handling
practices by prior site occupants, such as at former landfills, industrial
facilities, gas stations, and abandoned brownfield sites. The contamina-
tion caused by these former occupants may significantly impair the cur-
rent landowner's ability to develop or otherwise use the property and
current landowner is insolvent or otherwise incapable of proceeding with the cleanup, or the current
owner meets the requirements for a defense to remediation liability, such as the third party defense
found in CERCLA section 107(b)(3). Non-current landowner PRPs who incur cleanup costs be-
cause they are named on a cleanup order or otherwise take the lead in site cleanup would need to
rely on legal theories other than a direct private nuisance action (e.g., contract rights, state or federal
cleanup cost statutes, derivative claims) to recover cleanup costs from other PRPs.
364. Some state appellate courts may not encounter significant stare decisis problems in order
to embrace the paradigm because they have not specifically applied the common law of private
nuisance to contaminated property disputes. Many decisions applying state nuisance law to private
contaminated property disputes are from federal courts estimating how a state court of last resort
would apply nuisance law to environmental contamination problems. See, e.g., Phila. Elec. Co. v.
Hercules, Inc., 762 F.2d 303, 312 (3d Cir. 1985) (applying Pennsylvania law); Lilly Indus., Inc. v.
Health-Chem Corp., 974 F. Supp. 702, 708 (S.D. Ind. 1997) (applying Indiana law); Wellesley Hills
Realty Trust v. Mobil Oil Corp., 747 F. Supp. 93, 98-99 (D. Mass. 1990) (applying Massachusetts
law); Amland Props. Corp. v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 711 F. Supp. 784, 808 (D.N.J. 1989) (applying
New Jersey law); Westwood Pharm., Inc. v. Nat'l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1272, 1280
(W.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying New York law). State appellate courts which have not specifically
addressed the application of private nuisance law to contaminated property disputes are not bound by
federal court interpretations of state law. See, e.g., Howard Contracting, Inc. v. G.A. MacDonald
Constr. Co., Inc., 83 Cal. Rptr. 2d 590, 597 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998) ("[Flederal decisional authority is
neither binding nor controlling in matters involving state law"); SI Sec. v. Bank of Edwardsville, 841
N.E.2d 995, 1001 (Ill. App. Ct. 2005) (Illinois courts not bound by federal court interpretation of
Illinois statutes not involving federal questions). Moreover, rather than assume that a state court will
apply an anachronistic interpretation of nuisance law to a contaminated property dispute, federal
courts may wish to follow the lead of the Tenth Circuit in Hoery v. United States, 324 F.3d 1220,
1222-23 (10th Cir. 2003), and certify nuisance law questions applicable to soil or groundwater
contamination cases to state courts of last resort for resolution.
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subject her to costly environmental regulatory obligations. 365  Neverthe-
less, the vast majority of states continue to ignore the realities of envi-
ronmental contamination problems by restricting private nuisance claims
to disputes involving neighboring property uses. 366  This majority rule
should be abandoned for several reasons.
First, the neighboring use dispute limitation is not mandated by the
fundamental structure of private nuisance law. On the contrary, private
nuisance provides a remedy for significant interference with the use and
enjoyment of another's property. It is well-recognized that "[p]rivate
nuisance is traditionally a claim based upon activities outside the land by
a stranger to the title, for instance, based upon a neighbor's noise or pol-
lution." 367 Courts have bootstrapped this traditional role of private nui-
sance law into a doctrinal requirement barring same property claims. For
example, in Philadelphia Electric Company v. Hercules, Inc.,3 6 8 the
Third Circuit in 1985 focused on "the historical role of private nuisance
law as a means of efficiently resolving conflicts between neighboring
contemporaneous land uses" to hold that the current owner of contami-
nated property could not assert a same property private nuisance
claim.369 Courts throughout the country, over the following two decades,
have cited Philadelphia Electric and embraced the "traditional role" of
private nuisance law-often without further analysis-to bar same prop-
erty private nuisance claims involving hazardous substance contamina-
tion.37°
The fact that private nuisance claims historically served as a com-
mon law zoning tool does not exclude other purposes that could be
served well by private nuisance law. The hallmark of nuisance is its
flexibility; the doctrine can and should adapt as a solution to modem
environmental problems. 371  The current owner of property required to
365. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 821D & cmt. e (1975) (private nuisance is an
invasion of another's use and enjoyment of property, including interference with possessory inter-
est); id. § 821F (claim for private nuisance requires significant harm).
366. See supra notes 178-96 and accompanying text.
367. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 463 (2000) (noting also that a few recent cases had
imposed same property liability for serious contamination or ultra-hazardous conduct).
368. 762 F.2d 303 (3d Cir. 1985); see also supra notes 179-96 and accompanying text.
369. Phila. Elec. Co., 762 F.2d at 307, 314.
370. See supra note 196 and accompanying text.
371. See, e.g., Vogel v. Grant-Lafayette Elec. Coop., 548 N.W.2d 829, 834 (Wis. 1996) (hold-
ing that Wisconsin private nuisance law supported damages judgment for dairy farmers against
electric cooperative for damage to their dairy herd allegedly caused by stray electrical voltage,
noting that "[The Wisconsin Supreme Court] has previously characterized the common law doctrine
of private nuisance as being both 'broad' to meet the wide variety of possible invasions, and 'flexi-
ble' to adapt to changing social values and conditions." (citation omitted)); Cook v. Rockwell Int'l.
Corp., 358 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1012-14 (D. Colo. 2004) (presence on plaintiffs' property of plutonium
released from nearby nuclear weapons plant constituted a continuing nuisance and trespass for
statute of limitations purposes, and could provide basis for prospective diminution in value damages,
effectively purchasing an easement for invasion to continue given Colorado's "adoption of a flexible
approach to determining the appropriate measure of damages for injury to real property"); Carter v.
Monsanto Co., 575 S.E.2d 342, 348 (W. Va. 2002) (Starcher, J., concurring) ("The cause of action
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remediate the contamination caused by others experiences the same in-
terference with the use and enjoyment of the property whether the con-
tamination came from a prior owner or a predecessor. Indeed,
[a]s Oliver Wendell Holmes commented on the development of the
common law: "It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of
law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still
more revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have van-
ished long since, and the rule simply persists from blind imitation of
the past."
372
Simply put, the historic pedigree of private nuisance law in neighboring
property owner disputes should not pose an insurmountable barrier to its
adoption as a tool for resolving same property contamination disputes.
Second, current common law or statutory definitions of nuisance do
not compel courts to bar same property private nuisance claims. Section
821 D of the Restatement (Second) of Torts defines a private nuisance as
an "invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of
land. '3 73  The Philadelphia Electric court, among many others, cited
section 821D to define a private nuisance for purposes of conducting its
Pennsylvania law analysis.374 The section 821D definition is broad
enough to encompass same property disputes where the continued pres-
ence of contamination caused by the prior owner invades and substan-
tially interferes with the use and enjoyment of land by another, i.e., the
current owner.
Some courts adopting the Philadelphia Electric analysis have dis-
tinguished California cases 375 recognizing same property private nui-
sance claims on the ground that (a) the law of nuisance is codified in
California and (b) California's broad statutory definition of nuisance has
for private nuisance has been for centuries a highly flexible one, giving courts substantial latitude to
fashion appropriate and reasonable remedies, depending on the harm to be avoided or remedied.");
Antolini, supra note 162, at 771 ("Although amorphous in definition, all nuisance actions have in
common three important doctrinal aspects that provide unique scope to their application by the
courts: substantiality of interference, unreasonableness of the defendant's conduct, and equitable
flexibility.").
372. Antolini, supra note 162, at 790 (quoting Oliver W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10
HARv. L. REv. 457, 469 (1897)).
373. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1975); see also id., cmt. e ("If the interfer-
ence with the use and enjoyment of the land is a significant one, sufficient in itself to amount to a
private nuisance, the fact that it arises out of or is accompanied by a trespass will not prevent recov-
ery for the nuisance, and the action may be maintained upon either basis as the plaintiff elects or
both.").
374. Phila. Elec. Co., 762 F.2d 303, 313 (3d Cir. 1985).
375. The California state courts are the only state courts as of this writing to have recognized in
a published opinion private nuisance same property claims. See supra notes 199-212 and accompa-
nying text. A Minnesota federal district court in Union Pacific Railroad Co. v. Reilly Industries,
Inc., 4 F. Supp. 2d 860, 867 (D. Minn. 1998) interpreted Minnesota's nuisance statute to permit
private nuisance same property claims. See supra notes 213-19 and accompanying text. Research
conducted for this article revealed no reported Minnesota state court decision or state court decision
from any jurisdiction other than California recognizing private nuisance same property claims.
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been expansively interpreted by the California courts.37 6 The breadth of
California's statutory definition of nuisance, however, is immaterial be-
cause the definition of nuisance in most states (including those that adopt
the section 821D definition from the Restatement (Second) of Torts is
sufficiently broad to encompass same property private nuisance claims as
well. 1
77
Third, some courts that bar same property private nuisance claims
nevertheless permit same property public nuisance claims brought by
private parties with standing to sue because in exercising a common pub-
lic right they have suffered a "special injury" different in kind or signifi-
cant degree from that suffered by the general public. 378 However, "it is
difficult to see any material difference between a public and a private
nuisance in the context of a subsequent private landowner seeking to sue
the previous owner for contamination of the property. 3 79 Permitting a
current property owner to sue a predecessor for damages (e.g., cleanup
costs) under a public nuisance theory while barring such a claim under a
private nuisance theory cannot meaningfully be explained by the differ-
ent interests protected by public and private nuisance and further demon-
strates the need for courts to think afresh about the role of nuisance in
contaminated property disputes.
Fourth, the Philadelphia Electric court was reluctant in its 1985 de-
cision to "extend private nuisance beyond its historical role ' 380 because
"[s]uch an extension is particularly hazardous in an area, such as envi-
ronmental pollution, where Congress and state legislatures are actively
seeking to achieve a socially acceptable definition of rights and liabili-
ties."38' Two decades later, such concerns should no longer inhibit a
court from recognizing same property private nuisance claims. Statutory
376. See, e.g., Truck Components, Inc. v. K&H Corp, No. 94 C 50250, 1995 WL 692541, at
*12 n.9 (N.D. 111. Nov. 22, 1995) (California same property nuisance case law based on unique
California statutory scheme).
377. See Lilly Indus., Inc. v. Health-Chem Corp., 974 F. Supp. 702, 707 (S.D. Ind. 1997)
(noting that the breadth of California's statutory definition of private nuisance is not unique to Cali-
fornia).
378. See supra notes 170-72 and accompanying text. See, e.g., Westwood Pharm., Inc. v. Nat'l
Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1272, 1281-84 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (applying New York law to
bar private nuisance claim under doctrine of caveat emptor but permitting public nuisance same
property claim because of unspecified "different interests and public-policy concerns involved in
public nuisance actions"); cf., e.g., Hydro-Mfg., Inc. v. Kayser-Roth Corp., 640 A.2d 950, 957-58
(R.I. 1994) (citing Philadelphia Electric to bar same property private nuisance claim while recogniz-
ing same property public nuisance claim, but granting summary judgment for defendant because
plaintiff failed to suffer "special damage").
379. Truck Components, Inc. v. K&H Corp., No. 94 C 50250, 1995 WL 692541, at *12 (N.D.
Ill. Nov. 22, 1995) (applying Illinois law to bar both private nuisance and public nuisance same
property claims and also observing that "[w]hile a public nuisance might be actionable against the
prior owner if brought on behalf of the public, the present property owner cannot avoid the limitation
against bringing a private nuisance action merely by converting his claim to one of public nui-
sance.").
380. Phila. Elec. Co., 762 F.2d at 315.
381. Id.
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environmental law has matured from its nascent stages in the mid-1980s.
Legislatures have had an opportunity to develop statutory liability
schemes addressing environmental regulatory liability and in the course
of doing so have largely chosen not to preempt state common law tort
theories of liability. 382 Moreover, same property private nuisance claims
are consistent in structure with provisions of CERCLA and state Super-
fund laws that impose strict liability on prior property occupants respon-
sible for site contamination.383 Recognizing same property private nui-
sance claims in the early twenty-first century will not interfere with leg-
islative environmental policy making; on the contrary, it would promote
legislative goals of encouraging prompt, voluntary cleanups and promot-
ing informal resolution of cleanup cost allocation disputes.
Fifth, courts should re-examine the propriety of same property pri-
vate nuisance claims in light of the fact that the development of state
nuisance law governing private cleanup cost disputes has disproportion-
ately occurred in federal court.384 Under the Erie385 doctrine, "a federal
court sitting in diversity must apply the state substantive law as pro-
nounced by the state's highest court or, if there has been no such deci-
sion, must predict how the state's highest court would decide were it
confronted with the problem., 38 6 A federal court presented with a ques-
tion of first impression regarding whether to permit a same property pri-
vate nuisance claim involving hazardous substance contamination dam-
ages might be reluctant to re-examine the "historical role" of private nui-
sance as a tool to resolve neighboring property use disputes. For exam-
382. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9614(a), 9652(d), 9659(h) (West 2006) (CERCLA "savings
clauses" regarding liability under state law theories); Edwards v. First Nat. Bank of Ne., 712 A.2d 33
(Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1998) (trial court erred by granting motion to dismiss groundwater contamina-
tion common law claims against lender on ground that Maryland environmental code lender liability
exemption preempted nuisance, trespass, negligence, and strict liability claims); City of Lodi v.
Randtron, 13 Cal. Rptr. 3d 107, 119-22 (Cal. Ct. App. 2004) (holding that local ordinance modeled
after CERCLA preempted as conflicting with and unauthorized by California Hazardous Substance
Account Act (HSAA) but noting that HSAA preserved common law liabilities for parties responsible
for hazardous substance contamination). But see City of Modesto Redevelopment Agency v. Dow
Chem. Co., No. 999345, 999643, 2005 WL 1171998, at *18-19 (Cal. Super. Ct., April 11, 2005)
(barring common law damage claims that conflicted with HSAA); see also Aronovsky, supra note 5,
at 85-86.
383. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(2) (definition of "covered persons" includes persons who
owned or operated a facility at the time of disposal of a hazardous substance); CAL. HEALTH &
SAFETY CODE § 25323.5 (West 2005) (incorporating CERCLA definitions of "responsible party"
and "liable person"); IND. CODE ANN. § 13-25-4-8 (West 2006) (incorporating CERCLA definition
of liable parties).
384. Federal courts have exclusive subject matter jurisdiction over claims "arising under"
CERCLA. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9613(b). CERCLA plaintiffs have often joined state law cleanup cost and
other contamination damage claims, such as private nuisance claims, to CERCLA claims pursuant to
a federal court's supplemental jurisdiction to hear state law claims for which the court otherwise
would lack subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.A. § 1367(a) (West 2006). Private nuisance claims
also could be brought in federal court (either joined to a CERCLA claim or as an independent claim)
pursuant to diversity of citizenship federal court subject matter jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C.A. §§ 1331-
1332.
385. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
386. Craig v. Lake Asbestos of Quebec, Ltd., 843 F.2d 145, 149 (3d Cir. 1988) (citation omit-
ted).
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pie, in Westwood Pharmaceuticals, Inc. v. National Fuel Gas Distribu-
tion Corp., 3 7 the plaintiff argued to a New York federal district court
that the doctrine of caveat emptor did not bar a same property private
nuisance claim brought under New York law, pointing to a series of New
York state court decisions recognizing various exceptions to the doc-
trine.388 The court declined to accept plaintiff's argument, stating that:
[w]ithout a more definitive indication from New York's courts that
the state's common law doctrine of caveat emptor does not apply to
cases such as the one at bar, well-established principles of federalism
dictate that this court refrain from extending the scope of private nui-
sance liability beyond its traditional bounds.
389
These federal court decisions 390-particularly Philadelphia Electric-
came to form many of the building blocks for the majority rule that pri-
vate nuisance contaminated property claims must involve a neighboring
property dispute. State (as well as federal) courts need to re-examine the
majority rule rather than further enable the development of a body of
same property contamination private nuisance jurisprudence created
largely by happenstance because of the Erie doctrine.
Finally, as a matter of policy, "expanding" private nuisance law be-
yond its traditional role in neighboring property use disputes also is con-
sistent with the traditional flexibility of nuisance law to address and
adapt to changing societal and economic conditions.39' The "traditional"
role of private nuisance law-as a vehicle for resolving neighboring
property disputes-was established long before the development of mod-
em environmental law, the creation of contaminated property regulatory
obligations, and growth of scientific knowledge and invention of techni-
cal tools necessary to discover (or begin to discover) the presence of
health risks and environmental problems presented by hazardous sub-
stance contamination. Private nuisance law is broad and flexible enough
to meet today's modem contamination problems and can apply with
equal force to interference with the use and enjoyment of property
caused by same property as well as neighboring property contamination.
387. Westwood Pharm., Inc. v. Nat'l Fuel Gas Distrib. Corp., 737 F. Supp. 1272 (W.D.N.Y.
1990); see also supra notes 231-32 and accompanying text.
388. Westwood, 737 F. Supp. at 1283-84.
389. Id. at 1284. The court also cited to the Third Circuit's decision in Philadelphia Electric,
barring a same property private nuisance claim under Pennsylvania law. Id. at 1284 n.12.
390. See supra note 195.
391. For example, economic disruption occasioned by the issuance of injunctive relief in pri-
vate nuisance cases has evolved from an irrelevant consideration to a component in a balancing
analysis (comparing the social utility of the actor's conduct and the total amount of economic and
other harm that would result from enjoining an offending use) employed to determine whether an
injunction should issue at all and, if so, under what conditions. See, e.g., Jeff L. Levin, Compensated
Injunctions and the Evolution of Nuisance Law, 71 IOWA L. REv. 775, 793-803 (1986) (describing
development of modem nuisance law and economic theory). There is a wide range of scholarship
discussing in detail the evolution of nuisance law from its twelfth century origins to the present. See,
e.g., supra note 166.
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C. Abolish the Caveat Emptor Defense to Environmental Nuisance Li-
ability
Along with adherence to the "traditional role" of private nuisance as
a rule of decision only for neighboring property use disputes, the doctrine
of caveat emptor has presented a second barrier to same property private
nuisance cleanup cost dispute claims. 392 Caveat emptor should not pro-
vide a defense to private environmental nuisance liability; instead, the
circumstances surrounding the current landowner's acquisition of the
property should remain relevant to the nature and scope of any remedy
ordered by the court.
Several arguments could be advanced in support of caveat emptor
as a defense in contaminated property disputes: (a) it provides a bright
line for risk allocation in real property transactions; 393 (b) it encourages
full disclosure by sellers and diligent property investigations by buyers,
promoting a true "meeting of the minds" regarding risk allocation in real
property transactions; 394 and (c) it prevents wasteful transaction costs
associated with vendor/vendee litigation about property conditions that
are better addressed by the allocation of risk by market forces. 395  These
arguments, however, fail to justify allocating exclusively to current land-
owners all of the costs of remediating contamination to which they may
have made little or no contribution.
First, any benefits of a caveat emptor bright line for allocating
risk 396 are outweighed by the inequity of allowing sellers of contami-
392. See supra notes 221-43 and accompanying text. See also Kay, supra note 154, at 170-71
(proposing that caveat emptor should not provide a defense to a same property contamination dam-
ages claim brought under a proposed theory of environmental negligence, arguing that Restatement
(Second) of Torts sections 352 (caveat emptor exception when seller knows of harmful condition but
conceals or fails to disclose it to seller) and 840A (seller remains liable as if still in position for
physical harm caused by nuisance condition) provide a "strong foundation on which to rest liability
for land sellers who polluted the property before sale.").
393. See Albert G. Besser, Caveat Emptor - Where Have You Gone?, 4 HOFSTRA PROP. L.J.
203, 226-27 (1992) (noting the unfairness of allowing a buyer of contaminated property to sue a
seller notwithstanding "as is" clause but barring a seller from shifting risk to a buyer or enforcing an
indemnity clause if contamination is unknown at time of purchase).
394. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 12, at 366 (by encouraging seller disclosure and buyer investi-
gative diligence, "[t]he rule of caveat emptor, therefore, encourages parties to reach a true meeting of
the minds in real estate transactions."); Besser, supra note 393, at 210-11 (purchaser of contaminated
property not a "mere bystander" injured by circumstances outside his control; rather, "[t]he pur-
chaser can and, in this environmentally conscious era, should inspect the property or subject it to
environmental investigations.").
395. See, e.g., Besser, supra note 393, at 215-16 (changing common law allocation of risk
between successive owners is better left to legislatures); Klein, supra note 12, at 365 ("using nui-
sance law to shift cleanup costs to intermediate landowners will cause such entities to expend re-
sources in unproductive litigation-related activities.").
396. The caveat emptor risk allocation line is not always as bright as its proponents might
suggest. For example, in some states risks associated with undisclosed site conditions do not shift
until the buyer has had a "reasonable opportunity" to discover undisclosed conditions. See, e.g.,
New York Tel. Co. v. Mobil Oil Corp., 473 N.Y.S.2d 172, 174 (N.Y. App. Div. 1984) (under New
York law, the owner of land ceases to be liable in tort after the conveyance at such time as the new
owner has had a reasonable opportunity to discover the condition by making prompt inspection and
necessary repairs).
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nated property to avoid common law remediation liability as a matter of
law. The doctrine's underlying economic theory-that the market should
allocate risks associated with real property conditions-assumes that the
buyer (and, for that matter, the seller) has the technical and financial ca-
pacity to discover site contamination and understand its regulatory, eco-
nomic and health significance during the narrow window of opportunity
available for inspection of commercial or residential real estate. This
assumption is unrealistic. Until relatively recently, few buyers fully un-
derstood the consequences of soil or groundwater contamination. A
properly conducted invasive (e.g., Phase II) site inspection can be expen-
sive and, without information about past waste disposal practices to
guide investigators, potentially fruitless. Moreover, discovery of con-
tamination does not necessarily mean that all potential environmental
problems at the site have been identified much less understood. A site
assumed to present one set of risks based on data collected years ago
may prove to present additional concerns in light of newly developed
contaminant detection techniques.397 It is not realistic to assume that the
market can efficiently or fairly allocate responsibility for such unknown
and unknowable risks.
Second, applying the doctrine is likely to have little or no material
impact on expanding the scope of seller disclosures. In many jurisdic-
tions, the scope and content of real estate disclosure obligations, particu-
larly those involving the use or disposal of hazardous substance on the
property, are now often mandated by statute or regulation.398 In addition,
under the proposed paradigm a seller would not be tempted by a prospec-
tive caveat emptor liability defense to minimize disclosures about past
property use and avoid scaring away potential buyers. Similarly, caveat
emptor is likely to have little effect on whether a buyer diligently inves-
tigates the property in question. To the contrary, the scope of a potential
buyer's site investigation likely would be determined by the buyer's in-
terest in identifying any potential risk of assuming the environmental
liabilities and regulatory requirements that arise from owning contami-
nated property.
397. See, e.g., RANDALL L. ERICKSON & ROBERT D. MORRISON, ENVIRONMENTAL REPORTS
AND REMEDIATION PLANS: FORENSIC AND LEGAL REVIEW § 8.3 (1995) (discussing risks of misiden-
tification of compounds as a result of analytical testing method selected and how high detection
limits can mask the presence of a compound in a soil or groundwater sample).
398. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., REAL PROP. § 10-702(e)(2)(vii) (West 2006) (mandatory
disclosure form shall include a list of defects in relation to hazardous or regulated materials); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25359.7 (West 2006) (mandatory disclosure by owners to buyers, lessees
or renters of real property in writing of release of any hazardous substance that has "come to be
located on or beneath that real property"); NEB. REV. STAT. ANN. § 76-2, 120(4)(g) (West 2006)
(mandatory disclosure of "[a]ny hazardous conditions, including substances, materials, and products
on the real property which may be an environmental hazard"); see also N.J. STAT. ANN. 13:1 K-9
(West 2006) (absent alternative contractual arrangements between buyer and seller of industrial
property, seller must provide buyer with a no further action letter from state environmental regula-
tory agency or an approved remediation plan to be funded by seller).
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Third, litigation expenses are not "wasteful transaction costs" when
they serve to equitably reallocate the costs of cleaning up contamination
to the party creating it. The potential for same property private nuisance
litigation could further encourage pre-dispute agreements expressly allo-
cating cleanup cost risks. Indeed, the threat or prosecution of litigation
also can encourage post-dispute resolution that efficiently allocates
remediation and cleanup cost responsibilities between vendor and
vendee.
Finally, market forces can still efficiently allocate risk through con-
tract. A seller can (and should) be able to avoid liability to a buyer for
site contamination cleanup costs if the buyer contractually agrees to ac-
cept such responsibility.399 A contractual allocation of responsibility by
the buyer, however, must reflect a clear assumption of a known or know-
able risk, in contrast (particularly in connection with agreements that pre-
date CERCLA) to a generic "as is" clause unaccompanied by disclosures
about site hazardous substance use or waste disposal history.400 Accord-
ingly, without caveat emptor, a seller seeking to avoid site contamination
liability would have the additional incentive to fully disclose the site's
hazardous substance history in order to obtain an enforceable contractual
release of liability from the buyer.40'
Just as many courts have now rejected "coming to the nuisance" as
a defense to adjoining property dispute nuisance liability,40 2 they should
399. See, e.g., Mardan Corp. v. C.G.C. Music, Ltd., 804 F.2d 1454, 1461 (9th Cir. 1986) (buyer
barred from asserting CERCLA claims against seller pursuant to prior agreement resolving and
releasing claims relating to sale of property and business).
400. See, e.g., Ybarra, supra note 243, at 1216-19 (arguing for a "standard of clear awareness
of the specific contamination by the purchaser before rights against the responsible party (seller) are
relinquished" and distinguishing among cases involving release agreements in recent transfers of
property, older transfers of property, "as is" agreements, and purchaser knowledge of site contamina-
tion).
401. Similarly, because a seller's agreement to indemnify a buyer regarding hazardous sub-
stance liabilities can be enforceable, see, e.g., 42 U.S.C.A. §9607(e)(3) (West 2006) ("[n]othing in
this subsection [of CERCLA] shall bar any agreement to insure, hold harmless, or indemnify a party
to such agreement for any liability under this section"), buyers have additional incentive to conduct
thorough pre-acquisition site investigations to determine whether contamination issues may be
present that warrant negotiation of an indemnification agreement.
402. See 1 WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR., ENViRONMENTAL LAW: AIR AND WATER § 2:9 (1986 &
Supp. 2006) ("The priority in time of conflicting uses is pertinent to the question of whether a nui-
sance is proven. The issue arises typically as a defense to a nuisance claim on the theory that plain-
tiff has 'come to the nuisance."'); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 840D, cmt. b (1979) ("The
rule generally accepted by the courts is that in itself and without other factors, the "coming to the
nuisance" will not bar the plaintiffs recovery. Otherwise the defendant by setting up an activity or a
condition that results in the nuisance could condemn all the land in his vicinity to a servitude without
paying any compensation, and so could arrogate to himself a good deal of the value of the adjoining
land. The defendant is required to contemplate and expect the possibility that the adjoining land
may be settled, sold or otherwise transferred and that a condition originally harmless may result in
an actionable nuisance when there is later development."); cf, e.g., Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb
Dev. Co., 494 P.2d 700, 706, 708 (Ariz. 1972) (granting private nuisance injunction requested by
developer who purchased property located near cattle feeding operation on condition that developer
indemnify cattle feeder for the reasonable cost of moving or shutting down); Jerry Harmon Motors,
Inc. v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 337 N.W.2d 427, 432 (N.D. 1983) (plaintiff that comes
to an alleged nuisance has heavy burden to establish liability); Green, supra note 166, at 583-84
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also turn away from caveat emptor as a liability defense to private nui-
sance claims.4 °3 Nevertheless, the circumstances surrounding a plain-
tiff/current landowner's acquisition of contaminated property should
remain relevant to the nature and scope of any nuisance remedy. A wide
range of transactional factors could impact the shaping of private nui-
sance relief, including: (a) a current landowner's knowledge about past
on-site waste disposal practices before acquiring the property; (b) con-
tractual language relating to but not directly addressing remediation cost
risk allocation; (c) purchase price reduction or other consideration ad-
justment related to site contamination; and (d) post-transactional behav-
ior by the current owner (e.g., contributing to site contamination, failing
to promptly and effectively address discovered contamination).
These factors should not bar liability for a defendant who created
contamination conditions constituting a nuisance. They should, how-
ever, be taken into account at the remedy stage of private nuisance litiga-
tion. For example, a court may consider such factors in deciding whether
to grant an injunction,4° fashioning the terms under which injunctive
relief should be granted,4 °5 calculating damages to avoid any "double
recovery" by a current owner who received a purchase price discount
because of known or suspected contamination problems,4 °6 or evaluating
the extent to which cleanup cost or other contamination damages should
be borne by plaintiff rather than defendant under a "comparative respon-
(arguing that coming to the nuisance should be an affirmative defense if pollution costs have become
capitalized into surrounding land values).
403. See T & E Indus., Inc. v. Safety Light Corp., 587 A.2d 1249, 1258 (N.J. 1991) (rejecting
application of caveat emptor to same property ultra-hazardous activity contamination claim, observ-
ing that "the rule of caveat emptor has not retained its original vitality. With time, and in differing
contexts, we have on many occasions questioned the justification for the rule."). Courts have turned
away from caveat emptor as a matter of public policy in a variety of contexts, such as claims by the
buyer of a new home against the developer-seller. See, e.g., Hanlin Group, Inc. v. Int'l Minerals &
Chem. Corp., 759 F. Supp. 925, 932-33 (D. Me. 1990) (applying Maine law and holding that caveat
emptor did not bar private nuisance claim and noting that Maine courts previously had declined to
apply the defense in cases involving the sale of new homes); 17 SAMUEL WILLISTON & RICHARD A.
LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 50:26, at 352-53 (4th ed. 2000) ("Over the years, however, the
number of cases which have strictly applied the rule of caveat emptor appears to be diminishing, and
there is a distinct tendency to depart from the rule, either by way of interpretation, or exception, or
by simply refusing to adhere to the rule where it would work injustice."). Sound public policy
similarly requires that courts reject caveat emptor as a liability defense in same property private
nuisance cases involving soil or groundwater contamination.
404. Cf Kellogg v. Village of Viola, 227 N.W.2d 55, 58 (Wis. 1975) ("While coming to the
nuisance may properly be considered while weighing the equities in an abatement action, it is irrele-
vant in a damage suit.").
405. See, e.g., Spur Indus., Inc. v. Del E. Webb Dev., Co., 494 P.2d 700, 706, 708 (Ariz. 1972)
(granting private nuisance injunction requested by developer who purchased property located near
cattle feeding operation on condition that developer indemnify cattle feeder for the reasonable cost
of moving or shutting down).
406. See, e.g., W. Props. Serv. Corp. v. Shell Oil Co., 358 F.3d 678, 691 (9th Cir. 2004) (buyer
aware of environmental hazards as evidenced by reduced purchase price precluded from recovering
entire cost of cleanup).
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sibility" approach to environmental nuisance damages.4°7 Economics
and market forces thus should continue play a role in private nuisance
disputes. That role, however, should be at the remedy rather than the
liability phase of the case.
D. A Different Approach to Continuing Environmental Nuisance
Whether a nuisance is characterized as continuing or permanent im-
plicates several critical issues in private environmental nuisance cases:
(a) identifying when a cause of action accrues and the applicable statute
of limitations begins to run; (b) determining the appropriate nature and
scope of available legal and equitable relief; and (c) resolving whether a
plaintiff may bring successive actions to address future harm and con-
duct.40 8 The current status of private nuisance law is a hopeless jumble
largely because of the widespread inconsistency among (and sometimes
within) states regarding the definition of a continuing nuisance and its
application to soil and groundwater contamination cases. This inconsis-
tency must be eliminated so that private nuisance law can become a
meaningful alternative to a federal rule of decision in private cleanup
cost disputes across the country.
To begin with, under the proposed paradigm every state should rec-
ognize a tort of continuing environmental nuisance. The concept of con-
tinuing tort may seem inconsistent with the policies of finality, predict-
ability and encouraging prompt prosecution of claims that underlie stat-
utes of repose. Closer examination, however, reveals that a continuing
nuisance is not an open-ended exception to the statute of limitations; it
should be viewed as a tort of wrongful inaction-a defendant's failure to
abate a condition that continues to harm plaintiff and the environment.
Viewed this way, defendant's ongoing refusal to abate continues to ac-
crue a new cause of action based on defendant's ongoing inaction.
Moreover, soil and groundwater contamination presents statute of limita-
tions challenges significantly different in degree (if not in kind) from
those presented by other torts. For example, a property owner may have
noticed discolored soil decades ago but not understood its health, envi-
ronmental or regulatory significance. Similarly, recent changes in tech-
nology (e.g., development of laboratory equipment capable of identifying
increasingly smaller concentrations of contaminants) 409 may provide a
far more complete understanding of the harm and regulatory obligations
triggered by contamination caused by the defendant. Without a continu-
407. For a thorough discussion of "comparative nuisance" and the equitable allocation of
cleanup costs based on the comparative responsibility of the parties under a nuisance cause of action,
see generally Jeff L. Lewin, Comparative Nuisance, 50 U. PiTT. L. REv. 1009 (1989).
408. See, e.g., Schneider Nat'l Carriers, Inc. v. Bates, 147 S.W.3d 264, 275-76 (Tex. 2004)
(discussing issues implicated by nuisance characterization).
409. ERICKSON & MORRISON, supra note 397, at 161 (discussing risks of misidentification or
non-identification of compounds because of analytical testing methods and laboratory equipment
detection limitations).
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ing tort doctrine, a current owner who only recently learned the signifi-
cance of older contamination may find a state law cleanup cost claim
(and with it the incentive voluntarily to remediate contamination caused
by others) time-barred by applicable statutes of limitations, even under a
discovery rule.41°
1. Defining Continuing Nuisance-Reasonable Abatability
The definition of "continuing nuisance" in contaminated property
cases should reflect the circumstances of the underlying environmental
problem. The definition of a "continuing nuisance" should arise from the
defendant's failure to remediate the soil and groundwater contamination
she caused or to which she contributed. Viewed this way, the defendant
is responsible for the continued contamination even after the cessation of
her conduct that contaminated the environment (e.g., disposal activity,
installation and maintenance of a leaking underground storage tank). It
is the unabated contamination, not the acts creating it, that constitutes the
continuing interference with the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of prop-
erty. 41' The defendant thus should have an ongoing duty to abate the
contamination; the repeated failure to perform this duty constitutes a
separate cause of action that continues to accrue until the defendant per-
forms its duty or the contamination is otherwise abated.
An ongoing duty to abate through remediation assumes that reme-
diation is practicable. Under the proposed paradigm, the definition of a
continuing nuisance requires that the contamination reasonably be capa-
ble of remediation. "Reasonable abatability" contemplates that (a) the
contamination could be abated to an appropriate level; (b) abatement to
such a level is technically possible; and (c) the abatement could be ac-
complished at a reasonable cost.
41 2
a. Abatement to an Appropriate Level
An appropriate abatement level could be determined in one of two
ways. First, site-specific regulatory agency cleanup levels could set a
presumptive level of abatement. 413 The California Court of Appeal ac-
cepted such a role for agency approved cleanup levels in Capogeannis v.
410. See supra notes 248-49 and accompanying text.
411. See Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. (Mangini 1), 281 Cal. Rptr. 827, 838 (Cal. Ct. App.
1991) (continuing unabated harm is basis for continuing nuisance claim under California law);
Capogearmis v. Super. Ct., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 804 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) ("[T]he continuing nature
of nuisance refers to the continuing but abatable damage caused by the offensive condition, not the
acts causing the offensive condition to occur." (citation omitted)).
412. In Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. (Mangini II1), 912 P.2d 1220, 1229 (Cal. 1996), the
Supreme Court of California embraced a "reasonableness" limitation on an abatability standard for
continuing nuisance, concluding that a nuisance was continuing for limitations purposes if it "can be
remedied at a reasonable cost by reasonable means." See supra notes 267-73 and accompanying
text.
413. See supra note 271 and accompanying text.
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Superior Court.4 14 The court rejected the defendants' "essentially se-
mantic argument that because it does not appear that the contamination
[leakage from a removed underground storage tank] can ever be wholly
removed the nuisance must be deemed permanent. 4 5 Instead, the court
was "satisfied to presume that cleanup standards set by responsible pub-
lic agencies sufficiently reflect expert appraisal of the best that can be
done to abate contamination in particular cases. As judges we will not
presume to insist on absolutes these agencies do not require."' 6  Simi-
larly, the court noted that because "as a practical matter the only impact
of the contamination on the Capogeannises is by way of the regulatory
agencies demands, 417 once those "demands have been met, so far as the
Capogeannises are concerned the nuisance will be abated.
4 8
Second, expert testimony could be used to address site cleanup stan-
dards. The characterization of a nuisance as permanent or continuing
may come before the court at trial or by summary judgment motion be-
fore a regulatory agency has set cleanup standards for the site.4, 9 If so,
the court will require expert evidence regarding site conditions to evalu-
ate the abatability of site contamination. Similarly, a party may turn to
expert testimony to rebut any presumption that agency cleanup standards
demonstrate that site contamination is abatable.42°
b. Reasonable Means of Abatement
The concept of "reasonable abatability" should include a two-fold
technical component. First, means must exist to accomplish the contem-
plated remediation. Merely because an agency (or an expert witness) has
proposed a cleanup standard does not mean that the standard can be met
with current technology. For example, a proposed standard may con-
template reduction of groundwater contamination pollution levels to a
specified level of X parts per billion (ppb) for a particular compound. It
may be impossible, however, to meet the X ppb standard: the sub-
surface source of groundwater contamination may not have been lo-
414. 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).




419. There may be many reasons why a contamination dispute could reach such advanced
stages of litigation without establishment of agency cleanup levels. For example, it may take years
to fully characterize large or technically complicated sites, and substantial time after completion of
site characterization activities to determine site cleanup levels. Moreover, limited resources can
substantially delay an environmental regulatory agency's determination of cleanup standards for
sites of any size or complexity.
420. In Mangini III, the California Supreme Court held that the contamination of plaintiff's
property constituted a permanent nuisance in part because there was no evidence of agency cleanup
standards or expert testimony proposing appropriate cleanup levels for the site. Mangini 111, 912
P.2d at 1221.
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cated; 421 the technology may not yet exist to clean up the contaminated
groundwater to the desired level; or laboratory equipment or available
analytical methods may not be capable of determining whether the
cleanup standards has been met.422
Second, even if the means exist to remediate the site contamination,
other environmental regulatory factors may argue against remediation.
For example, in Beck Development Co. v. Southern Pacific Transporta-
tion Co.,423 the court concluded that excavating oil-contaminated soil,
while technically possible, might not be reasonable in light of a regula-
tory agency's concern that the contamination presented no risk if left in
place but would raise other environmental concerns if it was excavated
and transported away from plaintiffs property for off-site disposal.424
c. Reasonable Cost of Abatement
For contamination to be deemed "abatable," the remediation must
be possible at a reasonable cost. The essence of private nuisance is inter-
ference with the plaintiffs use and enjoyment of property. 425 Whether
the cost of abatement is reasonable, therefore, should be viewed from the
plaintiffs perspective. In other words, abatement costs should be bal-
anced not against the value of the property as contaminated or, for that
matter, the value of the property after cleanup. Instead, it should be bal-
anced against the value of the remediated property to the plaintiff after
the cleanup, including the present value of profits that could be generated
from the remediated property. As a result, if a parcel of contaminated
property has no net value as contaminated, a fair market value of
$5,000,000 as remediated, and the capacity to generate an additional
$5,000,000 in profit if remediated (e.g., the present value of profits gen-
erated from developing the site for single family residences), the baseline
for measuring the reasonableness of remediation should be $10,000,000,
the overall value of the highest and best use of the property as uncon-
421. For example, at some sites the presence of dense non-aqueous phase liquids (DNAPLs)--
in effect, a volumetrically small but high-concentration collection of the contaminant in a sub-
surface water-bearing soil zone-can serve as a continuing source of groundwater contamination.
See ERICKSON & MORRISON, supra note 397, §7.4 (describing how, as groundwater flows past the
DNAPL, a portion of the DNAPL "will dissolve into the groundwater" at a rate dependent on
groundwater velocity and DNAPL solubility). Unless the DNAPL can be located and its effect
eliminated or significantly reduced, near-source concentrations of groundwater contamination may
not be capable of remediation to proposed cleanup levels.
422. See supra note 396 and accompanying text.
423. 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d 518 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996).
424. Beck Dev. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 559-60; see also 40 C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(ii)(E) (2006)
(NCP requires that selection of remedial action include consideration of "the preference for treat-
ment as a principal element and the bias against off-site land disposal of untreated waste.");
JENNIFER L. MACHLIN & TOMME R. YOUNG, MANAGING ENVIRONMENTAL RISK: REAL ESTATE AND
BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § 4-103 (2004) (noting NCP preference in connection with preparation of
RI/FS for on-site treatment and cost-effectiveness).
425. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 821D (1979) (defining private nuisance as "a non-
trespassory invasion of another's interest in the private use and enjoyment of land").
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taminated. Viewed this way, a $7,000,000 cleanup would represent
abatement at a reasonable cost and thus a continuing nuisance.426
Why should cost matter at all? Why should a defendant be "re-
warded" with a statute of limitations defense when she causes technically
abatable harm that is so extensive that the cost of abating it exceeds the
value of cleanup to plaintiff? Cost should matter because at some point
the harm is so great that the law should no longer permit a private plain-
tiff to demand that the defendant abate the nuisance in a direct action
premised on interference with the use and enjoyment of property. As
comment f to section 839 of the Restatement (Second) of Torts provides,
"[t]he law does not require the unreasonable or the fantastic, and there-
fore even though it might conceivably be possible to abate a particular
condition, it is not 'abatable' within the meaning of this Section unless
its abatement can be accomplished without unreasonable hardship or
,,427expense. Moreover, factoring costs to determine whether a nuisance
is continuing or permanent reflects a policy choice that preserves a role
for statutes of limitations. Without cost as a factor, almost any techni-
cally abatable contamination would support a claim for continuing nui-
sance, all but eliminating the statute of limitations as a defense in envi-
ronmental nuisance cases. An analysis into the means and cost of
abatement would involve a case-by-case analysis regarding site condi-
tions requiring the expenditure of additional party and judicial resources.
These resources likely would be expended anyway, however, in fashion-
ing a nuisance remedy,428 examining the reasonableness of abatement
426. The highest and best use of the property, viewed objectively, would take into account both
plaintiff's planned use and any other, more profitable use that could be employed by plaintiff or a
future purchaser (who presumably would pay plaintiff for the potential development opportunity). A
court may also consider the reason why plaintiff seeks to recover from defendant abatement costs
exceeding the value of the property to plaintiff. On the one hand, plaintiff may be required by a
regulatory agency to conduct such a cleanup. On the other hand, the plaintiff may choose to remedi-
ate for purely business reasons. See, e.g., Beck Dev. Co., 52 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 559 (evaluating plain-
tiff's private nuisance claim for remediation of a development site in light of regional water board
conclusion that contaminated soil could have remained in place). In the former situation, a court
may take into account whether the plaintiff has any choice in remediating defendant's pollution as
part of a "reasonableness" analysis; in the latter situation, the economics of remediation may assume
determinative significance regarding whether the nuisance is permanent or continuing.
427. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, § 839 (1979) (addressing liability of possessor of
land who fails to abate an artificial condition constituting a nuisance). In addition to evidence of
technical abatability, courts may also consider the selection of site-specific cleanup levels as relevant
to whether abatement can be achieved at a reasonable cost, at least in those instances where the
agency is required to take cost-effectiveness into account in setting cleanup levels. See, e.g., 40
C.F.R. § 300.430(f)(ii)(D) (requiring lead agency under NCP to take cost-effectiveness into account
in selecting remedial action); see also supra note 271 and accompanying text.
428. It is possible that a plaintiff at an older contamination site will be required by a regulatory
agency to cleanup contamination of her property to which she made little or no contribution at a cost
that exceeds the value of the remediated property to plaintiff. A court may take into account any
regulatory directives imposed on plaintiff in deciding whether the cost is reasonable and thus
whether the nuisance is continuing. Moreover, in contrast to a direct private nuisance claim based
on plaintiff's interest in freedom from a substantial interference with the use and enjoyment of her
property, derivative claims (e.g., if state law permits actions for contribution or equitable indemnity
upon issuance of a cleanup order or in the event of enforcement action) may be available against the
defendant with regard to cleanup costs arising from such a duty imposed on the current owner.
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costs sought as damages by the plaintiff,429 allocating cleanup costs
based on a comparative responsibility analysis, and the crafting of
abatement injunctive relief.
d. Comparison with Other Continuing Nuisance Standards
The "reasonable abatability" standard rests on a defendant's inac-
tion in the face of a reasonably abatable harm that continues to interfere
with a plaintiffs use and enjoyment of property. It also would preserve
cleanup cost claims at many older contamination sites at which the stat-
ute of limitations would bar claims for permanent nuisance. The reason-
able abatability standard is superior to other continuing nuisance stan-
dards currently used by courts around the country, which fail to ade-
quately serve the policy considerations that support preservation of
cleanup cost claims at older contamination sites.
The continuing harmful conduct standard430 does nothing to address
the problem of a defendant's inaction in the face of the reasonably abat-
able harmful condition that remains on a plaintiffs property. Moreover,
although the discontinuance of a defendant's conduct creates something
of a bright line to determine when the permanent nuisance statute of limi-
tations begins to run, it provides no relief at older contamination sites
where a defendant's polluting conduct may have ceased years ago but the
offensive condition it created remains unabated.
The predictability of future harm standard employed by the Texas
courts43 1 looks away from both a defendant's conduct and the abatability
of pollution, focusing instead on the predictability of future damages. In
effect, the predictability of harm standard constitutes a presumption that
a nuisance is permanent by limiting "temporary" nuisance actions to
those where future damages cannot reasonably be determined and thus a
single action would be unable to fully compensate the plaintiff. It creates
no incentives for abatement; indeed, the Texas standard creates a per-
verse incentive for a plaintiff to argue that the nature of a contamination
problem cannot yet be characterized and for a defendant to argue that
because the problem can be abated by reasonable means and at a cost
capable of a current reliable estimate the contamination must constitute a
permanent nuisance and plaintiffs claim should be time-barred.
Other types of property damages, e.g., lost rental or other use of the property, would presumably not
be available under a derivative theory of liability.
429. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 929(1) (1979) (stating that "[i]f one is
entitled to a judgment for harm to land resulting from a past invasion and not amounting to a total
destruction of value, the damages include compensation for (a) the difference between the value of
the land before the harm and the value after the harm, or at his election in an appropriate case, the
cost of restoration that has been or may be reasonably incurred, (b) the loss of use of the land, and
(c) discomfort and annoyance to him as an occupant.")
430. See supra notes 286-300 and accompanying text.
431. See supra notes 301-14 and accompanying text.
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The courts that use a "changing over time" standard effectively
equate a "continuing nuisance" with a "different-looking nuisance. 432
In other words, if the harmful condition changes over time, it is a differ-
ent nuisance and therefore a new cause of action should accrue. This
approach ignores both the defendant's failure to abate harm and ongoing
active causation of harm as the basis for a continuing nuisance analysis.
It also draws arbitrary remedial lines, permitting a continuing nuisance
claim for groundwater contamination (which changes form over time as
groundwater continues to migrate) while relegating to permanent nui-
sance status discrete, easily removed soil contamination (which generally
remains immobile and does not change form or environmental impact
over time).
The continued presence standard 433 comes closest to serving the
goals achieved by the proposed reasonable abatability standard. On its
face, however, the continued presence standard does not address either
the technical means of abatement or its cost, transforming all soil and
groundwater contamination that does not serve a socially beneficial pur-
pose by remaining in place into a continuing nuisance. Such a broad
standard would support a nuisance-based cleanup cost claim in almost all
contaminated property cases but would virtually eliminate the statute of
limitations as a defense at these sites and in theory permit perpetual suc-
cessive continuing nuisance actions concerning contamination that can-
not practicably be abated.434 If soil or groundwater contamination is not
practicably abatable, it properly should be viewed as a permanent prob-
lem for which the rules of permanent nuisance should apply.
Finally, the multi-factored balancing approach 435 has the benefit of
flexibility. It also has the significant disadvantages of unpredictability
and unreliability regarding whether a given contamination problem con-
stitutes a continuing nuisance. Moreover, it shifts the focus of continu-
ing nuisance law from abating contamination to a case-by-case bundling
of issues to be weighed in a potentially inconsistent manner from court to
court.
In sum, states should re-examine the law of continuing nuisance as
applied to soil and groundwater contamination problems by viewing the
definition of continuing nuisance through the lens of the public policy
that this tort should serve. The proposed paradigm promotes prompt,
efficient cleanups by preserving cleanup cost claims based on a defen-
432. See supra notes 315-24 and accompanying text.
433. See supra notes 274-85 and accompanying text.
434. Even if a state court found the continued presence test more attractive than a reasonable
abatability approach, a court might decline to embrace a standard that would all but eliminate the
statute of limitations (even with a "social utility" exception) as a liability defense and instead defer
such a policy choice to the state legislature.
435. See supra notes 325-28 and accompanying text.
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dant's continued failure to reasonably abate the soil or groundwater con-
tamination she caused or to which she contributed.
2. Rebuttable Presumption of Continuing Nuisance
The proposed paradigm is designed to encourage (a) abatement of
soil and groundwater contamination, (b) voluntarily cleanup by current
property owners of contamination caused in whole or in part by others,
and (c) informal resolution of private cleanup cost allocation disputes
among PRPs. The default characterization of a nuisance in the event of
evidentiary equipoise can play a substantial role in serving these goals.
Accordingly, the proposed paradigm would create a rebuttable presump-
tion436 that soil or groundwater contamination constitutes a continuing
rather than permanent nuisance.437
An environmental nuisance framework that presumes soil and
groundwater contamination constitute a continuing nuisance would pro-
vide a number of benefits. First, abatement-related private nuisance
claims (e.g., claims for cleanup cost damages or injunctive relief order-
ing defendant to abate a nuisance) presumptively would not be time-
barred.
Second, equitable relief directed to abating the nuisance presump-
tively would be available. Under a reasonable abatability standard for
436. Some courts have articulated a preference for finding a continuing nuisance to protect
plaintiffs from the statute of limitations, unforeseen future injuries, and to encourage the abatement
of nuisances. See Capogeannis v. Super. Ct., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 804-05 (1993) (holding that
issues of material fact whether contaminants from former owner and tenant underground storage
tank constituted a continuing or permanent nuisance barred summary judgment for defendants on
statute of limitations). This preference, however, often manifests itself by allowing plaintiffs in
close or doubtful cases to elect which nuisance theory to pursue. Id. at 801. This election, of course,
is illusory in connection with older contamination problems where a permanent nuisance claim
would be time-barred.
437. Not all soil or groundwater contamination, of course, constitutes a nuisance. De minimus
concentrations of contaminants on a plaintiff's property, for example, might not constitute a nui-
sance. A plaintiff thus would still be required to prove that the contamination substantially inter-
fered with the use and enjoyment of her property and that the defendant's negligent, intentional and
unreasonable or ultra-hazardous activity conduct proximately caused the contamination. See supra
note 174 and accompanying text; see also Jezowski v. City of Reno, 286 P.2d 257, 260-61 (Nev.
1955) (private nuisance claim requires proof of "material annoyance, inconvenience, discomfort or
hurt"); Robie v. Lillis, 299 A.2d 155, 158 (N.H. 1972) (interference with use and enjoyment of
property must be substantial); Energy Corp. v. O'Quinn, 286 S.E.2d 181, 182 (Va. 1982) (condition
"substantially impairing the occupant's comfort, convenience, and enjoyment of the property" may
constitute private nuisance); Brown & Hansen, supra note 224, at 664-65 (noting that "many Cali-
fornia courts have utilized the common law balancing approach to determine whether a condition or
activity constitutes a nuisance under the provisions of [California Civil Code] section 3479. Under
this approach, the plaintiff must establish that the harm of a nuisance outweighs the benefits of the
defendant's conduct. In addition, the plaintiff must demonstrate that the injury is substantial and not
nominal. Whether a particular use of land constitutes a nuisance must be determined on a case-by-
case basis in light of all the circumstances. The relevant balancing factors include the priority of the
use, the locality and surroundings of the property, the nature and extent of the nuisance and the
injury caused thereby, whether the nuisance is continual or occasional, and the number of people
affected."). Assuming, however, that the presence of contaminants does constitute a nuisance, under
the proposed paradigm it would presumptively constitute a continuing rather than permanent nui-
sance.
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continuing nuisance, soil and groundwater contamination presumptively
would be capable of abatement by reasonable means and at reasonable
cost.438 A plaintiff also would be entitled to recover damages consistent
with the continuing (i.e., non-permanent) nature of the nuisance sus-
tained during the limitations period (e.g., abatement costs, damages aris-
ing from the lost use of the property). 439  A defendant would typically
438. Sites that already are the subject of a regulatory agency cleanup order may present pri-
mary jurisdiction concerns. Under the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, a court has the discretion to
refer certain matters to a specialized administrative agency. It is "a prudential doctrine under which
courts may, under appropriate circumstances, determine that the initial decision-making responsibil-
ity should be performed by the relevant agency rather than the courts." Syntek Semiconductor Co.
v. Microchip Tech., Inc., 307 F.3d 775, 780 (9th Cir. 2002). Courts may consider a variety of fac-
tors in deciding whether to exercise the doctrine, including whether (a) the court is being called on to
decide factual issues which are not within the conventional experience of judges or are instead issues
of a sort that a court routinely considers; (b) the defendant could be subjected to conflicting orders of
both the court and the agency; (c) relevant agency proceedings have been initiated; (d) the agency
has proceeded diligently or allowed the proceedings to languish; and (e) the plaintiff is seeking
injunctive relief requiring technical or scientific expertise for the courts to craft. Schwartzman, Inc.
v. Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 857 F. Supp. 838, 841-43 (D.N.M. 1994) (applying pri-
mary jurisdiction doctrine to stay landowner's claim for injunctive relief where EPA had already
begun process of initiating remedial investigation and feasibility study). Some courts have deferred
consideration of injunctive relief under the primary jurisdiction doctrine where an environmental
regulatory agency actively was involved in site characterization or remediation, see id.; Liss v.
Milford Partners, 39 Conn. L. Rptr. 216 (Conn. Super. Ct. 2005) (unpublished) (denying motion to
dismiss claim seeking injunction under Connecticut law that defendants remediate soil and ground-
water contamination but postponing further judicial proceedings pending completion of administra-
tive action by state Department of Environmental Protection); White Lake Improvement Ass'n. v.
City of Whitehall, 177 N.W.2d 473, 485 (Mich. Ct. App. 1970) (affirming dismissal of complaint
seeking injunction to abate nuisance caused by discharge of waste into lake on ground that plaintiff
should pursue administrative remedies through state water agency before court should further enter-
tain action to abate nuisance), while others have rejected the primary jurisdiction argument and
permitted claims to abate a nuisance, see, e.g., Attorney Gen. of Mich. v. Thomas Solvent Co., 380
N.W.2d 53, 67-68 (Mich. Ct. App. 1986) (doctrine of primary jurisdiction did not require court to
defer jurisdiction over contaminated site to EPA in light of limited agency resources, lack of emer-
gency situation, and absence of agency objection); Meinders v. Johnson, 134 P.3d 858, 867 (Okla.
Civ. App. 2005) (affirming injunction that defendants remedy surface and subsurface pollution from
mineral exploration and production on plaintiffs property where Corporation Commission had not
yet exercised jurisdiction over matter).
439. See supra note 252 and accompanying text. Some courts have treated a nuisance as
continuing for statute of limitations purposes only but nevertheless awarded "permanent" nuisance
(i.e., prospective) damages. See, e.g., Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 358 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1012 (D.
Colo. 2004) (presence on plaintiffs' property of plutonium released from nearby nuclear weapons
plant constituted a continuing nuisance and trespass for statute of limitations purposes but could
provide basis for prospective, diminution in value damages effectively purchasing an easement for
invasion to continue); Beatty v. Washington Metro. Area Transit Auth., 860 F.2d 1117, 1125 (D.C.
Cir. 1988) ("[N]uisances may be classified for two distinct purposes, one for the assessment of
damages, and the other for the application of the statute of limitations."); cf Briscoe v. Harper Oil
Co., 702 P.2d 33, 36-37 (Okla. 1985) (affirming temporary nuisance damage award for cost of
repairing well and permanent nuisance damage award for unabatable diminution in farmland prop-
erty value caused by oil and gas lessee). Such an inconsistent approach to continuing nuisance
would all but eliminate the statute of limitations as a defense in environmental nuisance cases and
fail to serve any unifying policy except maximizing plaintiffs financial recovery. Under the pro-
posed paradigm, a presumption against prospective damages would keep the policy focus of continu-
ing nuisance actions on remediation and cooperation. Whether stigma damages are more consistent
with a permanent or continuing nuisance theory presents a challenging conceptual problem. (A
detailed discussion of stigma damages is beyond the scope of this article.). On the one hand, dimi-
nution of property value caused by stigma of prior contamination that has been abated arguably is
consistent with a continuing nuisance theory and thus could be recoverable. On the other hand,
diminution in property value caused by contamination stigma could be viewed as prospective harm
BACK FROM THE MARGINS
bear sole responsibility for these damages at sites where the defendant
was the sole cause of the contamination. At sites where the plaintiff had
partial responsibility for the contamination, 440 damages (including the
cost of complying with any injunction issued by the court) could be allo-
cated proportionately. 44 1 By contrast, contamination that cannot rea-
sonably be abated should not be enjoined 442 and would constitute a per-
manent nuisance.
443
Third, plaintiffs presumptively would have a right to bring succes-
sive actions until the nuisance was abated. In each action, a plaintiff
would be able to seek injunctive relief and damages sustained during the
preceding limitations period. The right to bring successive actions pro-
tects a plaintiff against unforeseen future remediation costs and tempo-
rary harm occasioned by a defendant's continued failure to remediate the
contamination (e.g., lost property use damages, abatement costs). It also
provides powerful incentives for the parties to cooperate in promptly
remediating the property. A plaintiff would want to get the site cleaned
and thus reserved only for permanent nuisance actions. For example, in Santa Fe Partnership v.
Arco Products Co., 54 Cal. Rptr. 2d 214, 224 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996), a California Court of Appeal felt
constrained by California Supreme Court precedent holding that prospective damages are unavail-
able for a continuing nuisance action to hold that stigma damages were unavailable in a continuing
nuisance case.
440. Even if a plaintiff did not contribute to site contamination, a court may consider as part of
a comparative responsibility analysis whether the plaintiff acted diligently to mitigate harm upon
discovery of the contamination or its significance, or instead allowed site conditions to worsen and
abatement costs to increase through inattention or indifference.
441. See generally Lewin, supra note 407, at 1053-69 (advocating nuisance remedial scheme
contemplating proportional allocation of nuisance damages and cost of performing abatement in-
junction based on the comparative responsibility of plaintiff and defendant for creating or maintain-
ing the nuisance). Courts also could freely experiment with alternative remedial schemes consistent
with the fundamental nature of the continuing nuisance analytical framework. See, e.g., RICHARD A.
POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 65 & n.8 (4th ed. Aspen 1992) (citing William F. Baxter &
Lillian R. Altree, Legal Aspects ofAirport Noise, 15 J. L. & ECON. 1 (1972), as basis for proposal, in
context of noise pollution, of "time-limited easements," limiting successive continuing tort actions to
periodic suits (e.g., every 10 years) in order to limit administrative costs and provide extended plat-
form for bargaining in exchange for payment by defendant of prospective damages covering the
temporary pollution easement period). For an extensive discussion regarding the evolution of nui-
sance remedies, see generally Lewin, supra note 166.
442. See, e.g., Spaulding v. Cameron, 239 P.2d 625, 629 (Cal. 1952) (directing the trial court to
determine whether a landslide onto the plaintiffs property constituted a permanent nuisance; if so,
the court should award diminution in property damages and if not, the court should award injunctive
relief to abate the nuisance).
443. By filing a timely claim for permanent nuisance, a plaintiff could recover all past, present,
and future damages caused by the contamination, in effect representing the price of a permanent
easement for the pollution on plaintiff's property. Cf Cook v. Rockwell Int'l Corp., 358 F. Supp. 2d
1003, 1012 (D. Colo. 2004) (presence on plaintiffs' property of plutonium released from nearby
nuclear weapons plant constituted a continuing nuisance and trespass for statute of limitations pur-
poses, and could provide basis for prospective, diminution in value damages effectively purchasing
an easement for invasion to continue). If the permanent nuisance claim is not timely filed, plaintiff
could not recover damages because of the statute of limitations and "because the nuisance is deemed
permanent, the plaintiff may not abate the nuisance by an injunction; rather she is limited to her
time-barred claim for damages. In effect, defendant has acquired a right to damage, and continue to
damage, plaintiff's land at no cost to defendant!" FISCHER, supra note 251, §84(d). The presump-
tion of continuing nuisance created by the proposed paradigm would reduce the risk of the latter
result.
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up promptly to restore the value of her asset and satisfy regulatory obli-
gations. A defendant (who likely would be precluded from re-litigating
her liability in a subsequent action) would want to mitigate delay or lost
use damages arising from the continued presence of contaminants on
plaintiff's property. A defendant thus would be encouraged to actively
participate in site remediation to promote a cost-effective cleanup (which
the defendant is paying for, in whole or in part) and to avoid an argument
in a subsequent action that the defendant should pay punitive damages
for intentionally failing to abate a nuisance for which it has been previ-
ously found liable. 444
In the alternative, a defendant who is found liable for continuing
nuisance and subject to successive suits until the nuisance is abated has
an incentive to negotiate an informal resolution of remediation and
cleanup cost allocation issues. 44' For example, the defendant could enter
into a settlement agreement establishing a contract-based set of duties to
directly conduct or financially participate in the cleanup and avoid future
litigation transaction costs. Similarly, the defendant may attempt to ne-
gotiate a settlement by paying the plaintiff to liquidate the defendant's
continued obligation to remediate the contamination.
The presumption that soil or groundwater contamination constitutes
a continuing nuisance would be rebuttable. Accordingly, whether a nui-
sance ultimately was found to be continuing or permanent would turn on
the intersection of three components of the paradigm: (a) the standard
(reasonable abatability) by which a court would determine whether the
objecting party satisfied its burden; (b) the default presumption that the
nuisance is continuing; and (c) the placement of the burden of proof on
any party objecting to characterization of the nuisance as continuing, i.e.,
any party contending that the nuisance is permanent. It is to this shifted
burden of proof that we now turn.
E. Burden of Proof on the Party Advocating for Permanent Nuisance
The presumption that soil or groundwater contamination constitutes
a continuing nuisance is effected by the allocation of the burden of proof.
If the evidence regarding the reasonable abatability of contamination
conditions is in equipoise, under the proposed presumption the nuisance
would be deemed continuing. This presumption could only be overcome
if a party-whether defendant or plaintiff-who argues that a nuisance is
444. See, e.g., Sumitomo Corp. of Am. v. Deal, 569 S.E.2d 608, 615-16 (Ga. Ct. App. 2002)
(affirming as consistent with due process $250,000 continuing nuisance and trespass punitive dam-
age award against upstream developer who knew of damage caused by water leaving its detention
ponds but did nothing to abate the flow of water).
445. See Capogeannis v. Super. Ct., 15 Cal. Rptr. 2d 796, 804 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993) (finding of
continuing nuisance "will tend to encourage private abatement, and perhaps monetary cooperation in
abatement efforts, if only to limit successive lawsuits").
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permanent can demonstrate that the contamination likely cannot be
abated by reasonable means and at a reasonable cost.
44 6
Courts that have addressed the issue generally place the burden of
proof on a plaintiff to show that a nuisance is continuing." 7 Because the
question commonly arises only when a permanent nuisance claim would
be time-barred, the burden of proof issue traditionally is framed as
whether continuing nuisance characterization is an element of a plain-
tiff's cause of action 448 or part of a defendant's statute of limitations af-
firmative defense. 449 Nuisance characterization, however, affects not
only the statute of limitations but the right to bring successive nuisance
actions and the nature of available relief. The burden of proof, thus,
should turn on the policy considerations and consequences arising from
nuisance characterization.45 °
Characterizing contamination as a continuing nuisance would pro-
mote the paradigm's policy objectives to (a) expand the availability of
current landowner common law rights to recover from other PRPs their
fair share of cleanup costs, (b) encourage prompt characterization and
remediation of contamination, and (c) promote settlement of private
cleanup cost disputes. On the other hand, if a nuisance is deemed per-
manent, landowners would be unable to recover cleanup costs at many
older contamination sites and defendants would have no obligation or
incentive under common law to help remediate contamination that oc-
446. The party advocating for a permanent nuisance would bear both the burden of production
(i.e., the obligation to produce sufficient evidence to avoid summary judgment or entry ofjudgment
as a matter of law) and the burden of persuasion at trial.
447. See, e.g., Mangini v. Aerojet-Gen. Corp. (Mangini 111), 912 P.2d 1220, 1230 (Cal. 1996);
see also supra notes 337-60 and accompanying text.
448. See, e.g., Mangini 111, 912 P.2d at 1226 (noting that the parties did not dispute that the
characterization of nuisance was an element of plaintiff's cause of action); Beck Dev. Co., 52 Cal.
Rptr. 2d at 556 (finding a private nuisance claim time-barred because the plaintiff failed to meet its
burden to prove continuing nuisance).
449. See Brown & Hansen, supra note 224, at 698-99 (arguing that defendants should bear
burden of proving that contamination from an underground storage tank constitutes a permanent
nuisance, rather than plaintiffs bearing the burden that the site constitutes a continuing nuisance,
likening the issue to the defendant's burden of proving an affirmative defense that a claim is barred
by the statute of limitations); see also Smith, supra note 164, at 60-61 (noting that, while plaintiffs
typically bear burden of proving damages within continuing tort limitations period, the statute of
limitations usually is an affirmative defense).
450. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, Denver, Colo., 413 U.S. 189, 209 (1973) (finding of
intentionally segregative school board actions shifted to school authorities the burden of showing
that their actions as to other segregated schools within the system were not also motivated by segre-
gative intent, observing that "[t]here are no hard-and-fast standards governing the allocation of the
burden of proof in every situation. The issue, rather, 'is merely a question of policy and fairness
based on experience in the different situations."' (citation omitted)); David S. Cohen, The Eviden-
tiary Predicate For Affirmative Action After Croson: A Proposal for Shifting the Burdens of Proof 7
YALE L. & POL'Y REv. 489, 499 (1989) ("Courts, however, are not hesitant to reallocate both bur-
dens in order to achieve the purposes of the underlying substantive law and to fulfill notions of good
public policy."); Martin J. LaLonde, Allocating the Burden of Proof to Effectuate The Preservation
and Federalism Goals of the Coastal Zone Management Act, 92 MICH. L. REV. 438, 449 (1993)
("Courts often do not hesitate to allocate the burden to realize the purposes of the substantive law
and to promote public policy goals.").
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curred long ago. Moreover, at sites where a permanent nuisance claim
would not be time-barred, an award of prospective permanent nuisance
damages would effectively purchase a pollution easement for defendant
and undermine the current landowner's incentive to use a damage award
to fully remediate her property, leaving the environment polluted and
potentially useful property unavailable for fully productive use.
451
Placing the burden of proof on the party advocating that contamina-
tion constitutes a permanent nuisance would eliminate a series of per-
verse incentives under current practice. First, defendants arguing that a
nuisance claim should be time-barred because the contamination consti-
tutes a permanent nuisance currently need only point to the absence of
data regarding contamination abatability. 4 2  Under the proposed para-
digm, defendants would need to proffer site characterization data if they
wished to show that a nuisance cannot be abated by reasonable means
and at reasonable cost.4 53 Second, defendants would have an incentive to
become actively involved in the site investigation and remediation proc-
ess, either to control abatement costs for which they may be liable or to
demonstrate that they were prepared to participate in nuisance abatement
but were deterred from doing so by unreasonable plaintiff demands.
454
Third, plaintiffs seeking to pocket a one-time potential "windfall" of
past, present, and future money damages for permanent nuisance rather
than use their recovery to remediate their property would have to prove
that their property is not subject to reasonable abatement. Plaintiffs
would be deterred taking this position by the risks of harming prospects
for future site development (e.g., the risk of creating by their own argu-
451. Where the statute of limitations defense is unavailable, the risk of a substantial damages
award for permanent nuisance could lead a defendant to argue that a nuisance is continuing. The
risk of such an award also could encourage greater care in hazardous substance handling and dis-
posal practice.
452. See supra notes 338-56 and accompanying text.
453. The burden of proof regarding nuisance characterization also has a significant impact on
litigation timing. A plaintiff bearing the burden of proving that a nuisance is continuing cannot
proceed to trial until sufficient site condition data has been generated to meet its burden of produc-
tion. As a result, a plaintiff may be forced to try to delay trial until the information becomes avail-
able. A defendant, on the other hand, currently has the incentive to accelerate trial in the hope that
the plaintiff cannot meet his or her burden of proving that contamination is reasonably abatable.
Under the proposed paradigm and re-allocated burden of proof, until a site has been adequately
characterized the defendant would need to obtain a delayed trial date or else risk a failure of proof
that the contamination cannot be reasonably abated. Similarly, a defendant also would have an
incentive to become involved in the regulatory process and urge agencies to proceed promptly with
approval of site investigation and remediation plans and issuance of cleanup standards. The pro-
posal further would eliminate the risk that a plaintiff would be unable to recover cleanup costs for
contamination created by another because an agency failed to generate the site cleanup standards
necessary for plaintiff to prove that the contamination was reasonably abatable.
454. Defendants thus could argue that delays or unreasonable demands imposed on them by
plaintiffs in abatement activities (e.g., demanding that defendants pay without meaningful input
about how the money would be spent, preventing defendants from communicating with regulatory
agencies) would support equitable liability defenses of waiver, laches, or estoppel, see, e.g., Jamail
v. Stoneledge Condo. Owners Ass'n, 970 S.W.2d 673, 676-77 (Tex. App. 1978) (laches may bar or
qualify relief in private continuing nuisance claim), or reduce defendant's share of abatement cost
responsibility.
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ment a future stigma on property value), compromising potentially avail-
able insurance coverage for site remediation, and undermining arguments
to regulatory agencies about site-specific, cost-effective remediation
strategies.
The proposed re-allocated burden of proof, by increasing the chance
that the contamination will be considered a continuing nuisance and thus
subject to reasonable abatement, also would encourage a cooperative
approach to site characterization and settlement of cleanup cost responsi-
bilities. A defendant may wish to avoid litigation transaction costs asso-
ciated with the threat of a series of continuing nuisance lawsuits, the risk
of an injunction ordering participation in a cleanup, the specter of pro-
spective damages for plaintiffs lost use of the property until the con-
tamination is abated, and the possibility that a plaintiff would demand
punitive damages for defendant's alleged willful failure to abate a con-
tinuing nuisance. Similarly, a plaintiff would have an incentive to nego-
tiate settlement because of the reduced chance of a large prospective
damage award, the risk of regulatory compliance obligations, and the
desire to avoid litigation transaction costs.
Finally, the proposed re-allocation of the burden of proof should be
accompanied by a presumption that the only remedies available to a
plaintiff are those consistent with the abatability of the nuisance.
455
These remedies would include (a) injunctive relief for abatement of con-
tamination and its source (if still actively polluting) and (b) damages
consistent with an abatable nuisance suffered by plaintiff during the limi-
tations period,456 such as abatement costs and damages arising from lost
opportunity costs associated with unabated contamination (e.g., lost
rents, delayed development profits).45 7 Damages that assume permanent
455. This presumption would be consistent with the perspective of most courts that permanent
nuisance claims permit a plaintiff to recover in one action all past, present, and future damages
caused by the nuisance, and that continuing nuisance claims permit injunctive relief directed toward
nuisance abatement as well as past damages suffered within the limitation but not future damages
based on a nuisance that could be discontinued or abated at any time. See generally FISCHER, supra
note 251, §84[b]-[e].
456. See, e.g., Hoery v. United States, 64 P.3d 214, 219 n.7 (Colo. 2004) (damages available
for continuing torts up to time of suit); Anderson v. State, 965 P.2d 783, 792 (Haw. Ct. App. 1998)
("[A] continuous tortious act should not be subject to a limitations period until the act ceases. The
doctrine also recognizes that though the statute of limitations is tolled by a continuing tortious act,
'in such a case[,] a recovery may be had for all damages accruing within the statutory period before
the action, although not for damages accrued before that period.' (quoting Wong Nin v. City &
County of Honolulu, 33 Haw. 379 (1935))); Lyons v. Township of Wayne, 888 A.2d 426, 430 (N.J.
2005) ("One who suffers a continuing nuisance, therefore, is 'able to collect damages for each injury
suffered within the limitations period."' (citation omitted)). To promote efficiency, continuing
nuisance damages incurred to the time of trial (rather than to the time the continuing nuisance action
was commenced) also could be recoverable. See, e.g., Renz v. 33rd Dist. Agric. Ass'n., 46 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 67 (Cal. Ct. App. 1995) (permitting recovery of continuing nuisance damages between
commencement and conclusion of action notwithstanding California Supreme Court dicta that dam-
ages available during limitations period preceding commencement of action).
457. See, e.g., Kathan v. Bellows Falls Village Corp., 223 A.2d 470, 472 (Vt. 1966) (cost of
repair rather than diminution in property value is appropriate measure of damages in this continuing
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property impairment, such as diminution in property value, would be
presumptively unavailable under the proposed paradigm. 458  Such a re-
medial presumption would further promote the policies of site remedia-
tion and voluntary cleanup on which the proposed paradigm is based by
keeping the focus of continuing nuisance litigation on cleanup rather than
on calculating the price of a permanent nuisance pollution easement.
CONCLUSION: NUISANCE LAW AND THE FUTURE OF PRIVATE CLEANUP
COST DISPUTES
The uncertainty regarding the future role of federal law in private
cleanup cost disputes caused by Aviall has created an opportunity for
private nuisance to play a significant role in private cleanup cost dis-
putes. Private nuisance law can fill significant gaps in the CERCLA
private enforcement scheme by providing a private cleanup cost remedy
at petroleum contamination sites459 and encourage voluntary remediation
by owners of contaminated property by allowing them to obtain from
those who caused most or all of the pollution their fair share of cleanup
costs. 460  Moreover, private nuisance law can promote litigation and re-
medial efficiency and flexibility by providing a common body of state
law for resolution of all contamination-related claims 461 and encouraging
technically sound, prompt, and cost-efficient remediation whether or not
in compliance with the often time-consuming and expensive procedural
requirements of the NCP.462
In its current state, however, private nuisance law remains a theory
of unrealized potential inapplicable to many common types of private
cleanup cost disputes. In most states, a landowner cannot bring a private
nuisance claim to address same property contamination problems. The
responsible parties' failure to remediate long-standing contamination
continues to substantially interfere with current owner's use and enjoy-
ment of her property, yet in many jurisdictions nuisance claims to obtain
cleanup costs from or an abatement injunction against the polluter would
trespass case); see also FISCHER, supra note 251, §84(b)(i) (temporary nuisance damages include
diminished rental value and lost use damages).
458. See supra note 439 and accompanying text.
459. CERCLA does not provide a cleanup cost remedy for petroleum contamination because
petroleum is expressly excluded from the definition of "hazardous substances" covered by the stat-
ute. 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(14) (West 2006). See supra note 136 and accompanying text.
460. The current owner of contaminated property is a "covered person" liable under CERCLA
section 107(a)(1). 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a)(1). Under Aviall, the landowner would be unable to bring
a section 113(f) contribution action unless it first had been sued under CERCLA or settled with the
government, while under pre-Aviall case law the current owner as a PRP also would be barred from
asserting a section 107(a)(4)(B) cost recovery claim. See supra notes 72-83 and accompanying text.
461. Private remedies under CERCLA only address recovery of "necessary costs of response"
to a release or threatened release of hazardous substances. 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9607(a)(4)(B), 9613(f).
CERCLA does not authorize private claim injunctive relief, nor does it provide for personal injury
damages, lost profit or other economic damages, lost use or diminution in value property damages.
See supra note 63 and accompanying text. Some or all of these contamination-related damages may
be available to a current owner under a continuing or permanent nuisance theory.
462. See supra notes 140-45, 429 and accompanying text.
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be time-barred. Finally, the doctrinal limitations of current nuisance law
are underscored by the dramatic state-by-state variations in the scope of
nuisance law, reflecting a patchwork quilt of random environmental pro-
tection rather than a coherent body of law responding to the nationwide
problem of remediating contaminated properties.
The environmental nuisance paradigm proposed by this article
would solve these problems by (a) expanding the scope of nuisance li-
ability to include same property private nuisance disputes, (b) eliminat-
ing caveat emptor and other common law market-based risk allocation
tools as defenses to liability, 463 (c) adopting a reasonable abatability of
harm standard for continuing nuisance, (d) creating a rebuttable pre-
sumption that a soil or groundwater contamination nuisance was continu-
ing (i.e., the contamination was reasonably abatable), and (e) placing the
burden of proof on the party contending that a nuisance was permanent
to show that the contamination was not reasonably abatable. This pro-
posed paradigm would allocate cleanup cost obligations on the basis of
comparative responsibility for site conditions, encouraging voluntary
cleanups by current landowners and the informal resolution of cleanup
cost allocation disputes.
This paradigm could be adopted by the states in several ways. First,
state appellate courts could embrace the principles underlying the para-
digm through the case-by-case evolution of common law. The definition
of nuisance under the Restatement (Second) of Torts and most state law
is broad enough to encompass same property cleanup cost disputes, and
many state appellate courts have not yet directly addressed whether soil
or groundwater contamination constitutes a continuing or permanent
nuisance.
Second, state legislatures may find that legislation represents a
faster and more efficient solution. Some state appellate courts may be
unable to implement the paradigm because of stare decisis concerns or
limitations imposed by existing state statutes. Moreover, the evolution of
state private nuisance case law could take years. To avoid these potential
obstacles, state legislatures could enact an environmental nuisance stat-
ute codifying the elements of this paradigm. Whether accomplished by
statute or case law, however, the goal of meaningfully addressing the
nation's soil and groundwater pollution problem will be served by each
state that chooses to embrace the paradigm.
463. An express contractual release constituting a knowing waiver of nuisance-based rights
would remain enforceable under the proposed paradigm. Caveat emptor and other common law
market-based risk allocation tools would remain relevant to fashioning a remedy against a liable
defendant. See supra notes 399-407 and accompanying text.
464. See supra note 364 and accompanying text.
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Other bodies of law, of course, remain applicable to private cleanup
cost disputes.465 To the extent that after Aviall a landowner can still re-
cover cleanup costs from other PRPs under CERCLA, she may choose to
proceed with a cleanup consistent with the NCP in order to take advan-
tage of CERCLA's retroactive, status-based strict liability scheme466 as
well as comparable private claims possibly available under state Super-
fund laws. Buyers of contaminated property may have contract or fraud-
based claims against sellers, newly-discovered contamination may give
rise to a negligence claim, and contamination from a neighboring prop-
erty could provide the basis for a trespass or traditional private nuisance
action. None of these legal theories, however, provide the breadth and
flexibility that would be available under the proposed private nuisance
paradigm.
467
A modernized law of private nuisance would assure the availability
of a cleanup cost remedy to the owner of property contaminated in whole
or in part by others. The sea change in contaminated property law occa-
sioned by Aviall has shined a spotlight on the need to modernize the law
of private nuisance. State courts and legislatures should seize the oppor-
tunity to bring a revitalized law of private nuisance law back from the
margins as a significant rule of decision in private cleanup cost disputes.
465. See supra note 363.
466. CERCLA should not broadly preempt direct actions under nuisance or other state law
theories for cleanup cost damages or abatement injunctive relief (at least in the absence of an EPA or
court order issued under RCRA or CERCLA). For a discussion of CERCLA preemption of state law
direct and derivative claims, see Aronovsky, supra note 5, at 90-104.
467. See supra notes 150-61 and accompanying text.
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